9. Bowen v. Phinney, 162 Mass.

"Materialmen," that is, persons furnishing, not labor, but materials, have liens only when the statute so provides, and are not usually regarded as within the scope of provisions for the benefit of "contractors," "mechanics," or the like.11 Materialmen may be those furnishing materials under contract either with the owner, with the contractor, or even with a subcontractor, and the phraseology of the statute may be such as to give a lien to a materialman of one of such classes, and not to others. The distinct systems of legislation referred to in connection with subcontractors exist also in the case of persons furnishing materials to the contractor, their rights being dependent on the state of accounts between the contractor and the owner in those states in which New York rule is followed,12 while their rights are unaffected by this consideration in states where the Pennsylvania rule is adopted.13

- Contract or consent of owner. The statute

593, 44 Am. St. Rep. 391, 39 N. E. 283; Linden Steel Co. v. Rough Run Mfg. Co., 158 Pa. St. 238, 27 Atl. 895; Shenandoah Valley R. Co. v. Miller, 80 Va. 821; Seeman v. Biemann, 108 Wis. 365, 84 N. W. 490.

10. Boisot, Mech. Liens, Sec.Sec. 228-231; Phillips, Mech. Liens, 58, 62g; 2 Jones, Liens, Sec. 1289; Schroeder v. Galland, 134 Pa. St. 277, 7 L. R. A. 711, 19 Am. St. Rep. 691, 19 Atl. 632; Taylor v. Murphy, 148 Pa. St. 337, 33 Am. St. Rep. 825, 23 Atl. 1134; Sie-brecht v. Hogan, 99 Wis. 437, 75 N. W. 71.

11. See Davis v. Batz, 66 Ala. 206; Hinckley v. Field's Biscuit & Cracker Co., 91 Cal. 136, 27 Pac. 594; Duff v. Hoffman, 63 Pa. St. 191; Arnold v. Budlong, 11 R. I. 561; Boisot, Mech. Liens, Sec. 241; Phillips, Mech. Liens, Sec. 47.

12. Shelton v. Merrill, 63 Ala. 343; Turn+er v. Strenzel, 70 Cal. 28, 11 Pac. 389; Carman v. Mc-Incrow. 13 N. Y. 70; Berry v. McAdams, 93 Tex. 431, 55 S. W. 1112.

13. Henry & Coatsworth Co. v. Evans, 97 Mo. 47, 3 L. R. A. 332, 10 S. W. 868; White v. Miller, 18 Pa. St. 52.

3 R. P. - 32 usually provides that the labor or materials must have been furnished by agreement with, or sometimes by the "consent" of, the "owner."14 The term "owner" includes not only those who have an estate in fee in the land, but also those having an estate less than freehold. One having such limited estate can, however, as a rule, not create a lien more extensive than his own interest, that is, on others' interests in the land.15 Labor or materials furnished under a contract with one having a mere leasehold estate in the land may, however, support a lien upon the reversion, if the owner of the latter expressly or impliedly authorizes or adopts such contract,16 and, where the statute creates a lien for labor or materials furnished with the consent or permission of the owner, the reversion may become subject to a lien for work or labor furnished under a contract with the lessee, by reason of consent, expressed or implied, on the part of the reversioner, to the making of the improvements.17

A vendee under an executory contract for the sale of land is sometimes regarded as the "owner," within the meaning of the mechanic's lien acts, he having, as before explained, an equitable interest in the land. On this theory, one furnishing labor or materials under contract with such vendee has a lien on his interest in the land, which extends to the legal title when acquired by the latter, and which is, on the other hand, terminated if the vendee loses all rights under his contract by a failure to comply therewith.18 A lien has been sustained in favor of one furnishing labor or materials under a contract with a vendee, in some cases, on the theory that he was, under the particular circumstances, the agent of the vendor,19 and, in other cases, on the ground that the improvements on the land were with the vendor's consent, and so within the statutory requirement of the owner's consent, as when it was stipulated in the contract of sale that such improvements were to be made.20

14. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Sec. 1966.

15. See Paulsen v. Manske, 126 I11. 72, 9 Am. St. Rep. 532, 18 N. E 275; Williams v. Vanderbilt, 145 I11. 238, 21 L. R. A. 489, 36 Am. St. Rep. 486, 34 N. E. 476; Monroe v. West, 12 Iowa, 119, 79 Am. Dec. 524; Hoffman v. Mc-Colgan, 81 Md. 390, 32 Atl. 179; Francis v. Sayles, 101 Mass. 435; Currier v. Cummings, 40 N. J. Eq. 145, 3 Atl. 174; Cornell v. Barney, 94 N. Y. 394; Choteau v. Thompson, 2 Ohio St. 114; Long v. McLanahan, 103 Pa. St. 537;

Stetson-Post Mill Co. v. Brown, 21 Wash. 619, 75 Am. St. Rep. 862, 59 Pac. 507; 2 Jones, Liens, Sec.Sec. 1272-1276; Phillips, Mech. Liens, 83-89.

16. Scroggin v. National Lumber Co., 41 Neb. 195, 59 N. W. 548; Hall v. Parker, 94 Pa. St. 109; Kremer v. Walton, 11 Wash. 120, 48 Am. St. Rep. 870, 39 Pac. 374.

17. West Coast Lumber Co. v. Newkirk, 80 Cal. 275, 22 Pac. 231; Gay v. Hervey, 41 N. J. L. 39; Burkitt v. Harper, 79 N. Y. 273; Bentley v. Adams, 92 Wis. 386, 66 N. W. 505.

- Priorities. A mechanic's lien is valid, in most, if not all, jurisdictions, as against purchasers of the land, the purchaser being affected with notice of the lien either by the fact that improvements are being made on the land, or by the presence upon the court records of proceedings to obtain or enforce the lien.21

18. Paulsen v. Manske, 126 I11. 72, 9 Am. St. Rep. 532, 18 N. E. 275; Monroe v. West, 12 Iowa, 119, 79 Am. Dec. 524; Chicago Lumber Co. v. Osborn, 40 Kan. 1G8, 19 Pac. 656; Colman v. Good-now, 36 Minn. 9, 1 Am. St. Rep. 632, 29 N. W. 338; Fullmer v. Poust, 155 Pa. St. 275, 35 Am. St. Rep. 881, 26 Atl. 543; Kerrick v. Ruggles, 78 Wis. 274, 47 N. W. 437. Contra, to the effect that the vendee is not an "owner," see Brown v. Morison, 5 Ark. 217; Hayes v. Fessenden, 106 Mass. 228.

19. Moore v. Jackson, 49 Cal. 109; Henderson v. Connelly, 123 I11. 98, 5 Am. St. Rep. 490, 14 N. E 1; Althen v. Tarbox, 48 Minn. 18, 31 Am. St. Rep. 616, 50 N. W.