"First. The requirement of the Constitution is not that some, but that full, faith and credit shall be given by states to the judicial decrees of other states. That is to say, where a decree rendered in one state is embraced by the full faith and credit clause that constitutional provision commands that the other states shall give to the decree the force and effect to which it was entitled in the state where rendered. Harding vs. Harding, 198 U. S., 317, 25 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 679.

"Second. Where a personal judgment has been rendered in the courts of a state against a nonresident merely upon constructive service, and therefore without acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, such judgment may not be enforced in another state in virtue of the full faith and credit clause. Indeed, a personal judgment so rendered is by operation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment void as against the nonresident even in the state where rendered, and, therefore, such nonresident in virtue of rights granted by the Constitution of the United States may successfully resist, even in the state where rendered, the enforcement of such a judgment. Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U. S., 714. The facts in that case were these: Neff, who was a resident of a state other than Oregon, owned a tract of land in Oregon. Mitchell, a resident of Oregon, brought a suit in a court of that state upon a money demand against Neff. The Oregon statutes required, in the case of personal action against a nonresident, a publication of notice calling upon the defendant to appear and defend, and also required the mailing to such defendant at his last known place of residence of a copy of the summons and complaint. Upon affidavit of the absence of Neff, and that he resided in the state of California, the exact place being unknown, the publication required by the statute was ordered and made, and judgment by default was entered against Neff. Upon this judgment execution was issued and real estate of Neff was sold and was ultimately acquired by Pennoyer. Neff sued in the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of Oregon to recover the property, and the question presented was the validity in Oregon of the judgment there rendered against Neff. After the most elaborate consideration it was expressly decided that the judgment rendered in Oregon under the circumstances stated was void for want of jurisdiction and was repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States. The ruling was based on the proposition that a court of one state could not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against a nonresident who did not appear by the mere publication of a summons, and that the want of power to acquire such jurisdiction by publication could not be aided by the fact that under the statutes of the state in which the suit against the nonresident was brought the sending of a copy of the summons and complaint to the post-office address in another state of the defendant was required and complied with. The court said (page 727):

" 'Process from the tribunals of one State cannot ran into another State, and summon parties there domiciled to leave its territory and respond to proceedings against them. Publication of process or notice within the State where the tribunal sits cannot create any greater obligation upon the nonresident to appear. Process sent to him out of the State, and process published within it, are equally unavailing in proceedings to establish his personal liability.'

"And the doctrine thus stated but expressed a general principle expounded in previous decisions. Bischoff vs. Wethered, 9 Wall. (U. S.), 812. In that case, speaking of a money judgment recovered in the Common Pleas of Westminster Hall, England, upon personal notice served in the City of Baltimore, Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, said (page 814):

" 'It is enough to say [of this proceeding] that it was wholly without jurisdiction of the person, and whatever validity it may have in England, by virtue of statute law against property of the defendant there situate, it can have no validity here, even of a prima facie character. It is simply null.'

"Third. The principles, however, stated in the previous proposition are controlling only as to judgments in personam and do not relate to proceedings in rem. That is to say, in consequence of the authority which government possesses over things within its borders there is jurisdiction in a court of a State by a proceeding in rem, after the giving of reasonable opportunity to the owner to defend, to affect things within the jurisdiction of the court, even although jurisdiction is not directly acquired over the person of the owner of the thing. Pennoyer vs. Neff, supra.

"Fourth. The general rule stated in the second proposition is, moreover, limited by the inherent power which all governments must possess over the marriage relation, its formation and dissolution, as regards their own citizens. From this exception it results that where a court of one State, conformably to the laws of such State, or the State through its legislative department, has acted concerning the dissolution of the marriage tie, as to a citizen of that State, such action is binding in that State as to such citizen, and the validity of the judgment may not therein be questioned on the ground that the action of the State in dealing with its own citizen concerning the marriage relation was repugnant to the due process clause of the constitution. Maynard vs. Hill, 125 U. S., 190; 8 U. S. Sup. Ct. Rep., 723. In that case the facts were these: Maynard was married in Vermont, and the husband and wife removed to Ohio, from whence Maynard left his wife and family and went to California. Subsequently he acquired a domicile in the territory of Washington. Being there so domiciled, an act of the legislature of the territory was passed granting a divorce to the husband. Maynard continued to reside in Washington, and there remarried and died. The children of the former wife, claiming in right of their mother, sued in a court of the territory of Washington to recover real estate situated in the territory, and one of the issues for decision was the validity of the legislative divorce granted to the father. The statute was assailed as invalid, on the ground that Mrs. May-nard had no notice and that she was not a resident of the territory when the act was passed. From a decree of the Supreme Court of the territory adverse to their claim the children brought the case to this court. The power of the territorial legislature, in the absence of restrictions in the organic art, to grant a divorce to a citizen of the territory was, however, upheld, in view of the nature and extent of the authority which government possessed over the marriage relation. It was therefore decided that the courts of the territory committed no error in giving effect within the territory to the divorce in question. And as a corollary of the recognized power of a government thus to deal with its own citizen by a decree which would be operative within its own borders, irrespective of any extraterritorial efficacy, it follows that the right of another sovereignty exists, under principles of comity, to give to a decree so rendered such efficacy as to that government may seem to be justified by its conceptions of duty and public policy.