Sec 629

The first office of interpretation is to determine the genuineness of the text.1 To establish or disprove this experts may be called;2 and ancient history may be appealed to to establish or to explain anachronisms.3 When a writing is offered in evidence in which a spurious word is alleged to have been interpolated, it is admissible to apply chemical and microscopic,4 as well as circumjacent tests;5 and to show the falsity of the alleged interpolation.6 And so, a fortiori, when a whole document is alleged to have been forged.7

Sec 630

Terms of art, also, having a distinctive meaning among specialists, may be explained by specialists.8 Evidence, for instance, is admissible to show the meaning of "zinc" and of "franklinite," when used in a mining deed;9 and of "danseuses" when used in a theatrical agreement.10 Terms of business, also, will be governed by the sense they have received in business usage.11 Mercantile terms are to be construed according to the custom of merchants;12 and these terms, when local and distinctive, are to be proved as matters of fact to the jury, subject to the opinion of the court as to the construction of the contract after the meaning of the words is thus determined.13

Genuineness of text to be first established.

Terms of art and business to be explained by parol.

"7. We follow special rules given by proper authority.

"8. We endeavor to derive assistance from that which is more near before proceeding to that which is less so.

"9. Interpretation is not the object, but a means; hence superior considerations may exist."

The first of the rules I doubt. In view of the limitations (1) of our perceptive powers, (2) of the objects we perceive, and (3) of our modes of expression, we can hardly speak of the meaning of any sentence as being ever more than highly probable.

1 Lieber, op. cit. 72.

2 Wh. on EV. sec 704, 718, 722, 972.

3 Ibid. sec 964.

4 Wh. on Cr. EV. sec 848.

5 Ibid. sec 849. 6 Ibid. sec 850. 7 Ibid.

8 Wh. on EV. sec 435, 946; Pollen V. Le Roy, 30 N. Y. 549; Colwell V. Lawrence, 38 Barb. 643; Collender V. Dins-more, 55 N. Y. 200.

9 New Jersey Zinc Co. V. Franklinite Co., 15 N. J. Eq. 418.

10 Baron V. Placide, 7 La. An. 229.

11 See other cases in Wh. on EV. sec 961 a, 962-8.

12 Chitty on Con. 11th Am. ed. 116; Gibson V. Young, 8 Taunt. 254.

13 Ibid.; Hutchinson V. Bowman, 5 M. & W. 535; Barnard V. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383; Worcester Med. Inst. V. Harding, 11 Cush. 289; Rice V. Cod-.

Sec 631

When it is necessary to take testimony to determine the meaning of a term of art or business, the meaning of the term is for the jury; when this meaning is ascertained, the construction of the whole document, incorporating this meaning, is for the court.1 Where, however, there is no dispute as to the meaning of terms, the question of construction is exclusively for the court.2 "It is the duty of the court to construe all written instruments, if there are peculiar expressions used which have in particular places or trades a known meaning attached to them; it is for the jury to say what the meaning of these expressions was, but for the court to decide what the meaning of the contract was."3 Hence, as will be hereafter more fully seen,4 the meaning of words is to be found by the jury as a matter of fact, while the construction of the words thus settled is to be found by the court as a matter of law.5

Meaning of terms of art or business is for jury; construction of meaning is for court.

man, 1 Allen, 377; Luce V. Ins. Co., 105 Mass. 297; Schnitzer V. Print Works, 114 Mass. 123; Page V. Cole, 120 Mass. 37; Wayne V. St. Pike, 16 Ohio, 421; and cases cited Wh. on EV. sec 961.

Windscheid (sec 84) states that the fundamental rule of interpretation is the bringing out the sense in which the word to be interpreted was used; and that for this purpose, not only the usage of the place and time of writing, but the idiosyncrasies of the writer, are to be taken into consideration. To this are cited L. 50, sec 3, D. de leg. 10, 30; L. 65, sec 17; L. 69, sec D. de leg. III. 32; L. 18, sec 3, D. de instr. 33, 7; L. 34, D. de R. I. 50, 17.

1 Neilson V. Harford, 8 M. & W. 806; Ford V. Beech, 11 Q. B. 852; Simpson V. Margitson, 11 Q. B. 32; Hodgson V. Davies, 2 Camp. 530; Barnard V. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383; Stagg V. Ins. Co., 10 Wall. 589; May V. Sloan, 101 U. S. 231; Nash V. Drisco, 51 Me. 417; Pierce V. State, 13 N. H. 536; Wason V. Rowe, 16 Vt. 525; Eaton V. Smith, 20 Pick. 150; Glass Co. V. Morey, 108 Mass. 570; School Dist. V. Lynch, 33 Conn. 330; Bradley V. Wheeler, 44 N. Y. 496; Edwards V. Goldsmith, 16 Penn. St. 45; Evans V. Waln, 71 Penn. St. 69; Brown V. Hatton, 9 Ired. 319; Paris, etc. R. R. V. Henderson, 89 Ill. 86; State V. Hastings, 24 Minn. 78.

2 Supra, sec 647; Wh. on EV. sec 966; Smith V. Margitson, 11 Q. B. 852.

3 Parke, J., Hutchinson V. Bowker, 5 M. & W. 535. See to same effect Eaton V. Smith, 20 Pick. 150; Short V. Woodward, 13 Gray, 86.

4 Infra, sec 647.

5 In McKenzie V. Sykes, Sup. Ct. Mich. 1882 (13 Rep. 400), we have the following from Cooley, J.: "It is for the court to interpret the written contracts of parties; for when they have assented to definite terms and stipulations and incorporated them in formal documents, the meaning of these it is supposed can always be discovered on inspection; nothing which is within.