The reason ordinarily asserted for this view is that otherwise the occurrence of one quitclaim deed in a chain of title would to a great extent render the title unmarketable. But it is difficult to see how, if a quitclaim deed is insufficient to give a good title to the grantee therein, as against a prior unrecorded conveyance, such grantee can give a good title to another, and thereby divest the rights of the grantee under the prior conveyance. The practical necessity, if it be so regarded, of protecting a subsequent claimant under the grantee in the quitclaim deed, tends strongly to indicate the propriety of protecting the grantee himself.

A conveyance purporting to convey land by a general description, such as "all my land," or "all the land which I have," or "all which I now have," in a certain place, has been held not to take precedence of a prior unrecorded conveyance of particular land in such place, the language used, construed in connection with the surrounding circumstances, showing an intention to convey only such land as the grantor still retains.29

659, 86 N. W. 44; Rich v. Downs, 81 Kan. 43, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1035, 105 Pac. 9, and note; Cul-bertson v. H. Witbeck Co., 92 Mich. 469, 52 N. W. 993; Otis v. Kennedy, 107 Mich. 312, 65 N. W. 219; Marston v. Catterlin, 270 Mo. 5, 192 S. W. 413; Snowden v. Tyler, 21 Neb. 199, 31 N. W. 661; Martin v. Ragsdale, 71 S. C. 67, 50 S. E. 671; Campbell v. Home Ice & Coal Co., 126 Tenn. 524, 150 S. W. 427. And see Brown v. Nelms, 86 Ark. 368, 112 S. W. 373. But see to the contrary Schmidt v. Musson, 20 S. D. 389, 107 N. W. 367; Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 174 S. W. 1094, 1095; Muller v. Mccann, 50 Okla. 710, 151 Pac. 621 (semble). 29. Callanan v. Merrill, 81 Iowa, 73, 46 N. W. 753; Coe v.

Persons Unknown, 43 Me. 432; Fitzgerald v. Libby, 142 Mass. 235, 7 N. E. 917; Ames v. Robert, 17 N. M. 609, 131 Pac. 994; Mc-namara Syndicate v. Boyd, 112 Va. 145, 70 S. E. 694; See Henderson v. Armstrong, 128 Ga. 804, 58 S. E. 624; Buttergeld v. Smith, 11 111. 485; Brown v. Banner, etc., Co., 97 111. 214, 37 Am. Rep. 105. In Hethering-ton v. Clark, 30 Pa. St. 393, the question whether such a conveyance was intended to convey only such land as the grantor still retained was regarded as a question for the jury. In Garner v Boyle, 97 Tex. 460, 79 S. W. 1066, it was considered that such a conveyance passed all land which on the records appeared to belong to the grantor, an un- Purchaser from heir or devisee. It has occasionally been decided that a purchaser from an lienor devisee takes subject to a conveyance by the ancestor which was not recorded, on the theory that the conveyance being valid as against the ancestor, he retained no interest which could pass to the heir or devisee and consequently the latter's grantee acquired nothing.30 But usually it has been held, more consistently, it would seem, with the policy of the recording laws, that a purchaser from an heir or devisee is, like a purchaser from any other person, entitled to rely upon the title as it appears of record.31

- Purchaser of equitable interest. To what extent one who acquires an equitable interest is entitled to take advantage of the failure to record an instrument earlier in date, as giving him priority over the earlier instrument, would properly depend on whether the person acquiring the equitable interest could be regarded as a purchaser or incumbrancer such as the statute undertakes to protect. In several cases the purchaser of an equitable interest has been regarded as entitled to protection as against a prior unrecorded conveyance,32 while in one or two states the right to take adrecorded conveyance being regarded as non existent. And see Cook v. Smith, 107 Tex. 119, 174 S. W. 1094.

30. Hill v. Meeker, 24 Conn. 211; Hancock v. Beverly's Heirs, 6 B. Men. (Ky.) 531; See Henderson v. Armstrong, 128 Ga. 804, 58 S. E. 024. The Kentucky rule in this regard was changed by statute. See Dozier v. Barnett, 13 Bush (Ky.) 457.

31. Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 328, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1277, 114 Par. 490, 491; Kennedy v. Northup, 15 111. 148; Mcclure v. Tallman, 30 Iowa, 515; Earle v. Fiske, 103

Mass. 491; First Nat. Bank of Durand v. Phillpotts, 155 Mich. 331, 119 N. W. 1; Youngblood v. Vastine, 46 Mo. 239; Powers v. Mcferran, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 47; Mcculloch's Lessee v. Eudaly, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 346; Holmes v. Johns, 56 Tex. 41; Keenon v. Burkhardt, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 162 S. W. 483; Memphis Land & Timber Co. v. Ford, 58 Fed. 452. 7 C. C. A. 304.

32. Weston v. Dnnlap, 50 Iowa, 185; United States Insur. Co. v. Shiver, 3 Md. Ch. 381; General Insur. Co. v. United States Insu.r Co., 10 Mil. 517; Tarbell v. West. 86 N. Y. 280; Trogden v. Wil vantage of the failure to record is apparently confined exclusively to purchasers of the legal title.33

- Lessees. The question whether a lessee is within the protection of the recording statute, so as to be able to assert the failure to record a prior conveyance, is one which is not calculated to arise, since a lessee, agreeing merely to pay a periodical rent, as is usually the case, could not well be regarded as a purchaser for value. If, however, he does pay value, he may come within the protection accorded to purchasers for value, the fact that the estate acquired by him being for years only instead of in fee simple being immaterial.34

- Claimant under judicial decree. In at least one state it has been decided that one taking title by judicial decree is to be regarded as a purchaser for the purpose of receiving protection under the recording acts as against a prior unrecorded conveyance.35

- Creditors. The recording acts, in many jurisdictions, in terms invalidate an unrecorded instrument only as against a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee, and consequently a creditor of the grantor cannot assert a claim in priority over the grantee by reason of the failure to record, except so far as the failure to record may operate, under the doctrine of estoppel by representation, to preclude the grantee from asserting his title as against such creditor's claim.36 In some jurisdictions, however, the statutes expressly require a conliams, 144 N. C. 192, 10 L. R. A. N. S. 867, 56 S. E. 865 (semble); Bellass v. Mccarty, 10 Watts, (Pa.) 13; Rbines v. Baird, 41 Pa. 256; Batts v. Scott, 37 Tex. 59; Preston v. Nash, 76 Va. 1.

33. Combs v. Nelson, 91 Ind. 123; Wailes v. Cooper, 24 Miss. 208; Dedeaux v. Cuevas, 107 Miss. 7, 64 So. 844.

34. That a lease is a "conveyance" within the protection of the recording act, see Waskey v. Chambers, 224 U. S. 564, 56 L. E 885. Contra, Topping v. Parish, 96 Wis. 378, 71 N. W. 367.

35. Wilkins v. Mccorkle, 112 Tenn. 688, 80 S. W. 834.

36. Ante, Sec. 546, note 80a.

Veyance or mortgage to be recorded in order that it may be effective as against creditors of the grantor or mortgagor as well as against subsequent purchasers.37 Such a statute, in terms protecting creditors against unrecorded instruments, is ordinarily construed as protecting only such creditors as have, by attachment or judgment, acquired a lien on the property,38 though occasionally the statute is given a broader effect, in favor of general creditors.39 The usual construction of the statutes, as not applying to general creditors unless the language clearly shows an intention to that effect, is based on the theory that the purchaser, in failing to record his deed, has done merely what the creditor has done, unduly trusted the grantor, and that the equity of the creditor is no higher than that of the purchaser under the unrecorded deed, who, if deprived of the property, would also be a creditor of the grantor.

Ordinarily the statutes are construed to protect creditors as to such claims only as were created after the execution of the instrument in question, it being considered that, as regards claims which existed previously, they could not have suffered by reason of the failure of the record to show the true state of the title.40