Among the express limitations upon the powers of Congress, enumerated by the Constitution is that which provides that "no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State."55 In another clause substantially the same prohibition is laid upon the States, it being declared that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports." 56

The term " exports " has been judicially limited to goods exported to foreign countries. In the earlier cases of Brown v. Maryland57,and Almy v. California58 it was taken for granted by the court that the term applied also to goods carried from one State to another State of the Union, but in Woodruff v. Parham59H

52 143 U. S. 649; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 495; 36 L. ed. 294.

53 163 U. S. 427; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1120; 41 L. ed. 215.

54 See Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454; and Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655; 22 L. ed. 455. Cf. Harvard Laic Review, V, 320, article by C. F. Chamberlayne entitled " The Sugar Bounties."

55 Art. I, Sec. IX, Cl. 5.

56"Except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws; and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the Congress" (Art. I, Sec. X, CI. 2). The state taxation of exports is considered in Chapter XLIT.

57 12 Wh. 419; 6 L. ed. 678.

58 24 How. 169; 16 L. ed. 644.

59 8 Wall. 123; 19 L. ed. 382.

these dicta were overruled and the position taken which hag not since been disturbed, that the prohibition has reference only to exportations to countries foreign to the United States. In this case, Justice Miller, after referring to the general power given to Congress to levy and collect taxes, duties, and imposts, says: "Is the word ' impost' here used, intended to confer upon Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods or merchandise carried from one State to another? Or is the power limited to duties on foreign imports? If the former be intended, then the power conferred is curiously rendered nugatory by the subsequent clause of section IX, which declares that no tax shall be laid on articles exported from any State, for no article can be imported from one State into another which is not at the same time exported from the former. But if we give to the word 'imposts' as used in the first-mentioned clause the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, and to the word 'export' the corresponding idea of something carried out of the United States, we have, in the power to lay duties on imports from abroad and the prohibition to lay such duties on exports to other countries, the power and its limitations concerning imposts. It is not too much to say that, so far as our research has extended, neither the word 'export,' 'import,' or 'impost' is to be found in the discussion on this subject, as they have come down to us from that time, in reference to any other than foreign commerce, without some special form of words to show that foreign commerce is not meant . . . Whether we look, then, to the terms of the clause of the Constitution in question, or to its relation to the other parts of that instrument, or to the history of its formation and adoption, or to the comments of the eminent men who took part in those transactions, we are forced to the conclusion that no intention existed to prohibit by this clause [that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, levy any impost or duty upon any export or import] the right of one State to tax articles brought into it from another."

In Dooley v. United States,60 one of the "Insular Cases," it was argued that the Foraker Act of April 12, 1900, was unconstitutional in so far as it provided for the payment of duties upon merchandise imported into Porto Rico from the United States. The court, however, held that Porto Rico, after cession to the United States, even though not "incorporated" into the United States was not foreign territory, and, therefore, that, under the definition laid down in Woodruff v. Parham, the tax in question was not a tax on goods exported from the United States. The court, moreover, go on to show from the circumstances of the case that the tax was to be construed rather as one on goods imported into Porto Rico, than upon goods exported from the State of New York. The court in its opinion, however, are careful to add: "It is not intended by this opinion to intimate that Congress may lay an export tax upon merchandise carried from one State to another. While this does not seem to be forbidden by the express words of the Constitution, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to lay such a tax without a violation of the first paragraph of Article I, Section VIII, that ' all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.' There is a wide difference between the full and paramount power of Congress in legislating for a territory in the condition of Porto Rico and its power with respect to the States, which is merely incidental to its right to regulate interstate commerce. The question, however, is not involved in this case, and we do not desire to express an opinion upon it." 61

60 183 U. S. 151; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 62: 43 L. ed. 128.

61 In a dissenting opinion, concurred in by four justices, it was argued that, "The fact that the net proceeds of the duties are appropriated by the act for use in Porto Rico does not affect their character any more than if so appropriated by another and separate act. The taxation reaches the people of the "States directly, and is national, and not local, even though the revenue derived therefrom is devoted to local purposes. . . . The prohibition that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State * negatives the existence of any power in Congress to lay taxes or duties in any form on articles exported from a State, irrespective of their destination, and, this being so, the act in imposing the duties in question is invalid, whether Porto Rico after its passage was a foreign or reputed foreign territory, a domestic territory or a territory subject to be dealt with at the will of Congress regardless of constitutional limitations. . . . The prohibition on Congress is explicit, and noticeably different from the prohibition on the States. The State is forbidden to lay 'any imposts or duties;'