McKerrihan, 172 Pa. 234, 51 Am. St. Rep. 734, 33 Atl. 583; Parrish v. Mahany, 10 S. D. 276, 66 Am. St. Rep. 715.

90. Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 552, 82 Am. St. Rep. 391, 63 Pac. 844; Shepherd v. Burkhalter, 13 Ga. 443, 58 Am. Dec. 523; Gilchrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576, 30 Am. Rep. 250; Miller v. Bradford, 12 Iowa, 14; Hall v. Wright, 137 Ky. 39, 127 S. W. 516; Hill v. Mc-nichol, 76 Me. 314; Brydon v. Campbell, 40 Md. 331; Grand Rapids Nat. Bank v. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 114 Am. St. Rep. 66S, 8 Ann. Cas. 102, 107 N. W. 76; Frost v. Beekman, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 288; Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 544; New York Life Ins. Co. v. White. 17 N. Y. 469; Jennings' Lessee v.

Accordingly as the one or the other of the two views referred to is adopted, it is, in some states, immaterial to the grantee in a conveyance that the instrument is recorded in the wrong book, it nevertheless operating as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers,92 while in other states the contrary is true.93

The rule before referred to94 that it is the time of the filing or deposit of an instrument of record, and not the time of its actual record by the official recorder, that determines the rights of the claimant thereunder as against a subsequent purchaser, is recognized even in

Wood, 20 Ohio 261; Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211, 74 Atl. 550; Sawyer v. Adams, 8 Vt. 172, 30 Am. Dec. 459; Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 12 L. R. A. 384, 22 Am. St. Rep. 155, 25 Pac. 341; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449, 19 Am. Rep. 772.

91. Miller v. Bradford. 12 Iowa, 14; Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376 (semble).

92. Lignoski v. Croiker, 86 Tex. 324, 24 S. W. 278, 788; Swenson v. Bank, 9 Lea (Tenn.) 723. In Cawthon v. Stearns Culver Lumber Co., 60 Fla. 313, 53 So. 738, it was held that since the statute did not contain any requirement as to recording in a particular book, the fact that the instrument was recorded in a book other than the one in which it might be expected to be found was immaterial.

In Pennsylvania, although, according to the latest decision, a purchaser is bound only by what the records show, nevertheless ho Is bound by a mortgage recorded and indexed, not in the mortgage book and index, but in the deed book and index, since it would be discovered by any person examining the title. Seo Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211, 74 Atl. 550; distinguishing Farabee v. Mc-kerrihan, 172 Pa. 234, 51 Am. St. Rep. 734, 33 Atl. 583.

93. Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 552, 82 Am. St. Rep. 391, 63 Pac. 844; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 197 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376; Grand Rapids, etc., Bank v. Ford, 143 Mich. 402, 114 Am. St. Rep. 668, 8 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 102, 107 N. W. 76; Gilllg v. Maass, 28 N. Y. 191; Parsons v. Lent, 34 N. J. Eq. 67; Drake v. Reg-gel, 10 Utah, 376, 37 Pac. 583; Sawyer v. Adams, 8 Vt. 172; Bernard v. Benson, 58 Wash. 191, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1051, 108 Pac. 439.

94. Ante, Sec. 567(h).

Those states in which a grantee is not protected as against subsequent purchasers by the mere filing of the instrument for record, but must see that the recording is correctly done. In this class of states it is considered that, while the riling or deposit of the instrument for record is in itself nugatory, yet if it is thereafter properly recorded, the recording dates back to the time of filing, for the purpose of determining priorities.95

- (k) Index to records. An index of the grantors and grantees as named in the recorded conveyances is ordinarily kept in the record office, and the statute frequently so requires. And occasionally the statute requires that this index also indicate the property conveyed, and perhaps other details of the conveyance. A subsequent purchaser has been regarded as chargeable with notice of statements in the index, even after the conveyance is actually recorded, in so far as such statements may serve to correct errors or supply omissions in the record itself.96 An entry in the index is sufficient if it serves to put a purchaser on inquiry,97 and, in so far as it undertakes to describe the land, points thereto with reasonable certainty.93 An omission, from the entry in the index, of all description of the land, although there is a blank space for such description, and it is ordinarily inserted, has been held not to affect the effectiveness of the entry, the index referring to the place of record of the conveyance.99

95. Anderson v. Dugas, 29 Ga. 440; Sinclair v. Gunzenhauser, 179 Ind. 78, 98 N. E. 37, 100 N. E. 376; Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309; Leger v. Doyle, 11 Rich. (S. C.) 109, 70 Am. Dec. 240; Bigelow v. Topliff, 25 Vt. 282. In Whalley v. Small, 25 Iowa, 184, while this principle was conceded, it was decided to be inapplicable when there was a delay of twenty-five years in the actual recording.

96. Sinclair v. Slawson, 44

Mich. 123, 38 Am. Rep. 235, 6 N. W. 207; Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449, 19 Am. Rep. 772. But a subsequent purchaser has been held not chargeable with notice of statements in the index as to matters not required to be stated. Gilchrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576, 30 Am. Rep. 250.

97. Jones v. Berkshire, 15 Iowa, 248, 83 Am. Dec. 412.

98. Barney v. Little, 15 Iowa, 527; Malbon v. Grow, 15 Wash. 301, 46 Pac. 330.

In so far as the recording statute of the particular state is construed as charging a subsequent purchaser with notice of an instrument by reason merely of the filing thereof, without reference to mistakes or omissions of the recorder,1 a subsequent purchaser can not assent that he was misled by errors or omissions in the index, he being chargeable with notice of the prior instrument without reference to the index.2 In jurisdictions in which a subsequent purchaser is chargeable with notice of a prior conveyance by reason of the record thereof only if the record is correct,3 the question whether a subsequent purchaser is bound by a prior conveyance not properly indexed has usually been determined by the consideration whether its inclusion in the index is to be regarded, under the statute, as an essential part of its record, the subsequent purchaser not being chargeable with notice of the conveyance if such inclusion is an essential part of its record,4 while he is so chargeable otherwise.5