This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
-A tenancy analogous to that from year to year, and differing therefrom merely in the length of the recurring periods with reference to which it is measured, and consequently in the character of the notice necessary to terminate it may, as before stated, be created either expressly or as a result of conditions similar to those giving rise to tenancy from year to year. That is, a tenancy from quarter to quarter, from month to month, or from week to week, or indeed from any period to like period, is created prima facie by the reservation or payment of rent with reference to such a period, when no period for the duration of the tenancy is named.50
47. See 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. Sec. 14 note 485.
48. Parker v. Constable, 3 Wils. 25; Timmins v. Rowlinson, 3 Burrow, 1C09; Larkin v. Avery, 23 Conn. 304 (semble); Sullivan v. Enders, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 66; Den d. McEowen v. Drake, 14 N. J. Law (2 J. S. Green) 523; Jackson v. Bryan, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 322; Phillips v. Covert, 7 Johns. (N. Y.) 1; Clark v. Smith, 25 Pa. 137.
49. See ante Sec. 57. And see
Den d. Stedman v. Mcintosh, 27 N. C. (5 Ired. Law) 571; Williams v. Deriar, 31 Mo. 13; Johnson v. Johnson, 13 R. I. 467; Rich v. Bolton, 46 Vt. 84, 16 Am. Rep. 615.
In Richardson v. Langridge, 4 Taunt. 128, it is said: "Surely the distinction has been a thousand times taken. A mere general letting is a letting at will. If the lessor accepts yearly rent, * * * that is evidence of a taking for a year.
The mere fact that rent is paid under a tenancy of undefined duration at intervals of a quarter of a year, of a month, or of a week, does not cause a tenancy measured by corresponding periods to arise, if such payments are merely on account of a yearly rent, that is, it is the character of the rent rather than the time of payment that determines the character of the periodic holding, and such payments of aliquot parts of an annual rent at equal intervals during the year will raise an inference of a tenancy from year to year.51 But where there is no evidence as to the terms of the letting, it would seem that the monthly payment of rent should show a letting at a monthly rent, thereby creating a tenancy from month to month rather than one from year to year.52
In some states there are statutory provisions to the effect that under certain circumstances named a tenancy from month to month shall be regarded as arising, while in at least two states there are provisions changing the common-law rule by which such a tenancy may in ease he makes a lease for several years, and one holding under such a sublease is, it seems, to be regarded as a tenant for years, subject only to the possible ending of his term by the termination of his lessor's tenancy from year to year.59 And so a tenant from year to year may make a lease from year to year, he having thereafter an estate from year to year in reversion.60
50. Wilkinson v. Hall, 3 Bing. N. C. 508; Sebastian v. Hill, 51 111. App. 272; Johnson v. Albert-son, 51 Minn. 333, 53 N. W. 642; Hoover, Rhodes & Co. v. Pacific Oil Co., 41 Mo. App. 317; Steffens v. Earl, 40 N. J. L. 128, 29 Am. Rep. 214; Peter Breidt City Brewery Co. v. Weber, 90 N. J. L. 641, 101 Atl. 382; Anderson v. Prindle, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 616; Branton v. O'Briant, 93 N. C. 99; Hollis v. Burns, 100 Pa. St. 206, 45 Am. Rep. 379. The New York decisions are conflicting in this regard. See 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. Sec. 14 c(l) note 506, 507.
51. McKinney v. Peck, 28 111. 174 (semble); Ridgeley v. Stillwell, 25 Mo. 570; Douglass v. Sei-ferd. 18 N. Y. Misc. 188, 41 N. Y. Supp. 289; Patton v. Axley, 50 N. C. (5 Jones Law) 440; Lesley v. Randolph, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 123; Hey v. McGrath, 81* Pa. St. 310; King v. Eversfield  2 Q. B. 475.
52. See Anderson v. Prindle, 23 Wend. (N. Y.) 616; Decker v. Hartshorne, 65 N. J. L. 87, 47 Atl. 755; Steffens v. Earl, 40 N. J. L. 128, 137, 29 Am. Rep. 214; Pinch v. Moore, 50 Minn. 116, 52 N. W. 384; Johnson v. Albertson, 51 Minn. 333, 53 N. W. 642; Edmund-son v. Preville, 12 Colo. App. 73, 54 Pac. 394. But in Ridgeley v. Stillwell, 25 Mo. 570, a contrary arise as a result of the reservation or payment of a monthly rent.53 In Maine and Massachusetts, it would seem, a tenancy from quarter to quarter, from month to month, or from week to week, can exist only when is is expressly so provided.54