As adopted, the federal Constitution contained no definition of citizenship. Impliedly, however, it recognized a state citizenship in that clause which provides that " citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States." It would also seem to have recognized a federal citizenship in the clauses providing that the President shall be "a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;" that Senators and Representatives shall have been nine and seven years respectively citizens" of the United States;" and that Congress shall have the power to pass laws regulating the naturalization of aliens.

The relationship between these two citizenships, state and national, however, the Constitution did not expressly determine.

There has never been any question as to the existence under the Constitution of a distinction between state and federal citizenship.3 The only dispute has been as to the relation of the two.

Prior to the argument of the Dred Scott case there was surprisingly little discussion of this point. The opinion generally held seems, however, to have been that every citizen of a State was a citizen of the United States. This was the view declared by Rawle in his work on the Constitution and by Story in his Commentaries. Story says: "Every citizen of a State is ipso facto a citizen of the United States."4 But it would appear that Story did not hold that the federal citizen body is made up exclusively of state citizens, for in the next section he adds: '"And a person who is a naturalized citizen of the United States, by a like residence in any State of the Union becomes ipso facto a citizen of that State. So a citizen of a territory of the Union by a like residence acquires the character of the State where he resides." In support of this last statement, Story refers to the case of Gassies v. Ballon.5 In that case, decided in 1832, it was held that the allegation that the defendant had been naturalized as an American citizen and was residing in Louisiana was equivalent to an averment that he was a citizen of that State. "A citizen of the United States," Marshall declared without argument, "residing in any State of the Union, is a citizen of that State." From the foregoing it appears that it was held that there was a reciprocal relationship between federal and state citizenship. By residence in a State a federal citizen became ipso facto a citizen of that State; and a state citizen was ipso facto a federal citizen. This doctrine did not, it is evident, decide the question as to which of the two citizenships was the more fundamental. Calhoun and others of his school have, by some writers, been credited with the doctrine that there was no federal citizenship apart from the state citizenship - that one could become a federal citizen only by first becoming a citizen of one of the States.6 Calhoun did not, however, take exactly this position. In a speech delivered in the United 'states Senate in 1833 upon the then pending Force Bill, he declared: "If by a citizen of the United States he [Senator Clayton] means a citizen at large, one whose citizenship extends to the entire geographical limits of the country without having a local citizenship in some State or Territory, a sort of citizen of the world, all I have to say is that such a citizen would be a perfect nondescript; that not a single individual of this description can be found in the entire mass of the population. . . . Every citizen is a citizen af some State or Territory, and as such, under an express provision of the Constitution, is entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States; and it is in this and no other sense that we are citizens of the United States."

Holderman, 1871 (7 Kans. 50). And for the imposition of other requirements for voting see Anderson v. Baker. 1865 (23 Md. 531); People v. De La Guerra, 1870 (40 Cal. 311).

This note is taken from the Report on Citizenship, 1906. H. R. Doc. No. 326, 59th Cong., 2d Session, p. 46.

3 See, for instance, the early ease of Talbot v. Janson (3 Dall. 1331, decided in 1795, in which the renunciation of state citizenship, for which provision was made by the state Constitution, was held not to operate as a renunciation of allegiance to the United States. Of course, state citizenship may be lost by residence outside of the State without national citizenship being affected. (Prentiss v. Brennan, 2 Blatchf. 162.)

4 § 1687.

5 6 Pet. 7G1: 8 L. od. 573.

6 For example. see Brannon, The Fourteenth Amendment, p. 17.

From this it will be seen that Calhoun recognized not only a state citizenship but a territorial citizenship, which latter, of course, could be derived only from a federal source. What he and others of the States' Rights school held was that as between state citizenship and federal citizenship, the former was the more fundamental; that, in other words, the latter, except as to citizens in the Territories, was derived from the former. The fact of the federal control of naturalization Calhoun explained by alleging that that power was one which enabled Congress simply to remove the disabilities of foreign birth, the several States being left free to decide whether or not, when such disabilities had been removed from aliens resident within their borders, they should be accepted by them as citizens.