1075; Mattison v. Mattison, 53 Ore. 254, 133 Am. St. Rep. 829, 18 Ann. Cas. 218, 100 Pac. 4; Thackara v. Muntzer, 100 Pa. St. 151; Wallace v. Campbell. 53 Tex, 229; Monday v. Vance, 92 Tex. 428, 49 S. W. 516; Lind v. Rose,- Tex. Civ. App. - , 175 S. W. 829.

87. The judicial statements of tary alienation, there is no liability to involuntarily alienation;92

3 R. P. - 4 of the income, and has consequently no interest which is accessible to his creditors.88 In the case of a spendthrift trust the intention of the creator of the trust is that the income be paid only to the cestui whom he names,89 or, in some cases, that it be applied only for his support and maintenance,90 and this being so, the grounds for upholding such a trust are conveniently collated in 26 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law (2nd Ed.) at p. 140.

88. Chambers v. Smith, 3 App. Cas. 795; Lord v. Bunn, 2 Y. & C. C. C. 98; Godden v. Crowhurst, 10 Sim. 649; Re Coleman, 39 Ch. D. 443; Nichols v. Eaton, 91 U. S. 716, 21 L. Ed. 254; Mason v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., 78 Conn. 81, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 586, 61 Atl. 57; Sterling v. Ives, 78 Conn. 498, 62 Atl. 948; King v. King, 168 111. 273, 48 N. E. 582; Davidson v. Kemper, 79 Ky. 5; Bland v. Bland, 90 Ky. 400, 9 L. R. A. 599, 29 Am. St. Rep. 390, 14 S. W. 243; Murphy v. Delano, 95 Me. 229, 55 L. R. A. 727, 49 Atl. 1053; True Real Estate Co. v. True, 115 Me. 533, 99 Atl. 627; Hall v. Williams, 120 Mass. 344; Leverett v. Barnwell, 214 Mass. 105, 101 N. E. 75; Brown v. Lumbelt, 221 Mass. 419, 108 N. E. 1079; Banfield v. Wiggin, 58 N. H. 155; Keyser v. Mitchell, 67 Pa. 473; Barker's Estate, 159 Pa. 518, 28 Atl. 365, 368; Stone v. Westcott, 18 R. I. 685, 29 Atl. 838; Heath v. Bishop, 4 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 46, 55 Am. Dec. 654. In Petty v. Moores Brook Sanitarium, 110 Va. 815, 27 L R. A. (N. S.) 800, 19 Ann. Cas. 271, 76 S. E. 335 it was held that even in the case of such a discretionary trust, a beneficiary named had an interest which could be reached by creditors, if the trust was created by the beneficiary himself. The decision is criticized in 23 Harv. Law Rec. at p. 649.

In England, though creditors or alienees of one of the cestuis under such a discretionary trust have no rights as regards income not yet paid over to such cestuis, the trustee must account to such cestui's voluntary assignee or assignee in bankruptcy for any payments made to the cestui after notice of the assignment. Re Coleman, 39 Ch. Div. 443; Re Neil, 62 L. T. N. S. 649.

89. See Fearson v. Dunlop, 21 Dist. Col. 236; King v. King, 168 111. 273, 48 N. E. 582; Smith v. Towers, 69 Md. 77, 9 Am. St. Rep. 398, 14 Atl. 497, 15 Atl. 92; Broadway Nat. Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170, 43 Am. Rep. 504; Nickerson v. Van Horn, 181 Mass. 562, 64 N. E. 204; Morgan's Estate, 223 Pa. 228, 25 L. R. A. N. S. 236, 132 Am. St. Rep 732, 72 Atl. 498.

90. Parker Holmes & Co. v. Bushnell, 80 Conn. 233, 67 Atl. 479; King v. King, 168 111. 273, 48 N. E. 582; Merchants Nat. Bank v. Crist, 140 Iowa, 308, 23 L. R. A. N. S. 526, 132 Am. St. Rep. 367, 118 N. W. 394; Gartrustee can acquit himself of his obligation under the trust only by payment or application of the income accordingly. Payment by him to a voluntary or involuntary assignee, not being in accordance with the requirement of the trust, would be nugatory for this purpose, and it consequently cannot be demanded.

The question of the validity of a provision, the effect of which is to make an equitable interesl inalienable, has more usually arisen in connection with the question of the subjection of the interest to the claims of creditors, but considerations of a similar character would seem to apply in connection with the question of the power of the cestui que trust voluntarily to alienate it. If the cestui's interest is of such a limited character that it is not available to his creditors, it would seem not to be available to his voluntary transferee.91 And conversely, it is submitted, if there is no right of volunner v. Wills, 92 Ky. 386, 17 S. W. 1023; Baker v. Brown, 146 Mass. 369, 15 N. E. 783; Berry v. Dunham, 202 Mass. 133, 88 N. E. 904; Leigh v. Harrison, 69 Miss. 923, 18 L. R. A. 49, 11 So. 604; Monday v. Vance, 92 Tex. 428, 49 S. W. 516; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. 258; Garland v. Garland, 87 Va. 758, 13 L. R. A. 212, 24 Am. St. 682, 13 S. E. 487; Hoffman v. Beltz-hoover, 71 W. Va. 72, 76 S. E. 968. And see Winthrop Co. v. Clinton, 196 Pa. 472. 79 Am. St. Rep. 729, 46 At1. 435; Slattery v. Wason, 151 Mass. 266, 7 L. R. A. 395, 21 Am. St. Rep. 448, 23 N. E. 843; Wenzel v. Powder, 100 Md. 36, 108 Am. St. Rep. 380, 59 Atl. 194.

91. See Bennett v. Bennett, 217 111. 434, 4 L. R. A. N. S. 470, 75 N. E. 339; Roberts v. Stevens, 84

Me. 325, 17 L. R. A. 266, 24 Atl. 873; Nickerson v. Van Horn, 181 Mass. 562, 64 N. E. 204; In re Siegwarth's Estate, 226 Pa. 591, 134 Am. St. Rep. 1086, 75 Atl. 842; Jourolmon v. Massen-gill, 92 Tex. 428; Barnes v. Dow, 59 Vt. 530, 10 Atl. 258. In Pearson v. Hanson, 230 111. 610, 82 N. E. 813; Johnson v. Preston, 226 111. 447, 10 L. R. A. N. S. 564, 80 N. E. 1001; Huntress v. Allen, 195 Mass. 226, 122 Am. St. Rep. 243, 80 N. E. 949; Parker v. Carpenter, 77 N. H. 453, 92 Atl. 955 it appears to be considered that the equitable interest may be subject to voluntary alienation though not subject to involuntary alienation. This involves, it is submitted, a somewhat unsatisfactory view of the nature of a spendthrift trust.

Whether in any particular case the interest of the cestui named is of such a restricted character that there is nothing available to his voluntary or involuntary alienee, whether, in other words, the trust is a spendthrift trust, is a question of the intention of the creator of the trust.93 The cases are generally to the effect that, in order to exclude the right of voluntary alienation or the rights of creditors, it is unnecessary explicitly so to provide in the instrument creating the trust, it being sufficient that such an intention can be inferred on a construction of the instrument taken as whole.94 Occasionally a mere direction that the income shall be paid to the cestui has been construed as showing an intention to create an inalienable interest,95 but such a provision has also received a different construction.96 Even though the instrument creating the trust expressly de92. See Coyne v. Plume, 90 Conn. 293, 97 Atl. 337.