In conformity with the foregoing doctrine it has been held that while the States may tax the capital employed in the manufacture of copyrighted or patented articles, as well as the tangible property embodied in these articles, they may not exact a fee as a condition precedent to the exercise of these federally granted rights, nor can they tax the intangible rights themselves as property.10

In Patterson v. Kentucky11 the court held that a state statute regulating the inspection and gauging of oils was a mere police regulation and did not violate a patent right under which a certain oil was manufactured. A similar conclusion was reached in" Webber v. Virginia.12 In Allen v. Riley13 was held valid a state law which required one selling a patent right in any county in the State, to file with the clerk of such county an authenticated copy of the letters patent, together with an affidavit of the genuineness of the letters patent, and that any written obligation given for the purchase price of a patent right should contain the words "given for a patent right." These, it was held, were proper police requirements. The court say: "We think the State has the power (certainly until Congress legislates upon the subject) with regard to the provision which shall accompany the sale or assignment of rights arising under a patent, to make reasonable regulations concerning the subject, calculated to protect its citizens from fraud.

10 Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. Maryland (87 Md. 687); People v. Assessors (156 X. T. 417); People v. Roberts (150 X. Y. 70). In these cases it is held that if the tax is upon the corporate property, or even upon the shares of stock evidencing that property, the value of the patent rights must be deducted. Jf, however, the tax be upon the shares of stock to the holders, or is upon the franchise of the corporation, the fact that patent rights are included within the assets of the company is not material. Cf. Judson, Taxation,§ 33. 1197 U. S. 501; 24 L. ed. 1115.

12 103 U. S. 334: 26 L. ed. 565.

13 203 U. S. 347; 27 Sup. Ct. Pep. 95; 51 L. ed. 216.

. . . The act must be a reasonable and fair exercise of the power of the State for the purpose of checking a well-known evil, and to prevent, so far as possible, fraud and imposition in regard to the sales of rights under patents. Possibly Congress might enact a statute which would take away from the States any power to legislate upon the subject, but it has not as yet done so." 14

Of course no State may, in the exercise of its police or other powers, in any way discriminate against patented articles.18