Section 17. (1) To sue and be sued. A county could neither sue nor be sued at common law, and it is only by virtue of statutory authority that an action can be maintained by it or against it; being merely a part of the State government, it partakes of the State's immunity from liability. The State is not liable, except by its own consent; and so the county is exempt from liability, unless the State has consented.13 The liabilities of counties, whether grounding in tort or contract, are the mere creatures of statutes; and they possess no power, and can incur no obligations, except such as are specially provided for by statute. In the absence of statute there is no county liability.14

10 Monroe County vs. Strong, 78 Miss., 565; Platter vs. Elkhart County. 103 Ind., 360.

11 The People ex rel. vs. McCormick et al., 106 III., 184.

12 State vs. Prince, 45 Wis., 610; State vs. Tippecanoe County, 131 Ind., 90; Walton vs. Greenwood, 60 Me., 356.

Section 18. (2) To take and hold real and personal property within their respective limits for county purposes. Counties possess only such powers respecting the acquisition of real estate as are given them either expressly or impliedly by statute, and they are generally given power by statutory enactment to acquire and hold both real and personal estate for the public use of the county.15

Section 19. (3) To make contracts. Counties are corporations to the extent that they may lawfully enter into contracts through their authorized officers or agents, usually the board of county commissioners, with the limitation that the officers or agents of a county cannot bind the county by any contract beyond the scope of its lawful powers or foreign to its purpose. The law is well settled, that all persons dealing with officers or agents of counties are bound to ascertain the limits of their authority or power as fixed by statutory or organic law, and are chargeable with knowledge of such limits, and such officers or agents cannot bind the county unless strictly within the limits so imposed.16

13 Browning vs. City of Springfield,

17 III., 142. 14 Granger vs. Pulaski Co., 26 Ark.,

37; Russell vs. Men of Devon,

2 T. R., 671. 15 As the power of a county to acquire and hold real estate is purely statutory, the mode to be pursued as provided in the statutes, must be strictly followed.

Section 20. (4) To borrow money. The weight of authority upholds the doctrine, that counties being the creatures of statute, that the power to borrow money and issue bonds will not be implied, but must be expressly granted to authorize its exercise. The mode by which a county may exact from its people funds needful for lawful expenses of the county, the purpose for which said funds may be expended, and the manner of its disbursement from the county treasury, are defined and regulated by statute.17

The statutes or constitutions of many of the states expressly limit the amount of the indebtedness counties may contract, and in some jurisdictions, an affirmative vote of the people of the county is required to authorize the borrowing of money.18