1 Infra, sec 514.

2 Per cur., Morley v. Boothby, 3 Bing. 113, cited Leake, 2d ed. 611; Brooks v. Ball, 18 Johns. 357.

3 Mather v. Maidstone, 18 C. B. 273; Forster v. Fuller, 6 Mass. 58; Stebbins v. Smith, 4 Pick. 97; Smith v. Weed, 20 Wend. 184; Haines v. Haines, 6 Md. 435; Williams v. Alexander, 4 Ired. Eq. 207; Pitt v. Gentle, 49 Mo. 74. As to forbearance to sue, see infra, sec 532; as to compromises, see infra, sec 533; as to equitable rights, see infra, sec 531.

4 See infra, sec 517, 1001; Brown v.

Brine, L. R. .1 Ex. D. 5; Edgeware Highway v. Gas Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 92; Laurence v. McCalmont, 2 How. 426; Warren v. Whitney, 24 Me. 561; Whittle v. Skinner, 23 Vt. 532; Clark v. Sigourney, 17 Conn. 511; Coleman v. Eyre, 45 N. Y. 38; Neal v. Gilmore, 79 Penn. St. 421; Buchanan v. Bank, 78 111. 500; Tompkins v. Philips, 12 Ga. 52.

5 Bradshaw v. McLaughlin, 39 Mich. 480.

6 Supra, sec 169; infra, sec 518.

Party suing must show consideration flowing from himself.

1 Brown v. Everhard, 52 Wis. 205'; infra, sec 858; Cutter v. Cochran, 116 Mass. 408; Rollins v. March, 128 Mass. 116.

2 Dean v. Skiff, 128 Mass. 174.

3 Wheatley v. Low, Cro. Jac. 668; see Riches v. Briggs, Yel. 4. In Coggs 9. Bernard, 2 Ld. Ray. 909, 920, Lord Raymond is reported to have said that delivery of casks to a party to be carried is a sufficient consideration for the contract of carriage.

4 See observations in Holmes' Common Law, 291.

5 Whitehead v. Greetham, McC. & Y. 205; Wilkinson v. Oliveira, 1 Bing. N. C. 490; Hart v. Miles, 4 C. B. N..S. 371.

6 Infra, sec 784 et seq., and see supra, sec 184.

7 See Patterson, J., Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q. B. 859; adopted in Leake, 2d ed. 612.

that there must be in all cases some detriment to the promisee. The promisee, in other words, must have done something or suffered something at the promisor's request as a reason for the promise. - The promise, so far as he is concerned, must not have been gratuitous.1 - Hence a promise to me by B. to pay C.'s debt to me does not bind B. to me, unless in exchange for this promise I give C. indulgence, or in some way benefit B.; nor can I support the suit by showing that some one else agreed to give C. indulgence or to confer some benefit on B.2 A promise by me, also, to pay a reward for the discovery of a lost article can only be enforced against me by a person who has done something, no matter how slight, in bringing the lost article to light, and who was aware of the reward.3 The real party in interest is to bring suit; if a principal acts through an agent, it is the principal who is to sue, and against whom set-offs may be introduced.4 In some of the earlier cases liability was further extended.5 "If A. promised to pay B. £1000 if C. would go to Rome, and C. took the journey, he and not B. was regarded as entitled to the reward, and to compel the payment of it by suit. For as the action of assumpsit was, as stated, brought not to enforce the contract specifically, but to recover compensation for the injury occasioned by the breach of faith, the person who parted with his property, or rendered the stipulated service, was obviously the one who should be compensated in damages." - In a Pennsylvania case, adopting substantially the same rule, the evidence was that the defendant, a member of a congregation of which M. was the minister, promised the plaintiff to pay him twenty-five dollars for the services to be rendered by M. as minister for a particular year. The money was for M.'s use, and it was held that M. should have sued for it. "A parol promise to one for the benefit of another," so it was held by Gibson, C. J., "can support an action on it only by him from whom the consideration moved, or who was the meritorious cause of it. And the rule is founded in good sense, not only because it avoids circuity, but because there is no necessity that one who has been the mere recipient of a promise should sue on it as a trustee, when there is no trust, and when the party beneficially entitled is able to sue for himself. Neither in equity nor in law is a bare recipient a party to the contract."1 The words italicized show that what Chief Justice Gibson had in view were contracts of agency in which the principal can unquestionably sue on a parol contract made by his agent.2 But the prevalent English view3 is that where a promise is made to A. for B.'s benefit, the suit to enforce the promise must be brought by A.4 It is true that the party from whom the consideration flows must sue either in his own name when a party, or in the name of his trustee when not a party. But, nevertheless, according to the English doctrine, as will be seen in the next section, none but a party to the contract can sustain on it a suit. There is no hardship in this. The party beneficially interested may use his trustee's name, or compel the trustee to sue. On the other hand, a mere stranger, who is not a trustee, and who has not done anything or surrendered anything in consideration of the defendant's promise, cannot sue on the promise.

1 Infra, sec 784, supra, sec 505; Bourne v. Mason, 1 Vent. 6; Crow v. Rogers, 1 Str. 592; Company of Felt Makers v. Davis, 1 B. & P. 102; Mandeville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Fugrove v. Mutual Soc, 46 Vt. 362; Segars v. Segars, 71 Me. 530; Stoddard v. Ham, 129 Mass. 383; Bury p. Ziegler, S3 Penn. St. 367; Gibson v. Cooke, 20 Pick. 18; Stewart v. Hamilton College,.

2 Denio, 403; see infra, sec 723 et seq. 784 et seq.

2 See Price v. Easton, 4 B. & Ad. 433; S. C, 1 N. & M. 303; overrulingMartyn v. Hind, 2 Cowp. 443; 1 Dougl. 146.

3 See supra, sec 24.

4 Supra, sec 96; infra, sec 802.

5 See Judge Hare's Lectures on Contracts, 20.

1 Edmunson v. Penny, 1 Barr, 334.

2 Wh. on Agency, sec 4, 5, 147, 398, 722. In an early case, where a conversation took place between two fathers, in which one promised that if the other would give his daughter in marriage to his son he would settle certain lands on the married couple, and the marriage took place in part reliance on this statement, but the settlement was not made, it was held that the husband might maintain an action for the default. But of this Mr. Leake, 2d ed. 483, says: " no modern case can be found to support such an exception to the general rule; and, on the contrary, it has always been held that no stranger can take advantage of a contract made with another person." Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S. 393; and see as to children under marriage settlement suing, infra, sec 790. In Dashwood v. Jermyn, L. R. 12 Ch. D. 776, P. a stranger to the family promised certain benefits to M. to enable M. to marry one of F.'s daughters, on faith of which M. was married to F.'s daughter. It was held that this was a promise on P.'s part without consideration.

3 See Leake, 2d ed. 443.

4 See also infra, sec 799.