As has been pointed out in Section 574 the state courts possess jurisdiction over certain cases concurrently with that possessed by the federal courts. This, however, is not a jurisdiction which is conferred upon them by federal statute, but one which they possess under state law and which they are permitted to retain even after the same jurisdiction is by act of Congress conferred upon the inferior federal tribunals. Congress, indeed, is without power to confer jurisdiction upon any courts not created by itself.58 bar to any further suit touching the matter in controversy. Section 642 provides for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus to obtain the custody of the defendant. A valuable discussion of the scope and intent of these sections is to be found in Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1; 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387; 50 L. ed. 633.

57 For further consideration of this law see in this treatise, Chapter VII (The Maintenance Of Federal Supremacy By The Removal Of Suits From State To Federal Courts. 65. Right Of Removal).

58 Houston v. Moore, 5 Wh. 1; 5 L. ed. 19.

Congress may, however, delegate to state courts the performance of certain routine functions which do not involve the trial of "cases." 59 Any state chancellor, judge, justice of the peace, etc., may cause to be arrested and commited or held to trial any person charged with an offense against the United States.

59 In Robertson v. Baldwin (165 U. S. 275; 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 326; 41 L. ed. 715), the court say: "The better opinion is that the second section of Article III of the Constitution was intended as a constitutional definition of the judicial power Which the Constitution intended to confine to courts created by Congress; in other words, that such power extends only to the trial and determination of 'cases ' in courts of record, and that Congress is still at liberty to authorize the judicial officers of the several States to exercise such power as is ordinarily given to officers of courts not of record; such, for instance, as the power to take affidavits, to arrest and commit for trial offenders against the laws of the United States, to naturalize aliens, and to perform such other duties as may be regarded as incidental to the judicial power rather than a part of the judicial power itself. ... In the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania (16 Pet. 539; 10 L. ed. 1060), it was said that, as to the authority conferred on state magistrates to arrest fugitive slaves and deliver them to their owners, under the act of February 12, 1793, while a difference of opinion existed, and might still exist upon this point in different States, whether state magistrates were bound to act under it, no doubt was entertained by this court that state magistrates might, if they chose, exercise the authority unless prohibited by state legislation. See also Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13; 14 L. ed. 306; In re Kaine, 14 How. 103; 14 L. ed. 345. We think the power of justices of the peace to arrest deserting seamen and deliver them on board their vessels is not within the definition of the 'judicial power' as defined by the Constitution, and may be lawfully conferred on state officers."