38. See Murray v. Cazier, 23 Ind. App. 600, 53 N. E. 476; Priester v. Hohloch, 70 N. Y. App. Div. 256, 75 N. Y. Supp. 405; Tuttle v. Raish, 116 Iowa, 331, 90 N. W. 66; Larson v. Lund, 109 Minn. 372, 123 N. W. 1070.

39. Ante, Sec. 461, notes 40-47.

40. See Griffin v. Mcintosh, 176 Mo. 392, 75 S. W. 677. And see cases cited, ante, Sec. 461, note 47; Murphy v. Gabbert, 166 Mo. 596, 89 Am. St. Rep. 733, 66 S. W. 536; Terry v. Glover, 235 Mo. 544, 139 S. W. 337; Pinkham v. Pinkham, 55 Neb. 729, 76 N. W. 411; Sappingfield v. King, 49 Ore.

102, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1066, 89 Pac. 142, 90 Pac. 150; Turner v. Scott, 51 Pa. 26; Coulter v. Shelmadine, 204 Pa. 120, 53 All. 638; Fellbush v. Fellbush, 216 Pa. 141, 65 Atl. 28.

41. Seay v. Huggins, 194 Ala. 496, 70 So. 113; Donald v. Nes-bit, 89 Ga. 290, 15 S. E. 367; Ransom v. Pottawattamie County, 168 Iowa, 570, 150 N. W. 657; In re Bybee's Estate, 179 Iowa, 1089, 160 N. W. 900; Leonard v. Leonard, 145 Mich. 563, 108 N. W. 985; Moody v. Macomber, 159 Mich. G57, 124 N. W. 549; Simpson v. Mc-gee, 112 Miss. 344, 73 So. 55.

That an instrument undertakes to dispose only of such property as the maker may have at the time of his death has been regarded as strong, if not conclusive, evidence of an intention that the instrument shall oiterate as a will and not as a conveyance.41

42. Abney v. Moore, 106 Ala. 131, 18 So. 60; Phillips v. Phillips, 186 Ala. 545, 65 So. 89; Burch v. Nicks, 50 Ark. 367, 7 S. W. 563; West v. Wright, 115 Ga. 277, 41 S. E. 602; Griffith v. Douglas, 120 Ga. 582, 48 S. E. 129; Harsh-barger v. Carroll, 163 111. 636, 45 N. E. 5G5; Hathaway v. Cook, 258 111. 92, 101 N. E. 227; Kelly v. Shimer, 152 Ind. 290, 53 N. E. 233; Rust v. Rutherford, 95 Kan. 152, 147 Pac. 805; Phillips v. Lumber Co., 94 Ky. 445, 42 Am. St. Rep. 367, 22 S. W. 652; Hunt v.

Hunt, 119 Ky. 39, 68 L. R. A. 180, 82 S. W. 998; Abbott v. Holway, 72 Me. 298; Vessey v. Dwyer, 133 N. W. 613; Rogers v. Rogers (Miss.) 43 So. 946; Wimpey v. Ledford (Mo.) 177 S. W. 302; Merck v. Merck, 83 S. C. 329, 65 S. E. 347; Triim-ijauer v. Rust, 36 S. I). 301,154 N. W. 801; Garrison v. Mc-lain, (Tex. Civ. App.) 112 S. W. 773; Lauck v. Logan, 45 W. Va. 25, 31 S. E. 986.

42a. Ante, Sec. 169.

