Story Case

The state of California passed a law levying a tax upon bills of lading for gold and silver transported from any place in that state to another out of the state. Almy opposed this law, refusing to pay taxes, on the ground that the state was interfering with interstate commerce, in that this was a subject matter national in scope. He contended that bills of lading were necessary to the transaction of commerce, and that the tax amounted to a duty on exports. The state of California maintained that Congress had never expressly forbidden such a tax, and, therefore, it could be levied. How should the United States court answer this?

Ruling Court Case No. 1. Board Of Wardens Vs. Cooley, Volume 12 Howard, United States Reports, Page 298

The state of Pennsylvania, by law, provided that every vessel coming into port at Philadelphia, or leaving the same, should secure the services of a pilot. It was further provided that, in case a pilot was not secured in accordance with the provision of the law in question, the owner of such vessel should forfeit and pay to the warden, to the use of the society for the relief of distressed pilots, their widows and children, a sum of money named in the statute. Cooley was the owner of a vessel, the master of which failed to comply with the provision of the law. The Board of Wardens brings this action to recover the penalty provided by statute.

Cooley resisted the payment of this penalty on the ground that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional. He contended that Congress was given exclusive power to regulate all interstate commerce, and any regulation of interstate commerce by a state was unconstitutional.

The Board of Wardens contended that, in respect to the powers expressly given to Congress, the state might continue to regulate such matters until Congress had exercised its constitutional power to regulate the same.

Mr. Justice Curtis said: "We are brought directly and unavoidably to the consideration of the question whether the grant of the commercial power to Congress did per se deprive the states of all power to regulate pilots. This question has never been decided by this court. The grant of commercial power to Congress does not contain any terms expressly excluding states from exercising authority over its subject matter. If they are excluded, it must be because the nature of power, thus granted to Congress, requires that a similar should not exist in the state.

"Now the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their nature; some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the commerce of the United States in every port, and some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local necessities of navigation. Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature, national, or admit of only one uniform system or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress. That this cannot be affirmed of laws for regulation of pilots and pilotage is clear. Judgment was given for the Board of Wardens.

Ruling Court Case. United States Vs. Adair, Volume 208 United States Reports, Page 161

The Congress of the United States passed an act providing that no common carriers should discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against him, because of his membership in a labor corporation, association, or organization. It was further provided that in case an employee was discharged for such reason, the person or corporation so discharging him, should, upon indictment and conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars, and not more than one thousand dollars.

William Adair, an agent of the Louisville and Nashville Railway Company, a corporation engaged in interstate commerce, discharged one 0. B. Coppage, as fireman, from the employment of the company, because of the fact that Coppage had become a member of a certain labor organization known as the Order of Locomotive Firemen. Because of this, Adair was convicted and fined, in accordance with the provision of the statute. He contended that the act was unconstitutional. Although Congress has the power to regulate interstate commerce, he contended that such regulations must be limited to interstate commerce itself, or matter closely related thereto; that the question of labor organization is so remotely to interstate commerce that Congress has no power over it.

Mr. Justice Harlan said: "Manifestly, any rule prescribed for the conduct of interstate commerce, in order to be within the competency of Congress under its power to regulate commerce among the states, must have some real or substantial relation to or connection with the commerce regulated. But what possible legal or logical connection is there between an employee's membership in a labor organization and the carrying on of interstate commerce? Such relation to a labor organization cannot have in itself and in the eye of the law, any bearing upon the commerce with which the employee is connected by his labor and services. Labor associations, we assume, are organized for the general purpose of improving or bettering the conditions and conserving the interests of its members as wage earners - an object entirely legitimate and to be commended rather than condemned. But, surely, those associations, as labor organizations, have nothing to do with interstate commerce as such. The statute in question is unconstitutional, as having no immediate relation to interstate commerce. Judgment was given for Adair.

Ruling Law. Story Case Answer

The United States Constitution expressly gives Congress power over interstate commerce. It does not expressly deny power to the states, and, therefore, it has been maintained that the states possessed power to act when Congress did not cover a particular field. In Gibbons vs. Ogden, Chief Justice Marshall declared that the power of Congress over commerce was exclusive, and admitted of no state action whatsoever. The case of Cooley vs. Board of Wardens seems to express the law as it is today. Whatever subjects of interstate commerce are national, and by their nature admit of only one uniform system of laws, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be exclusively within the control of Congress. If the subject will, in its nature, permit either of national or state control, the state may regulate it until Congress acts, when the state regulation ceases, insofar as it is inconsistent with Federal law. The Story Case is an illustration of a subject national in scope, and the state tax is an interference with interstate commerce, although Congress has not legislated. The case of Cooley vs. Board of Wardens illustrates how a state can act until Congress forbids by its own legislation. The case of Adair vs. United States illustrates a subject only state-wide in scope, over which Congress has no control, and, therefore, its law with reference thereto is unconstitutional.

There are several recent Supreme Court cases which illustrate the rule laid down in Cooley vs. Board of Wardens, to the effect that a state may act in some cases, although the subject matter is national in scope. In Reid vs. Colorado, a Colorado statute regulating the shipment of cattle into the state, was in question, and it was contended that the statute conflicted with the Animal Industry Act of Congress. The state law in question forbade the shipment of cattle into Colorado during certain seasons to avoid infection, unless they were kept north of a certain line for ninety days. Said Justice Harlan: "The difficulty with Reid's case is that Congress has not by any statute covered the whole subject of transportation of live stock among the several states, and has left a wide field for the exercise by the states of their power by appropriate regulation, to protect their domestic animals against contagious diseases." In the same way, a recent New York decision upholds a state statute prescribing eight hours as the working time for operators of signal towers. This is in face of the fact that Congress has forbidden interstate carriers from keeping tower operators on duty more than nine hours. Said the court: "There is no conflict; the state has simply supplemented the action of the Federal authorities. It is the same as if Congress has enacted that the classes of employees named might be employed for nine hours or less."

Local and state regulations are applicable to the following subjects so long that they have passed no conflicting laws: regulation of pilots, quarantine and inspection laws, policing of harbors, improvement of navigable channels, regulation of wharves, piers, docks, construction of dams, bridges, and establishment of ferries.