Story Case

In order to more effectually regulate the consumption of liquor in the state, South Carolina passed a law making it illegal to have any liquor in one's possession purchased outside of the state, while permitting the possession of liquor purchased at a state dispensary. Walter Holleyman imported liquor into the state, and when indicted, contested the constitutionality of this act. He maintained that the law was an unreasonable discrimination against interstate commerce. Will the act be sustained as constitutional?

Ruling Court Case No. 1. Husen Vs. The Railroad Company

The legislature of the state of Missouri passed an act providing that "no Texas, Mexican or Indian cattle shall be driven or otherwise conveyed into or remain in any county in this state, between the first day of March and the first day of November in each year, by any person or persons whatsoever." It was further provided by the act that any persons violating the act should be liable for all damages sustained by any person on account of any disease communicated by such cattle.

The railroad company herein, not regarding the statute, conveyed cattle into the state of Missouri between the first day of March and the first day of November. Cattle belonging to Husen were infected with a disease by the cattle so brought in by the company. Husen, thereupon, brought this action for damages. The railroad contended that, although a state may regulate commerce, even though affecting interstate commerce, yet such regulations must be reasonable, and that this law in question was wholly unreasonable and void.

Mr. Justice Strong said: "We admit that the deposit in Congress of the power to regulate foreign commerce among the states was not a surrender of that which may properly be denominated police. "What that is, it is difficult to define with sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making regulations promotive of domestic order, morals, health and safety. While we unhesitatingly admit that a state may pass sanitary laws and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health or property, within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, etc., from entering the state; while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the state, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self -protection."

It was held that this law was wholly unreasonable as far as state police power over commerce was concerned, and, therefore, unconstitutional. Judgment was given for the railroad company.

Ruling Court Case No. 2. Minnesota Vs. Barber, Volume 136 United States Reports, Page 313

The state of Minnesota, by law, provided for the inspection of all animals intended for human consumption, before such animals were slaughtered. It was further provided that any person who sold any meat in the state of Minnesota should be guilty of a misdemeanor, unless he could show that the animals from which the meat came, had been inspected and passed by the proper state authorities. Barber was convicted for a violation of this statute, in that he sold meat which had been slaughtered in Illinois, the live animals not having been inspected by Minnesota officers as required by law in that state. Barber contended that the law was void in that, as a police regulation, it unreasonably restricted interstate commerce, although purporting to be a health measure.

Mr. Justice Harlan said: "A law providing for the inspection of animals whose meats are designed for human food, cannot be regarded as a rightful exertion of the police powers of the state, if the inspection prescribed is of such a character, or is burdened with such conditions, as will prevent altogether the introduction into the state of sound meats, the product of animals slaughtered in other states. It is one thing for a state to exclude from its limits cattle, sheep or swine actually diseased, or meats that by reason of their condition, or the condition of the animals from which they are taken, are unfit for human food, and punish all sales of such animals or of such meats within its limits. It is quite a different thing for a state to declare, as does Minnesota, by the necessary operation of its statute, that fresh beef, veal, mutton, lamb or pork - articles that are used in every part of this country to support human life - shall not be sold for human food within its limits, unless the animals from which such meats are taken are inspected in that state, or, as is practically said, unless the animals are slaughtered in that state." Judgment was held that the law was unconstitutional, and that Barker was illegally convicted.

Ruling Court Case No. 3. Alabama Vs. Nashville, Chattanooga, & St. Louis Railway Company, Volume 128 United States Reports, Page 96

The legislature of the state of Alabama passed a law providing that any person, afflicted with color blindness, or partial loss of visual power, should be disqualified from serving on any railroad line in the state, as engineers, firemen, conductors, brakemen, or in any other position which requires the use of discrimination of forms or color signals. The law made it a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of $50 to $500, for any person to serve in any such capacity without a certificate from certain state medical authorities as to his visual power. It further provided that any railroad which should engage any such servant or agent, who has no such certificate, should be guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable by a fine of $50 to $500.

The railroad company, defendant in this action, did employ a train conductor who had no certificate from the medical authorities of Alabama, as required by law. The company was convicted and fined $50. It contended that it was engaged in interstate commerce, and not subject to control by the state; that the state law in question came into conflict with the Federal control over interstate commerce and was, therefore, void, and the fine imposed upon it was illegal.

Mr. Justice Field said: "It is conceded that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary; that, as incident to it, Congress may legislate as to the qualifications, duties, and liabilities of employees and others on railway trains engaged in that commerce; and that such legislation will supersede any state action on the subject. But until such legislation is had, it is clearly within the competency of the state to provide against accidents on trains whilst within their limits. Indeed, it is a principle fully recognized by decisions of state and Federal courts that wherever there is any business in which, either from the products created or instrumentalities used, there is danger of life or property, it is not only within the power of the state, but is among its plain duties to make provisions against accidents likely to follow in such business, so that the dangers attending it may be guarded against, so far as is practicable." Judgment was held that the conviction was legal, and should be affirmed.

Ruling Law. Story Case Answer

When through the Constitution of the United States, the individual states surrendered their power to control interstate commerce, they did not at the same time give away powers necessary to promote the public health and public welfare of their respective citizens. Each state, therefore, may reasonably interfere with interstate commerce. It is difficult to determine the scope of this, commonly known as the "police power." It extends to making regulations promotive of domestic morals, order, health and safety. This includes the power to pass laws for the inspection of articles of interstate commerce, and the levying of a small tax to pay the costs of this inspection. It is under police power that numerous regulations are made by the state pertaining to public safety, and convenience in connection with railways and other public service corporations doing an interstate business. This is illustrated by the Ruling Court Case - Hennington vs. Georgia; a statute, declaring that the transportation of freight should be suspended on Sunday, was upheld as a part of the policy of Georgia to promote the general welfare of its people. The Supreme Court said, however, in a recent case involving an ordinance forbidding the sale of theatre tickets to persons known as ticket scalpers, that the ordinance was not valid under the police power, since the law did not involve public health, public morals or safety. The state, therefore, could not legislate on the matter, and it couldn't grant the power to the city. In order to be a valid exercise of police power, a state law must be a reasonable exercise of that power, and must not discriminate against commerce coming from without the state.

The Story Case, based upon State vs. Holleyman, Volume 45 Lawyers' Reports Annotated, Page 567, illustrates a law which was held to be an unjust discrimination against interstate commerce, and, therefore, unconstitutional. It was held, however, that a law restricting to state officials, the privilege of importing liquors for sale, was not an unreasonable discrimination, for any citizen might import for his own use.

The so called "Jim Crow" laws of the southern states, separating negroes and whites in public places, have been held unconstitutional as an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce, when applied to traffic across state lines.

In determining whether or not a police law is reasonable, the courts do not take as criterion their own judgment; the test is not whether the judges would have passed this particular rule, but whether, viewing the subject nationally, it could be determined that the law-makers might have acted as reasonable men in passing the law. The laws passed by a number of states forbidding the transportation of liquors within the state, have been the subject for much controversy and litigation. These cases have excited extraordinary interest because of the social and economic questions involved. We have already noted that a state may prohibit the manufacture of liquor, because this precedes commerce. The provision against transporting liquor into a state has been declared unconstitutional as affecting in a national way a legitimate article of trade. Under pressure of public opinion, Congress recently passed a law (the Wilson Act) expressly giving a state the power to control shipments into the state. Under this law, a state may tax and probably forbid the sale of liquor to be shipped into the state. Under this law, a state may not prohibit the importation into the state, as for instance, for the use of the importer himself, but it may forbid the soliciting of orders for non-resident dealers.