This section is from the book "Business Law - Case Method", by William Kixmiller, William H. Spencer. See also: Business Law: Text and Cases.
When Dr. 0. G. Wells died it was found that he had, in his will, made his wife life owner of the Mine of Tho-rah, stipulating that the remainder should go in fee simple to their son John. The entrance to "Thorah" was on the side of a mountain, the surface of which had never been tilled for agriculture. Mrs. Wells, the life tenant, continued operating the mine as it had been operated before her husband's death. John, hereon, sued her, alleging," she holds the mine merely for me. She has no right to extract the treasures from beneath the surface of this mountain." Will the courts permit the mother to operate the mine?
Mary Rupel is in possession of certain lands as a life tenant; that is, with the right to occupy during her life. The fee of the lands, or absolute title thereto, is in her children, who will succeed to the possession at her death. The mother seeks to grant away the right to enter these lands, and to drill and remove oil. The children bring this action to prevent the grant from taking effect, claiming that the oil is part of the property itself, and as such, is owned by them in fee, so that their mother could not grant it away.
Mr. Justice Cox, speaking for the court, held that: "The general Common Law rule is 'that ownership of the fee of the surface carries with it the right to minerals beneath, and the consequent right to extract them. This right is exclusive in the owner of the fee. The life tenant in possession has no such right, and, not having it, he cannot, of course, grant it to another.' While oil underlies the surface of the land it is as much a part of it as any other mineral, though capable of being drawn off, or reduced to possession by operations on a neighbor's land. Therefore, a life tenant, such as Mary Rupel, cannot open up new oil wells, as the oil is the property of the children."
The court implied that the life tenant might continue the operation of mines opened by the previous owner, and hence, Mary Rupel had the right to continue the operation of the oil wells already in use. This does not give her the right to open new wells. Judgment was given for the children, owners in fee, that Mary Rupel, life tenant, had no right to grant away the right to open up oil wells.
The Ruling Court Case illustrates the general rule that the real property of an estate belongs to the owner of the fee simple. A life tenant of any property has no right to waste, convey, or destroy any part of the real property. Such a tenant may use the soil in the customary way, consistent with his limited ownership.
But the Story Case involves another principle of more general application than the one just mentioned.
That principle is that the intent of the devisor or conveyor is paramount and controlling. Hence, the conveyance of a life interest in a mine which has never been used for anything else but a mine, must mean that the life tenant is to continue the operation of mining in the usual way. Therefore, John, the son of the life tenant, though he has appealed to a correct principle, must be told that it cannot be applied in this case.
 
Continue to: