From the consideration of the status of aliens, we turn to an examination of the status of citizens or subjects.

The citizen or subject body of a State, regarded from the viewpoint of other States, that is, from the viewpoint of International Law, constitutes one homogeneous body, all the members of which have the same status, the same rights and duties. Considered, however, from the viewpoint of the constitutional or municipal law of the State in question, they may be grouped into distinct classes, with differing public and private rights. Thus it is that in the constitutional jurisprudence of the United States we have at present not only a distinction between federal and state citizenship, but, within the class of federal citizens, as including all those persons subject to the full sovereignty of the United .States, a distinction between those who are "citizens of the United States " according to the meaning of that phrase as used in the Constitution of the United States, and those who, though subjects of the United States, are not citizens within this narrower constitutional sense.

In Minor v. Happersett,1 decided in 1875, the definition of citizenship, its essential character, and the privileges necessarily attached to its possession, were examined in passing upon the claim made that a woman, as a citizen of the United States, might not, simply because of her sex, be denied by a State the right of suffrage. In denying this claim, Chief Justice Waite, who rendered the unanimous opinion of the court, declared: "There cannot be a nation without a people. The very idea of a political community, such as a nation is, implies an association of persons for the promotion of their general welfare. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. He owes it allegiance and is entitled to its protection. Allegiance and protection are, in this connection, reciprocal obligations. The one is a compensation for the other; allegiance for protection and protection for allegiance. For convenience it has been found necessary to give a name to this membership. The object is to designate by a title the person and the relation he bears to the nation. For this purpose the words 'subject,' 'inhabitant,' and 'citizen' have been used, and the choice between them is sometimes made to depend upon the form of the government. Citizen is now more commonly employed, however, and as it has been considered better suited to the description of one living under a republican government, it was adopted by nearly all of the States upon their separation from Great Britain, and was afterward adopted in the Articles of Confederation and in the Constitution of the United States. When used in this sense it is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more."2

121 Wall. 162; 22 L. ed. 627.

2 See, holding that the elective franchise is not a necessary incident of citizenship: 1. As to negroes - Smith v. Moody, 1866 (26 Ind. 299); United States v. Crosby, 1871 (1 Hughes, 448); Anthony v. Holderman, 1871 (7 Kans. 50); Van Valkenburg v. Brown, 1872 (43 Cal. 42); United States v. St. Petersburg (3 Hughes, 493); United States v. Reese, 1875 (92 U. S. 214; 23 L. ed. 563); and see Opinions of Justices, 1857 (44 Me. 507).

2. As to women - Spencer v. Board, 1873 (8 D. C. 169); United States v. Anthony, 1873 (11 Blatchf. 200); Minor v. Happersett, 1874 (21 Wall. 162; 22 L. ed. 627); Dorsey v. Brigham (177 111. 250); Gougar v. Timberlake, 1896 (148 Ind. 38); and see also People v. Oldtown, 1878 (88 111. 202); also Ware v. Wisner, 1883 (50 Fed. 310) holding that women are citizens.

3. As to minors - Lyons v. Cunningham, 1884 (66 Cal. 42); and see People v. Oldtown, supra. 4. As to Indians, holding that though they may have voted, this did not make them citizens - Laurent v. State, 1863 (1 Kans. 313). 5. As to aliens - Spragins v. Houghton, 1840 (2 Scam. 3 111. 377); In re Wohlitz, 1863 (16 Wis. 443); United States v. Hirschfield, 1876 (13 Blatchf. 330); Lanz v. Randall, 1876 (4 Dill. 425); City of Minneapolis v. Reum, 1893 (56 Fed. 576). An averment in pleading that one was "a citizen and resident" was held not equivalent to a specific charge that he was an "elector" - Blanck v. Pausch, 1885 (113 111. 60). That the elective franchise is not a right of citizenship is shown also by the fact that the courts have repeatedly sustained legislation which provides for a certain prior residence before voting in the county, town, and precinct. See Anthony v.