In case the transferee of the land expressly agrees to pay or assume the mortgage or mortgage debt, he becomes personally, liable for the amount of the debt,49 a lia48. In Savings Investment & Trust Co. of East Orange v. United Realty & Mortgage Co., 84 N. J. Eq. 472, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 1134, 94 Atl. 588, such a clause in a second mortgage of a part of the land included in the first mortgage was construed as intending that such part should contribute ratably to the payment of the paramount mortgage.

49. Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, 33 L. Ed. 667; Birke v.

Abbott, 103 Ind. 1, 53 Am. Rep. 474; Furnas v. Durgin, 119 Mass. 500, 20 Am. Rep. 341; Rice v. Sanders, 152 Mass. 108, 8 L. R. A. 315, 23 Am. St. Rep. 804, 24 N. E. 1079; Taylor v. Whitmore, 35 Mich. 97; Green v. Stone, 54 N J. Eq. 387, 55 Am. St. Rep. 577, 34 Atl. 1099; TVotter v. Hughes, 13 N Y. 74, 62 Am. Dec. 137; Campbell v. Smith, 71 N. Y. 26, 27 Am. Rep. 5; Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Gates, 33 Ore. 388, 72 Am. St. Rep.

Bility which can ordinarily be enforced by the mortgage creditor,50 as well as by the transferor, with whom the agreement is made.51 In case a stipulation that the transferee shall pay the debt is incorporated in the conveyance, the transferee is liable thereon, it has been frequently decided, although he does not himself execute the instrument, his acceptance of the conveyance,52 or failure to repudiate it upon learning of the presence of such stipulation,53 being regarded as sufficient to bind him as showing his assent. And it is not even necessary that the transferee's agreement to pay the mortgage debt be incorporated in the instrument of transfer.

724, 54 Pac. 205; Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. St. 436.

50. Post, this section, note 77, et seg.

51. Post, this section, note 7, et seq.

52. Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, 33 L. Ed. 667; Felker v. Rice, 110 Ark. 70, 161 S. W. 162; Lick v. Anderson, 29 Cal. App. 491, 156 Pac. 70; Dean v. Walker, 107 111. 540, 47 Am. Rep. 467; Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104, 26 Am. Rep. 765; Furnas v. Dur-gin, 119 Mass. 500, 20 Am. Rep. 341; Crawford v. Edwards, 33 Mich. 354; Finley v. Simpson, 22 N. J. Law 311, 53 Am. Dec. 252; Huyler's Ex'rs v. Atwood, 26 N. J. Eq. 504; Atlantic Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 54 N. Y. 35, 13 Am. Rep. 556; Bowen v. Beck, 94 N. Y. 86, 46 Am. Rep. 124; Baber v. Hanie, 163 N. C. 588, 80 S. E. 57; Windle v Hughes, 4 Ore. 1; South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Kohn, 108 S. C. 475, 95 S. E. 65; O'Conner v. O'Con-Ber, 88 Tenn. 76, 7 L. R. A. 33, 12 S. W. 447; Perry v. Ward. 82 Vt. 1, 71 Atl. 1; Thacker v. Hubard &

Plained.59 And in two or three instances it is asserted that in case of such acceptance the law "implies" a promise corresponding to the stipulation.60 But any liability imposed on the grantee by reason of such an expression of intention is, it is submitted, properly by way of express, as distinguished from implied, contract, that is, the liability is one growing out of contract, and not out of quasi contract.

Appleby, 122 Va. 379, 94 S. E. 929; Bishop v. Douglass, 25 Wis. 696; Small v. Thompson, 28 Can. Sup. Ct. 219.

53. Keller v. Ashford, 133 U. S. 610, 33 L. Ed. 667; Townsend v. Ward, 27 Conn. 610; Merriman v. Schmitt, 211 111. 263, 71 N. E. 986; Kelly v. Geer, 101 N. Y. 664, 5 N. E. 332.

The transferee's acceptance of the conveyance in ignorance of the insertion of the contract of assumption therein does not in" itself impose any liablity on him. Lloyd v. Lowe, - Colo. -, 165 Pac. 609; Raffel v. C.lark, 87 Conn. 567, 89 Atl. 184; Swisher v. Palmer, 106 111. App. 432; Merriman v Schmitt, 211 111. 263, 71 N. E. 986; Demaris v. Rodgers, 110 Minn. 49, 124 N. W. 457; Llewellyn v. Butler, 186 Mo. App. 525, 172 S. W. 413; Kilmer v. Smith, 77 N. Y. 226, 33 Am. Rep. 613; Blass v. Terry, 156 N. Y. 122, 50 N. E. 953; Bradshaw v. Provident Trust Co., 81 Ore. 55, 158 Pac. 274; Elliott v. Sackett, 108 U. S. 132, 27 L. Ed. 678.

It may be evidenced by a separate writing,54 or it may be oral.55 In the case of an oral agreement, as well as of one incorporated in a conveyance not executed by the transferee, the applicability of the Statute of Frauds has been quite frequently in question, and it has been decided that such a stipulation is not within the provision of the statute as to a promise to answer for the debt or default of another, usually upon the theory that the promise to pay the mortgage debt is an original promi to pay one's own debt,56 or that the promise is made to the debtor and not to the creditor.57 Occasionally, when the stipulation is contained in a conveyance, its acceptance by the grantee appears to have been regarded as equivalent to its execution by him for the purpose of the statute,58 though why this should be so is not ex54. Kenney v. Streeter, 88 Ark. 406, 114 S. W. 923; Hartman v. Six, 155 111. App. 202; Iowa Loan & Trust Co., v. Haller, 119 Iowa, 645, 93 N. W. 636; Schmucker v. Sibert, 18 Kan. 104, 26 Am. Rep. 765; Moore v. Booker, 4 N. D. 543, 62 N. W. 607; Society of Friends v. Haines, 47 Ohio St. 423, 25 N. E. 119.

55. Dodds v. Spring, 174 Cal. 412, 163 Pac. 351; Tutlle v. Arm-stead, 53 Conn. 175, 22 Atl. 677; Herrin v. Abbe, 55 Fla. 769, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907, 46 So. 183; Lang v. Dietz, 191 111. 161, 60 N. E. 841; Wright v. Briggs, 99 Ind. 563; Bowen v. Kurtz, 37 Iowa, 239; Bossingham v. Syck, 118 Iowa, 192, 91 N. W. 1047; Strobauer v. Votz, 42 Mich. 444, 4 N. W. 161; Swarthout v. Shields, 185 Mich. 427, 152 N. W. 202; Bolles v. Beach. 22 N. J. L. 680; Knighton v. Chamberlin, 84 Ore. 153, 164 Pac. 703; Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. St. 78; Goode v. Bryant, 118

Va. 314, 87 S. E. 588; Frazey v. Casey, 96 Wash. 422, 165 Pac. 104.

56. Mulvany v. Gross, 1 Colo. App. 112, 27 Pac. 878; Herrin v. Abbe, 55 Fla. 769, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 907, 46 So. 183; Lamb v. Tucker, 42 Iowa, 118; Flint v. Winter Harbor Land Co., 89 Me. 420, 36 Atl. 634; Van Meter v. Poole, 130 Mo. App. 433, 110 S. W. 5; Fiske v. Gregory, 34 N. H. 414; Moore v. Booker, 4 N. D. 543, 62 N. W. 607; Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. St. 436; Moore v. Stovall, 2 Lea (Tenn.) 543.