Logging Co. 79 Wash., 336, 140 Pac. 361.

83. Williams v. Hyde, 98 Mich. 152, 57 N. W. 98, so decides.

84. Boykin v. Rosenfield, 69 Tex. 115, 9 S. W. 318; Bank of Lansingburgh v. Crary, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 546; Cudworth v. Scotc, 41 N. H. 456; Kimball v. Sattley, 55 Vt. 285, 45 Am. Rep. 614. The three latter cases involved mortgages of growing grass, and somewhat siugularly, they each concede that the grass was a part of The realty at the time of the execution of the chattel mortgage thereon.

85. A mortgage made, not by the owner of the land, but by one who has entered into a contract to purchase growing trees is to be distinguished. Such a mortgage is a mortgage of "personal property, to take effect as mortgage thereof being, by the trend of authority, a transfer or mortgage of chattels merely.86

- Limitation as to time of removal. If, on a separate conveyance of trees, there is a time named within which the person to whom the conveyance is made must remove them, his rights in the trees, by the weight of authority, cease at the end of the period named, and the ownership of those not removed is vested in the owner of the land,87 on the theory, it seems, that the stipulation as to time is in effect a condition subsequent,88 or a special limitation,89 or that the conveyance is merely of such trees as may be cut and removed within the time named, in which case the beneficiary has no right of property in the such when the wood and timber should be severed from the freehold." Claflin v. Carpenter, 4 Met. (Mass.) 580, 38 Am. Dec. 381; Douglas v. Shumway, 13 Gray (Mass.) 498.

86. Benjamin, Sales (7th Am. Ed.) Sec. 126; Mechem, Sales, Sec. 342; Williston, Sales, Sec. 61. And see Jones v. Flint, 10 Ad. & Ell. 753; Stearns v. Gafford, 56 Ala. 544; Marshall v. Ferguson, 23 Cai. 65; Houston Nat. Bank v. J. T. Edmonson & Co. -, Ala., -, 75 So. 568; Graff v. Fitch, 58 111. 373; Backenstoss v. Stahler's Adm'rs, 33 Pa. St. 251.

; 87. Heflin v. Bingham, 56 Ala. 566; Smith v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 130 Ark., 9, 196 S. W. 481; Call v. Jenner Lumber Co., 33 Cal. App. 310, 165 Pac. 23; McRae v. Stillwell, 111 Ga. 65, 55 L. R. A. 513. 36 S. E. 604; Webber v. Proctor, 89 Me. 404, 36 Atl. 631; Perkins v. Stockwell, 131 Mass. 529;. Macomber v. Detroit

L & N. R. Co., 108 Mich. 491, 32 L. R. A. 102, 62 Am. St. Rep. 713, 66 N. W. 376;011is v. Drexel Furniture Co., 173 N. C. 542, 92 S. E. 371; Clark v. Guest 54 Ohio St. 298, 43 N. E. 862; Saltonstall v. Little, 90 Pa. St. 422, 35 Am. Rep. 683; Bond v. Ungerecht, 129 Tenn. 631, 167 S. W. 1116; Align & Nelson Mill Co. v. Vaughn, 57 Wash. 163, 106 Pac. 622; Smith v. Ramsay, 116 Va. 530, 82 S. E. 189; Adkins v. Huff, 58 W. Va, 645, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 649, 6 Ann. Cas. 246, 52 S. E. 773.

88. See editorial notes 28 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 114, 8 Mich. Law Rev. at p. 502; Western Lime & Cement Co. v. Copper River Land Co., 138 Wis. 404, 120 N.>W. 277.

89. Morgan v. Perkins, 94 Ga. 353, 21 S. E. 574; Midyette v. Grubbs, 145 N. C. 85, 13 L. R, A. (N. S.) 278, 58 S. E. 795. See ante, Sec. 90.

Even in the absence of an express limitation as to the time of cutting and removal, the courts, moved by a desire to prevent the operation of a mere conveyance of trees as in effect a conveyance of the soil on which the trees are growing, tend to imply a requirement that the trees shall be cut and removed within a reasonable time, with a resulting loss of all right to trees not removed within such time.91a real Property.

90. Johnson v. Truitt, 122 Ga. 327, 50 S. E. 135; Sanders v. Clark, 22 Iowa, 275; Fletcher v. Livingston, 153 Mass. 388, 26 N. E. 1001; King v. Merriman, 38 Minn. 47, 35 N. W. 570; Webber v. Proctor, 89 Me. 404, 36 Atl. 631; Boisaubin v. Reed, 2 Keyes (N. Y.) 323, 1 Abb. Dec. 161; Williams v John L. Roper Lumber Co., 174 N. C. 229, 93 S. E. 741; Smith v Ramsey, 116 Va. 530, 82 S. E. 189; Strasson v. Montgomery, 32 Wis. 52.

Whether timber cut, but not removed, within the time named, remains the property of the owner of the land, is properly a question of the intention of the parties. See Johnson v. Truitt, 122 Ga. 327, 50 S. E. 135; Erskine v. Savage, 96 Me. 57, 51 Atl. 242; Macomber v. Detroit L. & N. Co., . 108 Mich. 491, 66.N. W. 376, 62 Am. St. Rep. 713, 32 L. R. A. 102; Alexander v. Bauer, 94 Minn. 174,

102 N. W. 387; Hubbard v. Burton, 75 Mo. 65; Boisaubin v. Reed, 2 Keyes (N. Y.) 323; Strong v. Eddy

40 Vt. 547; Hicks v. Smith, 77 Wis. 146, 46 N. W. 133.

91. Zimmerman v. Daffin, 149 Ala. 380, 9 L. R. A. N. S. 663, 123 Am. St. Rep. 65, 42 So. 858; Walker v. Johnson, 116 111. App. 145; Halstead v. Jessup, 150 Ind. 85, 49 N. E. 821; Irons v. Webb,

41 N. J. L. 203, 32 Am. Rep. 193; Hoitt v. Stratton Mills, 54 N. H. 109; Halstead v. Jessup, 150 Ind. 85, 49 N. E. 821; Lodwick Lumber Co. v. Taylor, 100 Tex. 270, 98 S. W. 238; Chapmat v. Dear-man, - Tex. Civ. Apr. *-, 181 S W. 808; Wilson v. Buffalo Collieries Co, 79 W. Va. 279, 91 S. E. 449. See editorial note, 17 Harv. Law Rev. 411.

91a. Smith v. Dierks Lumber & Coal Co., 130 Ark. 9, 196 S. W. 431; McNair & Wade Land Co. v. Adams, 54 Fla. 550, 45 So. 492; it in contemplation of any present profit; but merely with a prospect of its being useful to himself in future, and to future successions of tenants."7 It does not extend to fruit growing on trees or bushes at the time of the termination of the tenancy.8 Grass, even though sown from seed, and ready to be cut for hay, cannot be taken as emblements, since "the improvement is not-distinguishable from what is natural product, although it may be increased by cultivation."9 It seems, however, that artificial grasses, such as clover, saintfoin and the like, may be taken as emblements.10 The right of emblements applies to the straw as well as to the grain raised by the annual planting.11