43. Nichols v. Nichols, 108 Cal. 444, 143 Pac. 712; Robinflon v. Schley, 6 Ga. 515; Brewer v.

That an instrument, in form a conveyance inter vivos, is handed to a person other than the grantee, with instructions to retain it until the grantor's death, is not, by reason of the reference to the grantor's death, testamentary in character, is generally recognized,44 such a physical transfer being regarded as involving delivery, of a quasi conditional character, of the instrument as a conveyance.45 If, however, the grantor, at the time of handing the instrument to a third person,46 or to the grantee himself,47 indicates an intention that the instrument shall have no operation whatsoever until the grantor's death, and that in the meanwhile he may revoke or cancel it, or treat it as not legally existent, the instrument cannot be regarded as having been delivered as a conveyance, and it must be regarded, either as an instrument of conveyance which is nugatory for lack of delivery, or as a testamentary instrument which is valid only if executed as such.47a

Baxter, 41 Ga. 512, 5 Am. Rep. 530; Roth v. Michalis, 125 111. 325, 17 N. E. 809; Heaston v. Kreig, 167 Ind. 101, 119 Am. St. Rep. 475, 77 N. E. 805; Poore v. Poore, 55 Kan. 687, 41 Pac. 973; Watkins v. Dean, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 321, 31 Am. Dec. 583; See Kyle v. Perdue, 87 Ala. 423, 6 So. 296; Roth v. Michaelis, 125 111. 325, 17 N. E. 809; Gage v. Gage, 12 N. H. 371.

44. Griswold v. Griswold, 148 Ala. 239, 121 Am. St. Rep. 64, 42 So. 554; Fine v. Lasater, 110 Ark. 425, 161 S. W. 1147; Hunt v. Wicht, 174 Cal. 205, 162 Pae. 639; Thurston v. Tubbs, 257 111. 465, 100 N. E. 947; American Nat Bank of Lincoln v. Martin, 277 111. 629, 115 N. E. 721; Wheeler v. Loesch, 51 Ind. App. 262, 99 N. E. 502; Schillinger v. Bawek, 135 Iowa, 131, 112 N. W.

210; Hoagland v. Beckley, 158 Mich. 565, 123 N. W. 12; Peterson v. Bisbee, 191 Mich. 439, 158 N. W. 134; Dickson v. Miller, 124 Minn. 346, 145 N. W. 112; Saltz-sieder v. Saltzsieder, 219 N. Y. 523, 114 N. E. 856; Shaffer v. Smith, 53 Okla. 352, 156 Pac. 1188.

45. Ante, Sec. 462.

46. Williams v. Kidd, 170 Cal. 631, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 703, 151 Pac. 1; Shipley v. Shipley, 274 111. 506, 113 N. E. 906; Tewkesbury v. Tewkesbury, 222 Mass. 595, 111 N. E. 394; Felt v. Felt, 155 Mich. 237, 118 N .W. 953.

47. Benner v. Bailey, 234 111. 79, 84 N. E. 638; Felt v. Felt, 155 Mich. 237, 118 N. W. 953; Watson v. Magill, 85 N. J. Eq. 592, 97 Atl. 43.

47a. Cox v. Schnerr, 172 Cal. 371, 156 Pac. 509.

Extrinsic facts and circumstances may usually be considered in order to ascertain whether a particular instrument was or was not intended to operate as a will.48 That is, the animus testandi, if not apparent from the face of the instrument, may be shown otherwise, and consequently, although the phrasing of an instrument is strongly suggestive of a conveyance inter vivos, or even of a contract, it may operate as a will.49 Conversely, although the instrument contains phrases suggestive of a will, it may be shown that it was intended to operate, not as a will but as a convevance inter vivos.50 There are several decisions, however, that if an instrument contains no language suggestive of a testamentary intent, such intent cannot be shown by-proof of extrinsic circumstances.51 And there are also decisions that if the language of the instrument clearly shows a testamentary intent, it cannot be shown to have been intended to take effect as a conveyance.52

48. Nichols v. Nichols, 2 Phillim. 183; Lister v. Smith, 3 Swab. & Tris. 282; Sharp v. Hall, 86 Ala. 110, 11 Am. St. Rep. 28; Clarke v. Ransom, 50 Cal. 595; Tuttle v. Raish, 116 Iowa, 331, 90 N. W. 66 (semble); Wareham v. Sellers, 9 G. & J. (Md.) 98; Mcgrath v. Reynolds, 116 Mass. 566; Prather v. Prath-er, 97 Miss. 311, 52 So. 449; Outlaw v. Hurdle, 46 N. C. 150; Tozer v. Jackson, 164 Pa. 373, 30 Atl. 400; White v. Helmes, 1 Mccord (S. C.) 430; Ferguson v. Ferguson, 27 Tex. 3.:9; Bel-garde v. Carter, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 146 S. W. 964; Smith v. Smith, 112 Va. 205, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1018, 70 S. E. 491.

