Having been confirmed by a senatus consultum (April 20), a plebiscite was ordered upon it for May 8. By the most strenuous exertions of the imperialists, and their interference everywhere with the elections, the result was made to show more than 7,000,000 affirmative votes, against fewer than 2,000,000 negative and illegal ballots. The large cities cast a great proportion of the negative votes; in the army and navy 47,000 persons voted "No." In spite of this result, the situation of internal affairs was extremely grave; and it is not to be doubted that, in the hope of warding off a more serious crisis, Napoleon rather favored than retarded the progress of those foreign complications which, in the early summer of 1870, began to assume a threatening aspect.-For a considerable period indefinite rumors of a possible alliance between France and Austria against the increasing power and pretensions of Prussia had agitated European diplomacy. Of late they had gained in distinctiveness. The position of Austria did not appear decided, but in France unmistakable manifestations of a hostile spirit on the part of the government were made; chief among them, perhaps, was the appointment to the ministry of foreign affairs of the duke de Gramont, well known for his hostility to Prussia. Hardly had this appointment been made when an unexpected event occurred, which hastened the rapidly increasing complications, and furnished what was taken by the French as an immediate cause of war.

This was the declaration of the candidature of the Hohenzollern prince Leopold for the throne of Spain. On July 6 Olli-vier and Gramont declared in the corps legislatif that such a candidature, agreed upon without the knowledge of the French government, could not be permitted by France. The greatest excitement against Prussia followed, both in the corps legislatif and among the people. The voluntary withdrawal of Prince Leopold did not end the matter. Benedetti, the French ambassador to the Prussian court, who had before been instructed to request the king of Prussia to command Prince Leopold's retirement from the candidature, was now instructed to demand of that monarch an explicit promise that no prince of Hohenzollern should ever in the future be a candidate for the Spanish crown. This demand, especially when pressed upon the king (who was then at Ems) in an unwarranted and even insolent manner, was decidedly refused (July 13). The king denied to Benedetti another interview; and the latter was recalled by Napoleon, while Prussia immediately withdrew her representative from the French court (July 14). Five days later, and after the failure of the proffer of mediation made by England and also by the pope, war was formally declared by France (July 19). The short time elapsing between the first public warnings of approaching hostilities and this formal declaration had been sufficient to permit popular enthusiasm in both countries to rise to the highest pitch; but in the matter of actual military preparations the two nations found themselves, as events proved, in widely different conditions.

In France, where measures for the increase and reorganization of the army and for the improvement of the military situation in all respects had occupied for several years a considerable part of the attention of the legislature, the preparation for a possible war had been perhaps more conspicuous than in the North German confederation; but so much less thorough in many respects had been the carrying out of the French military system that its results did not bear out the estimates upon which both people and government relied. The French army at the beginning of 1870 nominally numbered on a peace footing about 400,000 men; it was supposed from the estimates that it could be raised on a war footing, and including the national guard and all branches of the service, to nearly twice that number. That these expectations, however, were based upon exaggerated estimates of the numbers as well as of the immediate availability of the troops at command, appeared at the very beginning of military movements. The number of troops in the active army at the disposition of France at the beginning of the war was, according to the best military authorities, about 427,000; there were about 87,000 regular reserve troops in addition to these; and the entire force of men who, besides all those just named, could still be called out in the most extreme emergency (chiefly those employed in garrison duty), was about 157,000. The active or field army, which it is alone necessary to consider at this time, had been rapidly prepared for war for several months before the declaration.

The preparation of munitions and the purchase of horses and provisions were carried on with great energy throughout the months of May and June; while the organization of the line and the assignments of officers to its divisions and brigades were at the same time pushed forward. Yet so defective had been the arrangements of the government that the outbreak of hostilities found the army in great part unprepared, while the preparations for their mobilization were in the most incomplete condition. The "army of the Rhine," the first portion of the active force which was in any way ready for service, was pushed forward as rapidly as possible to the Rhenish frontier; but most of its munitions and equipments, instead of going forward at the same time, followed at irregular intervals; and the troops, arrived at their destinations, were subject in consequence to the most fatal delays. The whole strength of this first active army that appeared in the field did not exceed, by the highest estimates, 310,000 men; and of these probably not more than 270,000 constituted the "army of invasion," with the advance of which at the frontier actual hostilities began. In contrast with this state of affairs, the military system of Germany exhibited the greatest advantages.

Not only did the immediate support of the South German states (upon whose neutrality, if not upon their positive opposition to Prussia, Napoleon had undoubtedly relied) enable King William to bring into the field an active army more than one third greater than that of France; but the perfect organization which prevailed especially in the Prussian, and in less degree throughout the whole German military force, enabled him to do what was of perhaps even more importance, concentrate immediately on the frontier a well disciplined, perfectly trained, and completely prepared body of men; anticipating the movements of the enemy by taking advantage of his delay. Directly after the declaration of war, Germany found at its immediate disposition an active force of about 447,000 men, ready for the very beginning of hostile operations; and behind this were a first reserve of 188,000, and a second reserve of about 225,000, to say nothing of the Landuehr, or home militia. From the active force of 447,000, three armies were formed: the first, under Gen. von Steinmetz, took up it3 position (as the right wing) near Treves; the second, under Prince Frederick Charles, occupied the Rhenish Palatinate; the third, under the crown prince of Prussia, assembled on the frontier of Baden, from Mannheim to Ras-tadt. While the German forces had assembled in these positions, the French army of the Rhine had, after the delays we have explained, arranged itself as follows: The 1st corps, under Marshal MacMahon, was posted near Strasburg; the 5th corps (Gen. Failly) further to the northward, along the frontier of the Palatinate, near Bitsch; in the centre, the 3d corps, under Bazaine, assembled near Metz; the 2d corps (Gen. Fros-sard) was pushed forward toward the Prussian frontier near St. Avold; the 4th corps (Gen. Ladmirault) was near Thionville, on the left wing; reserves, under Bourbaki and Canrobert, were respectively at Nancy and at the camp of Chalons; the 7th corps, under Gen. Felix Douay, occupied the fortress of Belfort. In these positions the opposing armies stood ready for action in the last days of the month of July. A few skirmishes, of trifling importance, had taken place; but no decisive movement had been made on either side.