Sec 517

"Whether a party has made a good or bad bargain, supposing he was capax negotii, and there was no fraud, is not a question for the adjudicating tribunal to determine. Every person competent to do business must decide for himself whether the price he receives for a particular object is sufficient to induce him to part with it. What may be very inadequate to the mind of a stranger may be adequate to me. There may be particular reasons why I want to buy particular property or to obtain the services of a particular agent; and these reasons I alone can weigh. If I choose, on the other hand, to sell a property at less than its supposed market value, it must be remembered that I know best what it really is; and beside this, there may be reasons, also peculiar to myself, for selling to the particular vendee. Aside from this, for a court to determine the adequacy of prices would be in conflict with the established economical rule that by parties in business alone can prices be justly fixed. Hence, it is a settled principle that "the adequacy of the consideration is for the parties to consider at the time of making the agreement, not for the court when it is sought to be enforced.'*2 The rule is applied in equity as well as in see Austyn v. McLure, 4 Dall. 226; Greaves v. McAllister, 2 Binn. 591; Harlan v. Harlan, 20 Penn. St. 303.

Courts will not determine sufficiency.

1 Wilde, J., Train v. Gould, 5 Pick. 384, cited Read v. Hitchings, 71 Me. 596. To same effect see Nash v. Lull, 102 Mass. 60; Howe v. Richards, 102 Mass. 64n; Hardisty v. Smith, 3 Ind. 41.

2 Per cur. in Bolton v. Madden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 57; adopted in Leake, 2d ed. 613; Bainbridge v. Firmstone, 8 A. & E. 743. See to same effect Skeate v. Beale, 11 A. & E. 983; Lawrence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426; Newhall v. Paige, 10 Gray, 366; Leonard v. Vre-denburgh, 8 Johns. 29; Cowel v. Cornell, 75 N. Y. 91; Harlan v. Harlan,.

20 Penn. St. 303; Davidson v. Little, 22 Penn. St. 245. As to setting aside contract for inadequacy of consideration, see supra, sec 165, 239; infra, sec 518. As illustrations, Mr. Pollock cites Bainbridge v. Firmstone, 8 A. & E. 743, in which it was held that if a man who owns two boilers allows another to weigh them, this is a good consideration for that other's promise to give them up after such weighing in as good condition as before. "The defendant," said Lord Denman, "had some reason for wishing to weigh the boilers, and he could do so only by obtaining permission from the plaintiff, which he did obtain by promising to return them in good condition." We need not inquire law.1 - That the giving up of goods to a bailee is a sufficient consideration for a promise on his part to keep them safely, has been already shown.2 - When there are conflicting constructions assignable to a disputed consideration, that will be accepted which is most consistent with good faith.3.

Sec 518

Although the courts will not determine the question of the adequacy of a consideration, if the issue be presented singly, yet, if the issue of fraud be raised, the adequacy of consideration is of decisive importance. "Where the consideration is grossly inadequate, and where the party reaping the advantage had in any way authority or influence over the other party, then, as we have seen, the bargain is one which a court of equity will not only refuse to execute, but will rescind.4 Gross inadequacy of consideration, by itself, therefore, is not ground for setting aside a conveyance, but it may be of controlling moment in determining whether a conveyance was fraudulent.5 A court of equity, also, will not give its aid to the enforcement of a barwhat benefit he expected to derive. In Sykes v. Chadwick, 18 Wall. 141, also, a release of a supposed right of dower, though actually unfounded, was held a good consideration. In Gravely v. Barnard, L. R. 18 Eq. 518, it was held that an agreement to continue an existing service terminable at will is a good consideration.

Gross inadequacy may be ground to set aside.

1 Pollock, 159; 1 Ch. on Cont. 11th Am. ed. 30; 1 Sug. V. & P. 8th Am. ed. 273; Cheale v. Kenward, 3 De G. & J. 27; Taylor v. Manners, L. R. 1 Ch. 48; Lee v. Kirby, 104 Mass. 420; Osgood v. Franklin, 2 John. Ch. 23; Haines v. Haines, 6 Md. 435; Comstock v. Purple, 49 111. 158; Harrison v. Town, 17 Mo. 237; Davidson v. Little, 22 Penn. St. 245.

2 Supra, sec 505. 3 Infra, sec 654.

4 See supra, sec 157-165, 239; and see Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 450; Summers v. Griffiths, 35 Beav. 27; Hamet v. Dundas, 4 Barr, 178; Madison Co. v. People, 58 111. 456; Case v. Case, 26 Mich. 484; as to proof of fraud see supra, sec 239.

5 Supra, sec 157 et seq., 239, 376 et seq.; Kerr on Fraud and Mist. 187; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. C. C. 5; Emigrant Co. v. Wright Co., 97 U. S. 339; Shepard v. Rhodes, 7 R. I. 470; Byers v. Surget, 19 How. 303; East man v. Plumer, 46 N. H. 464; Dunn v. Chambers, 4 Barb. 376; Osgood v.. Franklin, 2 Johns. Ch. 23; S. C 14 Johns. 527; Melick v. Dayton, 34 N. J. Eq. 245; Johnson v. Dorsey, 7 Gill, 269; M'Kinney v. Pinckard, 2 Leigh, 149; Judge v. Wilkins, 19 Ala. 765; Morris v. Philliber, 30 Mo. 145; Mitchell v. Jones, 50 Mo, 435; Schnell v. Nell, 17 Ind. 29 (a promise to pay $600 in consideration of one cent). As to unconscionable and catching bargains see supra, sec 169.

gain which is peculiarly hard and unconscionable.1 Of this rule we have an instance in a Kansas case, decided in 1880. I. held a life-insurance policy for his wife's benefit, and then joined with his wife in assigning the policy to C, a creditor. C. paid the after-accruing premiums, and when the policy was mature, demanded the amount due. The company refused to pay until a blank receipt on the back of the policy was tilled up by I.'s wife. This, however, she refused to do unless C. agreed in writing to pay her a large sum of money. It was held that this sum, bearing no reasonable proportion to the loss sustained, was to be regarded as exorbitant, and the agreement was held inoperative as unconscionable.2