49. Gomez v. Higgins, 130 Ala. 493, 30 So. 417; Wellborn v. Weaver, 17 Ga. 267, 63 Am. Dec. 235; Blackman v. Preston,

Requiring that the will be signed, it has been decided that the place of the signature, whether by the testator himself, or by another for him, is immaterial, and that it may be made in the margin, in the body of the will, or elsewhere. Accordingly, the writing of the testator's name in the body of the will, as when he commences it, "I, John B.," is sufficient, under such statutes, as a signature, provided, it seems, it is so intended, or at least another signature is not intended to be added.62 The statutes of a number of states, however, require the testator to "subscribe" the will, or contain some other express requirement that the signature appear at the end of the will,03 and there are a number of decisions upon the question of whether the signature to a particular will was at the end thereof, so as to comply with the statute.64 The solution of this question involves the consideration, not only of whether some particular language is to be regarded as following the signature,65 but also of whether this language is of such a dispositive character as properly to constitute a part of the will, so that its occurrence after the signature can be regarded as conclusive that this is not at the end of the will.66 It has, moreover, occasionally been con62. Lemayne v. Stanley, 3 Lev. 1; Armstrong's Ex'r v. Armstrong's Heirs, 29 Ala. 538; Miles', Will, 4 Dana. (Ky.) 1; Armstrong v. Walton, 105 Miss. 337, 62 So. 173; Catlett v. Catlett, 55 Mo. 330; Peace v. Edwards, 170 N. C. 64, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 778, 86 S. E. "807; Lawson v. Dawson. 21 Tex. Civ. App. 361, 53 S. W. 64. See In re Phelan's Estate, 82 N. J. 316, 87 Atl. 625; In re Booth, 127 N. Y. 109, 24 Am. St. Rep. 429.

123 111. 381, 15 N. E. 42; Ison v. Halcomb, 136 Ky. 523, 124 S. W. 813; Moody v. Macomber, 159 Mich. 657, 124 N. W. 549; Sartor v. Sartor, 39 Miss. 760; In re Belcher, 66 N. C. 51; Kiesecker's Estate, 190 Pa. St. 476, 42 Atl. 886; Ingram v. Porter, 4 Mccord (S. C.) 198.

50. Ward v. Ward. 104 Ky. 857, 48 S. W. 411: Clayton v. Liverman, 29 N. C. 92; Tozar v. Jackson, 164 Pa. 373; Faulk v. Faulk, 23 Tex. 653.

51. Clay v. Layton, 134 Mich. 317, 96 N. W. 458; Hudson v. Dodson, 142 Mich. 586. 105 N. \Y. 1110; Elliott v. Cheney, is:: Mich. 561, 150 N. W. 163; Noble v. rickes, 230 111. 594, 82 N. E 950, 13 L. R. A .N. S. 1203 And see Fellbush v. Pellbush, 216 Pa. 141, 65 Atl. 28,

52. Goodale v. Evans, 263 Mo.

Upon the question whether an instrument which purports on its face to be a will, and is duly executed as such, can be shown to have been executed without any intention that it have a legal effect, whether it can be shown, for instance, that it was executed merely as a memorandum, or to illustrate how a will should be made, or to obtain immunity from the solicitation of a person named therein, the cases are not entirely in accord. The tendency of the authorities in this country is rather adverse to the introduction of evidence for this purpose, the solemnity of the execution of the instrument in the statutory mode being regarded as sufficient to exclude the possibility of thus asserting a lack of testamentary intent.53 The English authorities are to the effect that a lack of such intent may be shown.54