75. 1 Jarman, Wills, 139; Bige-low, Wills. 136.

The contents of a lost will may be shown for the purpose of establishing the revocation of a previous will.89 But the mere fact of the execution of a later will, without evidence as to its contents, is not sufficient to show a revocation.81

A revocation by a will or codicil of a previous disposition of property is invalid if expressly made upon an assumption of fact which turns out to be mistaken.82 But the fact that the revocation was the result of mis76. 1 Jarman, Wills, 139; In re Dunabaugh, 130 Iowa, 692, 107 N. W. 925; Deppen's Trustee v. Deppen, 132 Ky. 755, 117 S. W. 352; Lane v. Hill, 68 N. H. 275, 73 Am. St. Rep. 591, 44 Atl. 393; Smith v. Mcchesney, 15 N. J. Eq. 359; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450; In re Venable's Will, 127 N. C. 344, 37 S. E. 465; Gordon v. Whitlock, 92 Va. 723, 24 S. E. 342.

77. Freeman v. Freeman, 5 De Gex. M. & G. 704; Lemage v. Goodban, L. R. 1 Prob. & Div. 57; Kelly v. Richardson, 100 Ala. 584, 13 So. 785; in re Delavea-ga's Estate, 119 Cal. 651; Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb. 463, 110 Am. St. Rep. 431, 62 L. R. A. 383, 4 A. & E. Am. Cas. 306; Wetmore v. Parker, 52 N. Y. 450; Price v. Maxwell, 28 Pa. St. 23.

78. Barksdale v. Hopkins, 23

Ga. 332; Bayley v. Bailey, 5 Cush. (Mass.) 243.

79. Ex parte Hcbester, 7 Ves. 348, 373; Burns v. Travis, 117 Ind. 44, 18 N. E. 45; Dudley v. Gates, 124 Mich. 440, 83 X. \V. 97, 86 N. W. 959; In re Scott, 88 Minn. 386, 93 N. W. 109; llairston v. Hairston, 30 Miss. 276; Morey v. Sohier, 63 N. II. 507. 56 Am. Rep. 538, 3 Atl. 636; In re Melville's Estate, 245 Pa. 318, 91 Atl. 679.

80. Caeman v. Van Ilarke, 33 Kan. 333, 6 Pac. 620; Wall is v. Wallis, 114 Mass. 510.

81. Hitching v. Basset, 2 Salk. 592; Kern v. Kern, 154 Ind. 29, 55 N. E. 1004; In re Sternberg Estate, 94 Iowa, 305, 62 N. W 734; Williams v. Miles. 68 Ne 463, 94 N. W. 705. 96 X. W L61; Lane v. Hill, 68 N. H. 275, 73 Am. St. Rep. 591.

Take cannot be shown by evidence extrinsic to the will,83 and it has been held that even a mistake apparent in the will does not defeat the revocation if it is not based on information received from others, but the matter is within the personal knowledge of testator.84 A revocation, moreover, which is stated to be based upon certain advice given testator, has been supported, though the advice was mistaken, since it was the advice on which testator acted, and as to his receipt of the advice there was no mistake.85

- Marriage and birth of issue. The common law rule was that the will of a man is not revoked by his marriage alone,86 and this rule still controls in some states. In others the statutes changing the common-law rights of a married woman as regards her interest in her husband's estate on his death without issue have been regarded as changing the rule, so as to give to his marriage the effect of revoking his will,87 - 88 and occasionally there is a statutory provision expressly to that effect.89

82. Campbell v. French, 3 Ves. 321, where the revocation of a provision in favor of certain persons, "they being all dead," was held to be inoperative, they being alive. See also Doe d. Evans, 10 Adol. & El. 228; Mordecai v. Boylan, 59 N. C. 365; and a suggestive editorial note in 22 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 374.

83. Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 61, 29 Am. Rep. 642; Hayes v. Hayes, 45 N. J. Eq. 461, 17 Atl. 634; Gifford v. Dyer, 2 R. I. 99; Skipwith v. Cabell's Ex'r, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 758.

84. Mendinhall's Appeal, 124 Pa. St. 387, 10 Am. St. Rep. 590.

85. Attorney General v. Lloyd, 1 Ves. Sr. 32; Newton v. Newton, 12 Ir. Ch. 118; Skipwith v. Cabell's Ex'r, 19 Grat. (Va.) 758.

86. 1 Jarman, Wills, 111.

87-88. Brown v. Scherrer, 5 Colo. App. 255, 21 Colo. 481; Morgan v. Ireland, 1 Idaho, 786; Tyler v. Tyler, 19 111. 151; American Board of Com'rs for Foreign Missions v. Nelson, 72 111. 564; In re Teopfer, 12 N. Mex. 372, 67 L. R. A. 315. Contra, Goodsell's Appeal, 55 Conn. 171, 10 Atl. 557; Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 34 L. R. A. 384, 61 Am. St. Rep. 419; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 56 Am. Rep. 530, 3 Atl. 604.

89. See In re Anderson's Estate, 14 Ariz. 502, 131 Pac. 975; In re Cutting's Estate, 172 Cal. 191, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1171, 155 Pac. 1002; In re Roton's Will, 95 S. C. 118, 78 S. E. 711; Koontz v.

At common law, the marriage of a woman revokes her will, for the reason, it is said, that, since the marriage destroys her right to make or revoke a will, if marriage did not in itself cause a revocation, the will would stand as a permanent disposition of her property.90 This rule is a positive rule of law, and evidence is not admissible to show a contrary intention on the part of testatrix.91 In several states it has been held that this rule does not apply when the common-law restriction upon the right of a married woman to make a will no longer exists.92 An express statutory provision in accordance with the common-law rule has, however, been held not to be impliedly repealed by a statute giving testamentary capacity to married women;93 and the common-law rule has been regarded as confirmed by a provision, in the statute regarding the revocation of wills, that nothing therein contained shall prevent the revocation implied by law from subsequent changes in the condition or circumstances of the testator.94

By the common-law rule, generally recognized as in force in this country, in the absence of a statutory change, the marriage of a man, if followed by the birth of a child, revokes his will previously made.95 This rule

Koontz, 83 Wash. 180, 145 Pac. 201.

90. 1 Jarman, Wills, 110; Hodsden v. Lloyd, 2 Brown Ch. 534; Garrett v. Dabney, 27 Miss. 335. So by statute in a number of states. 1 Stimson's Am. St. Law, Sec. 2676(A).

91. Nutt v. Norton, 142 Mass. 242, 7 N. E. 720; Hoitt v. Hoitt, 63 N. H. 475, 56 Am. Rep. 530, 3 Atl. 604.

92. In .re Tuller's Will, 79 111. 99, 22 Am. Rep. 164; In re Emery, 81 Me. 275, 17 Atl. 68; Roane v. Hollingshead, 76 Md. 369, 35 Am. St. Rep. 438, 17 L. R. A. 592; Noyes v. Southworth, 55 Mich.