More difficulty is experienced in determining in what cases equity will decree specific performance of a contract for the sale of personal property.

Instead of granting relief in all such cases, as it does when real property is concerned, equity will only decree specific performance of contracts for the sale of personal property, when the special circumstances render such relief proper. The Supreme Court of Illinois, discussing this question in the case of Cohn vs. Mitchell,5 said:

"It is to be remarked, in the first place, courts of chancery have a large discretion in this class of cases. It is true it is a judicial discretion, and is therefore subject to review where relief is denied in a case clearly brought within the general principles which control courts of equity in the exercise of this branch of their jurisdiction. A court of review, however, before interposing in any case must be able to say there has been an abuse of this discretion. It results from this general principle, that every case of specific performance must necessarily depend in a large degree upon its own special circumstances. (Andrews vs. Sullivan, 2 Gilm., 327.) Again, the general rule clearly is, that a court of equity will not decree the specific performance of a contract relating to personal property unless there is some element or feature in it to show that the relief at law might not be adequate, - as, where the measure of damages resulting from the non-performance of the agreement is uncertain or difficult to ascertain, or where the thing contracted for has to the complainant some intrinsic or special value, and the like. The contract sought to be specifically enforced in this case is one relating solely to personal property. No special feature in the case has been suggested as authorizing the relief sought, and the only authority cited as supporting the theory of the bill is McMullen et ux. vs. Vanzant, 73 I11., 192. The statement cited by counsel from that case, to the effect 'that the fact that an action at law would lie on the agreement sought to be enforced was no reason why it might not be enforced in equity,' is certainly true, and would hardly be denied by any one. The case, however, has but slight bearing, if any, on the one before us. There are two elements of equity jurisdiction that enter into that case that we do not find in this - fraud and an express trust - the latter alone being sufficient to warrant the decree."

3 Harris vs. Greenleaf, 117 Ky., 817.

4 Id.

5 115 111., 124.

The most general rule which can be laid down is that specific performance will never be decreed for the sale of articles such as wheat, or corn, which can be readily purchased in the open market at any time.6

6 Scott vs. Billgerry, 40 Miss., 119; Gloucester Isinglass, etc., Co. vs. Russian Cement Co., 154 Mass., 92.

"Where the corporate stock to which the contract relates is not procurable in the market, and its pecuniary value is not readily ascertainable, specific performance will, as a rule, be decreed,7 especially where the court acquires jurisdiction of the action on the ground that it is an action to enforce a trust.8 Also where the stock with reference to which the contract is made is of peculiar value to the plaintiff in order that he may obtain a proper and legitimate control over the management of a private corporation, specific performance will, as a rule, be decreed."9 10