The leading case establishing the doctrine that the negotiation by sales-agents of sales of goods which are in another State for the purpose of introducing them into the State where the nego tiation is had, is interstate commerce and not subject to regulation or taxation by the State, is Robbins v. Taxing District of Shelby Co.69

In Asher v. Texas,70 and Brennan v. Titusville71 the same doctrine is declared.

In Ficklen v. Shelby Co.72 the doctrine is again asserted but declared not applicable to a license tax imposed upon a citizen doing a general commission business, though he was able to show that during the year for which he resisted the payment of the tax his commissions were wholly derived from interstate business, that is, orders taken for goods to be shipped into the State. The court argued that this was an adventitious circumstance and that having taken out a license to do a general commission business, and agreed to pay a certain percentage thereon, the tax was to -trued as a general license tax and not one on interstate business. In a later case, the court, however, recognized that this case was on the boundary line of the States' power.73

67 116 U. S. 446; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 454: 29 L. ed. 691.

68 U. S. 113; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247: 52 L. ed. 413. 69 120 U. S. 489; 7 Sun. Ct. Rep. 592; 30 L. ed. 694. 7o 128 U. S. 129; 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; 32 L. ed. 368 71 153 U. S. 289; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; 38 L. ed. 719. 72 145 U. S. 1; 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 810; 36 L. ed. 601.

In Stockard v. Morgan74 a privilege tax imposed by a State upon merchant brokers whose business was exclusively confined to soliciting orders from jobbers and wholesale dealers within the State, as agent for non-resident parties, for goods to be shipped into the State by such parties, was held void as laying a burden upon interstate commerce.75

In Caldwell v. North Carolina76 it was contended by the State that a tax levied by it for selling pictures therein was valid because, though the contract of sale was made outside the State, the pictures and frames when sent into the State were unboxed by the agent who received them, and each picture put into its frame, before delivery to the purchaser. The court, however, say: "Nor does the fact that these articles were not shipped separately and directly to each individual purchaser, but were sent to an agent of the vendor at Greensboro, who delivered them to the purchasers, deprive the transaction of its character as interstate commerce. It was only that the vendor used two instead of one agency in the delivery. It would seem evident that, if the vendor had sent the articles by an express company, which should collect on delivery, such a mode of delivery would not have subjected the transaction to state taxation. The same could be said if the vendor himself, or by a personal agent, had carried and delivered the goods to the purchaser. That the articles were sent as freight by rail, and were received at the railroad station by an agent who delivered them to the respective purchasers, in nowise changes the character of the commerce as interstate.

73 Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; 38 L. ed. 719.

74 185 U. S. 27; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; 46 L. ed. 785.

75 After quoting from the Ficklin case, the court say: "From these extracts from the opinion it is seen that a material fact in the case was that Ficklin had taken out a general and unrestricted license to do business as a broker, and he was thereby authorized to do any and all kinds of commission business, and therefore became liable to pay the privilege tax exacted. Although Ficklin's principals happened in the year 1887 to be wholly non-residents, the fact might have been otherwise, as was stated by the Chief Justice, because his business was not confined to transactions for non-residents. In this case the complainants did not represent or assume to represent any residents of the State of Tennessee, and each of the complainants represented only certain specific parties, firms, or corporations, all of whom were nonresidents of Tennessee. They did no business for a general public. We attach no importance to the fact that in the Robbins case the individual taxed resided outside of the State. He was taxed by reason of his business or occupation while within it, and the tax was held to be a tax upon interstate commerce. Nor does the fact that the complainants acted for more than one person residing outside of the State affect the question. If while so acting and soliciting orders within the State for the sale of property for one nonresident of the State, the person so soliciting was exempt from taxation on account of that business, because the tax would be upon interstate commerce, we do not see how he could become liable for such tax because he did business for more than one individual, firm, or corporation, all being non-residents of the State of Tennessee. The fact that the State or the court may call the business of an individual, when employed by more than one person outside of the State, to sell their merchandise, upon commission, a 'brokerage business,' gives no authority to the State to tax such a business as complainants'. The name does not alter the character of the transaction, nor prevent the tax thus laid from being a tax upon interstate commerce."

76 187 U. S. 622; 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; 47 L. ed. 336.

Transactions between manufacturing companies in one State, through agents, with citizens of another, constitute a large part of interstate commerce; and for us to hold, with the court below, that the same articles, if sent by rail directly to the purchaser, are free from state taxation, but, if sent to an agent to deliver, are taxable through a license tax upon the agent, would evidently take a considerable portion of such traffic out of the salutary protection of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution."

In Norfolk W. R. Co. v. Sims77 a license tax imposed by a State upon all persons engaged in selling sewing machines in the State was held void as applied to the sale of machines shipped into the State upon the written order of a customer under an ordinary C. O. D. consignment.78

77 191 U. S. 441; 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 151; 48 L. ed. 254.

78 To the contention that because in a C. O. D. consignment the sale could not be Said to be consummated until delivery, that is, that the sale was made in the State by the express company delivering the machine, which company thereby became liable to the tax, the court say: "The sewing machine a made and Bold in another State, shipped to North Carolina in its original package for delivery to the consignee upon payment of its price. It had never become commingled with the general mass of property within the State. While technically the title of the machine may not have passed until the price

In Adams Express Co. v. Iowa79 the cases of Caldwell v. North Carolina and Norfolk W. It. Co. v. Sims are examined and approved.

In Rearick v. Pennsylvania80 it was held that interstate commerce is unlawfully burdened by the exaction of a license fee from a person employed by a foreign corporation to solicit sales for goods which the company fills by shipping the goods to him for delivery and collecting the purchase price from the customer, who has the right to refuse the goods if not equal in quality to the sample, such goods being always shipped in distinct packages, corresponding to the several orders.81

In Ware v. Mobile82 it was held that the business of taking orders on commission for the purchase and sale of grain and cotton for future delivery, and transmitting such orders is not interstate commerce, so as to be exempt from state taxation.83 was paid, the sale was actually made in Chicago; and the fact that the price was- to be collected in North Carolina is too slender a thread upon which to hang an exception of the transaction from a rule which would otherwise declare the tax to be an interference with interstate commerce."

79 196 U. S. 147; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; 49 L. ed. 424.

80 203 U. S. 507; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; 51 L. ed. 295.

81 Except in the case of brooms which, after being marked and tagged, were for convenience of shipment, tied together into bundles of twelve or more. As to these brooms it was contended that the original bundle or package being broken before delivery the full authority of the State over them at once attached. To this Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion of the court, said: "But the doctrine of the original packages concerns the right to sell, within the prohibiting or taxing State, goods coming into it from outside. When the goods have been sold before arrival the limitations that still may be found to the power of the State will be due, generally, at least, to other reasons, and we shall consider whether the limitations may not exist, irrespective of that doctrine, in some cases where there is no executed sale." These limitations are found in the doctrines laid down in Brennan v. Titus-ville and American Express Co. v. Iowa. " The brooms were specifically appropriated to specific contracts, in a practical, if not in a technical sense. Under such circumstances it is plain that, whatever might have been the title, the transport of the brooms for the purpose of fulfilling the contracts was protected commerce." The statement of the case is from the syllabus.

82 209 U. S. 405; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526; 52 L. ed. 855.

83 After calling attention to cases like Paul v. Virginia and Hooper v. California in which it was held that contracts are not the subjects of interstate commerce simply because negotiated between citizens of different States, or