Story Case

Amos Davis owned the Champlain building, a fifteen story structure on State Street, Chicago. The Boston Store Company owned the balance of the block in which this building was located, and offered Davis such an attractive price for the ground alone, that he sold it to the company, agreeing to remove the building within thirty days. He immediately entered into a contract of sale with the Great Western Wrecking Company. This contract was originally merely oral, with the understanding that it should be reduced to writing; the wrecking company agreed to pay $40,000 for the building, and to remove it within the time stipulated by the contract between Davis and The Boston Store Company. On May 3, 1915, three days after these negotiations were completed, all the laborers employed by the wrecking company went out on a strike, and the company notified Davis that it could not carry out its contract with him. Davis started suit upon the contract, and the Great Western Wrecking Company pleaded that it was not bound, since the contract was not in writing and was for the sale of real property. Davis argued the sale was of personal property, since it was agreed to reduce the building to personalty. Therefore, the contract was binding, although not in writing. Who will win?

Ruling Court Case. Mueller Vs. Chicago, Milwaukee And St. Paul Rail-Way Company, Volume 111 Wisconsin Reports, Page 300; Volume 87 Northwestern Reports, Page 239

In the spring of 1897 the defendant employed the plaintiff to work for him as section foreman, with the understanding and agreement that the plaintiff and his family should occupy the section house of the defendant; that such section house was 16 feet wide by 26 feet long, and 1 1/2 stories, or 12 feet, high, and situated upon blocks, and upon the land of the defendant, and about 150 feet from the main track, and had an addition to it at the time, which the plaintiff removed after he moved into the section house; that while the plaintiff was so occupying the section house with his family, he did, with the knowledge and consent of the defendant, purchase lumber, and construct a small lean-to, for a kitchen, against said section house, at the cost and of the value of $67, and also with such knowledge and consent, put in a pump of the value of $7; that such lean-to had two common, middle sized windows of four lights each, and one door; that the section house had boards up and down, and the plaintiff nailed a two by four piece of lumber on the section house, and fastened the lean-to to that; that the floor was a double floor, and matched, and overhead there was a single pine flooring; that, after the section house and lean-to had remained in that condition for over two years, changes were made on the outside, and, while the plaintiff and his family were still occupying the same as tenant of the defendant, the defendants bridge carpenters papered and sided the same as directed by the plaintiff, but so that the siding did not go further than the section house, leaving a seam between it and the lean-to; that, after the plaintiff had placed the repairs and improvements on said section house in the manner aforesaid, and while he was living in said house, the defendant covered all of it with outside sheeting or lap-siding in the usual way, and thereby converted it to its own use and benefit, and prevented the plaintiff from removing all the same, as he intended to do in case the defendant did not buy it from him; and that, soon after the defendant had covered the lumber that the plaintiff had placed on its said building and put in said kitchen, it discharged him from its employment. The plaintiff was so employed by the month for no stated time, and could leave whenever he pleased, and could be discharged at the pleasure of the defendant. He was discharged in the spring of 1900. After he and his family moved away, the plaintiff asked the defendant's roadmaster if he could not pay the defendant for the siding it had so placed upon the lean-to, and for the two days' work in putting it on, and then be allowed to take the lean-to away, and remove it to Durand; but the roadmaster replied that that would destroy or injure the building. The plaintiff paid no rent for so occupying the section house with his fam-ily, and never agreed to.

Chief Justice Cassody gave the opinion of the court:

"Upon the facts stated, it is obvious that the lean-to became a fixture on the premises of the defendant. It was physically attached to the section house, and hence to the realty. It was adapted to the use and purpose to which the realty was devoted. It was the intention of the plaintiff, in constructing the same, that it should be so attached, and that it should be used in connection with the section house. The lean-to was a part and parcel of the real estate. Therefore, Mueller cannot recover the building."

Ruling Law. Story Case Answer

Buildings attached to the soil become a part and parcel thereof. Therefore, a sale made of such buildings must be evidenced by writing to be enforcible. If, in the Story Case, Davis had agreed to deliver the parts of the building to the Great Western Wrecking Company, this would have amounted to a sale of personal property, and the contract would have been enforcible, although not in writing. Since, however, the wrecking company itself agreed to remove the building, it purchased real property, and the contract was not enforcible.