In the Weil case the court argued that the President might sign during a recess of Congress even if he might not sign after its adjournment, and this proposition was upheld by the Supreme Court in La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States.10 subject. They show that the decisions of the state courts with reference to the signing of state bills by the governor after legislative adjournment are in conflict, with the balance of authority, however, in support of the practice. 10 175 U. S. 423; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 168: 44 L. ed. 223. "The ground of this contention is that having met in regular session at the time appointed by law, the first Monday of December, 1892, and having on the 22d of that month (two days after the presentation of the bill to the President) by the joint action of the two Houses taken a recess to a named day, January 4, 1893, Congress was not actually sitting when the President, on the 28th day of December, 1892, by signing it, formally approved the act in question. The proposition, plainly stated, is that a bill passed by Congress and duly presented to the President does not become a law if his approval be given on a day when Congress is in recess. This implies that the constitutional power of the President to approve a bill so as to make it a law is absolutely suspended while Congress is in recess for a fixed time. It would follow from this that if both Houses of Congress by their joint or separate action were in recess from some Friday until the succeeding Monday, the President could not exercise that power on the intervening Saturday. Indeed, according to the argument of counsel the President could not effectively approve a bill on any day when one of the Houses, by its own separate action, was legally in recess for that day in order that necessary repairs be made in the room in which its sessions were being held. Yet many public acts and joint resolutions of great importance, together with many private acts, have been treated as valid and enforceable, which were approved by the President during the recesses of Congress covering the Christmas holidays. In the margin will be found a reference to some of the more recent of those statutes. Do the words of the Constitution, reasonably interpreted, sustain the views advanced for appellant? ... It is said that the approval by the President of a bill passed by Congress is not strictly an executive function, but is legislative in its nature; and this view, it is argued, conclusively shows that his approval can legally occur only on a day when 'both Houses are actually sitting in the performance of legislative functions. Undoubtedly the President when approving bills passed by Congress may be said to participate in the enactment of laws which the Constitution requires him to execute. But that consideration does not determine the question before us. As the Constitution, while authorizing the President to perform certain functions of a limited number that are legislative in their general nature, does not restrict the exercise of those functions to the particular days on which the two Houses of Congress are actually sitting in the transaction of public business, the court cannot impose such a restriction upon the Executive.

It is made his duty by the Constitution to examine and act upon every bill passed by Congress. The time within which he must approve or disapprove a bill is prescribed. If he approve a bill, it is made his duty to sign it. The Constitution is silent as to the time of his signing, except that his approval of a bill duly presented to him - if the bill is to become a law merely by virtue of such approval - must be manifested by his signature within ten days, Sundays excepted, after the bill has been presented to him. It necessarily results that a bill when so signed becomes from that moment a law. But in order that his refusal or failure to act may not defeat the will of the people, as expressed by Congress, if a bill be not approved and be not returned to the House in which it originated within that time, it becomes a law in like manner as if it had teen signed by him. We perceive nothing in these constitutional provisions making the approval of a bill by the President a nullity if such approval occurs while the two 'Houses of Congress are in recess for a named time. After the bill has been presented to the President, no further action is required by Congress in respect of that bill, unless it be disapproved by him and within the time prescribed by the Constitution be returned for reconsideration. It has properly been the practice of the President to inform Congress by message of his approval of bills, so that the fact may be recorded. But the essential thing to be done in order that a bill may become a law by the approval of the President is that it be signed within the prescribed time after being presented to him. That being done, and as soon as done, whether Congress is informed or not by the message from the President of the fact of his approval of it, the bill becomes a law, and is delivered to the Secretary of State as required by law. Much of the argument of counsel seems to rest upon the provision in relation to the final adjournment of Congress for the session whereby the President is prevented from returning, within the period prescribed by the Constitution, a bill that he disapproves and is unwilling to sign. But the Constitution places the approval and disapproval of bills, as to their becoming laws, upon a different basis. If the President does not approve a bill, he is required within a named time to send it back for consideration. But if by its action, after the presentation of a bill to the President during the time given him by the Constitution for an examination of its provisions and for approving it by his signature, Congress puts it out of his power to return it, not.approved, within that time to the House in which it originated, then the bill falls, and does not become a law. Whether the President can sign a bill after the final adjournment of Congress for the session is a question not. arising in this case, and has not been considered or decided by us. We adjudge - and touching this branch of the case adjudge nothing more - that the act of 1892 having been presented to the President while Congress was sitting, and having been signed by him when Congress was in recess for a specified time, but within ten days, Sundays excepted, after it was so presented to him, was effectively approved, and immediately became a law, unless its provisions are repugnant to the Constitution."