Numerous decisions uphold the power of the legislature to grant to municipal corporations authority to enact ordinances regulating the weighing of meat, vegetables, grain and other products. The right to pass inspection laws belongs to the police powers of the government, and the legislature has authority to arrange the distribution of such powers as the public exigencies may require, apportioning them to local jurisdictions to such extent as the law-making power deems appropriate.

Inspection laws are not regarded as imposing burdens upon trade, nor as unjustly discriminating in favor of one class at the expense of another, so long as they are reasonable.25

24 Gundling vs. City of Chicago, 176

III., 340. 25 People vs. Harper, 91 III., 357;

Stokes vs. New York, 14 Wend. (N. Y.), 87; Howe vs. Norris, 12 Allen (Mass.), 82.

Under the police powers, whatever disturbs the public comfort, quiet and convenience may be prohibited by the enactment of ordinances, such, for example, as breaking the Sabbath, carrying concealed weapons, blasting of rock, preaching and singing in the street, public drunkenness, unnecessary blowing of steam whistles and cruelty to animals.

An ordinance or statute providing that certain acts upon the streets shall be unlawful without a permit from the mayor or governor, is a reasonable and valid law.26 A street is for ordinary business traffic and travel, and not for holding meetings.

Every street meeting or parade is an extraordinary use of the street, and such use is by sufferance of the public, and the public, through its constituted authorities, has the inherent right to regulate and control such use.27

Power of a Municipal Corporation to Prevent and Abate Nuisances.

Section 80. Although the power of municipal corporations to prevent and abate nuisances is usually conferred by direct legislative authority, yet the opinion prevails, that in the absence of such authority, the power is inherent in these corporations.

The power to abate nuisances is a portion of the police authority necessarily vested in the corporation of all populous towns.28

Where things are not nuisances per se, but become so under certain circumstances, it is generally held, that a declaration by the proper authority that it is a nuisance, is conclusive.

26 10 Allen (Mass.), 88; Pedrick vs. Heaton, 12 Gray, 161; Dunn vs. People, 94 III.. 140; State vs. White, 5 Atl. Rep., 828.

27 City of Bloomington vs. Richardson, 38 III., 60.

28 Baker vs. Boston, 12 Pick. (Mass.), 184; Kennedy vs. Phelps, 10 La. An., 227.

The general rule is that, if a thing is in its nature, or because forbidden by law, a nuisance, or if, in its nature, it may be a nuisance, although there might be an honest difference of opinion upon that point, the determination of the city council or other proper authority that it is a nuisance is conclusive.

However, trades, occupations, etc., which in their nature are not nuisances but which may become so by reason of their locality, surroundings or the manner in which they are conducted, etc., cannot be arbitrarily declared to be nuisances, but only when, under the circumstances, they are so in fact.

It is held, that the legislature has unquestioned authority under the constitution to confer on an incorporated town, the power to declare what shall be nuisances, and to provide for their abatement.29

29 Roberts vs. Ogle, 30 III., 459; in this case the court used the following language: "The Town of Carrolton was by its charter authorized to declare what should be nuisances, and to provide for the abatement thereof by ordinance. An ordinance was passed, declaring swine running at large within the corporate limits to be nuisances, and providing for the abatement thereof. The court instructed, 'that under the laws of the State of Illinois, the owners of stock have the right to turn them upon the common range of the county, and the corporation of the town of Carrolton has no right to pass an ordinance to impair that right; and that the ordinance, under which the defendant justifies the taking of the plaintiff's hogs, is null and void, so far as it regards persons residing without the limits of the corporation.' This instruction was erroneous. Admitting the right of common to be as stated, it is not such a right as is not within legislative control. It may be abridged or destroyed, wherever and whenever the law making power may think the public good may require it. If the legislature has the constitutional authority to confer this power upon the corporation, then the corporation had authority to pass this ordinance. The right to have hogs at large, in the corporate limits, is of no higher order than the right to have spirituous liquors within the same limits, and in the case of Goddard vs. Jacksonville, 15 III., 588, we held that it was competent to the legislature to authorize the corporation to destroy such right by declaring liquor a nuisance there. The ordinance was valid, and the instruction erroneous."

Numerous authorities hold, that the remedy by injunction will lie to restrain a municipal corporation from interfering with the use of property which has not been lawfully ascertained and declared to be a nuisance.30

Mode of Abatement. - Although the usual legal proceedings are generally resorted to by municipal corporations to abate public nuisances, yet the state has the undoubted authority to confer upon them the power of summary abatement in cases of emergency.31

The summary abatement of nuisances is a remedy which has ever existed in the law, and its exercise cannot be regarded as in conflict with constitutional provisions for the protection of the rights of private property, and giving a trial by jury.

The doctrine of law is quite generally recognized, that a court of equity has no power to enjoin the exercise of the police powers given by law to the officers of a municipal corporation, so as to prevent such officers from preserving the public peace, and from keeping a public street open to public use. The court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the public duties of any of the departments of the government, or override the policy of the state.

In the case of City of Chicago et al. vs. Wright, 69 III., 326, the court said: "Was it ever before heard of, that it was within the province of a court of equity to overrule the policy of the state, manifested by a statute passed with reference to the public peace and security, and thus shackle the hands of state officers whose functions relate to the preservation of that peace and security? The heads of the police department of Chicago are not merely municipal officers, whose functions relate exclusively to that particular municipality, but they are state officers-that is, officers whose duties concern the state at large or the general public, although exercised within defined territorial limits. The administration of justice, the preservation of the public peace, and the like, although confided to local agencies, are essentially matters of public concern."

30 Denver vs. Mullen, 7 Colo., 345; Kennedy vs. Phelps, 10 La. An., 227; Ferguson vs. Selma, 43 Ala., 398; Potter vs. Mena-sha, 30 Wis., 492.

31 Baumgartner vs. Hasty, 100 Ind., 575; Town of Davis vs. Davis, 4 W. Va., 464.

Authority of a Municipal Corporation to Provide Water Supply or Lights.

Section 81. Municipal corporations are usually empowered to provide for an adequate and proper water supply by their charter or by statutory provision.

"In the absence of such provision this particular power has been regarded as embraced within the general police power to make proper provision for the security, welfare, health, and good government of the inhabitants, or the authority to make such contracts as shall be deemed necessary for the welfare of the municipality." 32

Municipal corporations, under their general police powers, have the authority to furnish lights for their streets and other public places; and this power to light its streets includes the power to acquire, by purchase or building, a plant for such purpose.

It is not uncommon to confer upon municipal corporations express power to provide by contract for the lighting of their streets, public grounds and buildings.33

32 See Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 20, page 1148, and also see in same work the title, Waterworks and Water Companies.

33 Richmond County Gas-Light Co. vs. Middleton, 59 N. Y., 228; Mitchell vs. Negaunee, 113 Mich., 359.