71 Ante, p. 495.

72 Ante, p. 495; Findley's Ex'rs v. Findley, 11 Grat. (Va.) 434; Ellmaker v. Ellmaker, 4 Watts (Pa.) 89; Maryland Coal Co. v. Railroad Co., 41 Md.

(2, 3) The cardinal or fundamental rule in the construction of contracts is that a contract should receive that construction which will best effectuate the intention of the parties.73 This intention, however, is not one secretly cherished by a party, but is the intention expressed in the contract.74 And it must be collected, not from detached parts of the agreement, but from the whole agreement.75 "Greater regard is to be had to the clear intent of the parties than to any particular words which they may have used in the expression of their intent." 76 Where the intention clearly appears from the words used, there is no need to go further, for in such a case the words must govern; or, as it is sometimes said, where there is no doubt, there is no room for construction.77 The court will not attempt, under cover of construction, to make a new contract for the parties, nor to reform a written contract so as to make it express the real intention of the parties, which, by mistake, is not expressed in the words thereof.78 But, if the meaning is not clear, the court will place itself, as nearly as may be, in the position of the parties to the contract,79 and will consider the circumstances under which the contract was made, the subject-matter, the relation of the parties, and the object of the agreement, in order to ascertain their intention; and for this purpose, as we have seen, parol evidence is admissible.80

343; Eaton v. Smith, 20 Pick. (Mass.) 150; McAvoy v. Long, 13 111. 147; Rindskoff v. Barrett, 14 Iowa, 101. "The burden of proof of showing a special or technical or trade meaning is on him who asserts it." Parker, J., in American Lithographic Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 81 N. J. Law, 271, 80 Atl. 25. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 152; Cent. Dig. § 733.

73 PLANO MFG. CO. v. ELLIS, 68 Mich. 101, 35 N. W. 841, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 347; Bell v. Jordan, 102 Me. 67, 65 Atl. 759; Salisbury v. King (Ky.) 119 S. W. 160; Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin Ry. & Light Co., 134 Wis. 603, 115 N. W. 383; Brown v. Beckwith, 60 Fla. 310, 53 South. 542; Chicago Flour Co. v. City of Chicago, 243 111. 268, 90 N. E 674; Conservative Realty Co. v. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n, 133 Mo. App. 261, 113 S. W. 229 (holding that the rule applies whether the ambiguity is patent or latent). See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Keg-No.) § 147; Cent. Dig. §§ 730, 743.

74 Embry v. Hargardine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 127 Mo. App. 383, 105 S. W. 777. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 147; Cent. Dig. §§ 730, 743.

75 PLANO MFG. CO. v. ELLIS, 68 Mich. 101, 35 N. W. 841, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 347; Mallan v. May, 13 Mees. & W. 511, 517; Jackson v. Stackhouse, 1 Cow. (N. Y.) 122, 13 Am. Dec. 514; Gray v. Clark. 11 Vt. 583; Heywood v. Perrin, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 228, 20 Am. Dec. 518; Field v. Letter, 118 111. 17, 6 N. E. 877; Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338, 34 N. W. 26; Walsh v. Trevanion, 15 Q. B. 733; Bell v. Bruen, 1 How. 169, 11 L. Ed. 89; Armstrong v. Granite Co., 147 N. Y. 495, 42 N. E. 186, 49 Am. St. Rep. .683; German Fire Ins. Co. v. Roost, 55 Ohio St 581, 45 N. E. 1097, 36 L. R. A. 236, 60 Am. St. Rep. 711; Sattler v. Hallock, 160 N. Y. 291, 54 N. E. 667, 46 L. R. A. 679, 73 Am. St. Rep. 686; McLean v. Windham Light & Power Co., 85 Vt. 167, 81 Atl. 613; Warrum v. White, 171 Ind. 574, 86 N. E. 959. Where several instruments are made as part of one transaction, they will be read together, and each will be construed with reference to the other; and the different parts of one instrument will be read together. Wood v. College, 114 Ind. 320, 16 N. E. 619; Morss v. Salisbury, 48 N. Y. 636; Thomson v. Beal (C. C.) 48 Fed. 614; Lindley v. Groff, 37 Minn. 338. 34 N. W. 26; Pensacola Gas Co. v. Lotze, 23 Fla. 368, 2 South. 609; Hagerty v. White, 69 Wis. 317,. 34 N. W. 92; Sutton v. Beckwith, 68 Mich. 303, 36 N. W. 79, 13 Am. St Rep. 344; Bailey v. Railroad Co., 17 Wall. 96, 21 L. Ed. 611; Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U. S. 1, 11 Sup. Ct 243, 34 L. Ed. 843; Hunt v. Livermore, 5 Pick. (Mass.) 395; Pierce v. Tidwell, 81 Ala. 299, 2 South. 15; Freer v. Lake, 115 111. 662, 4 N. E. 512; Palmer v. Palmer, 150 N. Y. 139, 44 N. E. 966, 55 Am. St Rep. 653; American Gas & Oil Min. Co. v. Wood, 90 Me. 516, 38 Atl. 548, 43 L. R. A. 449. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 147; Cent. Dig. §§, 730, 743.

76 Ford v. Beach, 11 Q. B. 852, 866; Chesapeake & O. Canal Co. v. Hill, 15 Wall. 94, 21 L. Ed. 64; Hoffman v. Insurance Co., 32 N. Y. 405, 88 Am. Dec. 337; Walker v. Douglas, 70 111. 445; Collins v. Lavelle, 44 Vt. 230; First Nat. Bank v. Gerke, 68 Md. 449, 13 Atl. 358, 6 Am. St. Rep. 453; Hunter's Adm'rs v. Miller's Ex'rs, 6 B. Mon. (Ky.) 612; Gage v. Tirrell, 9 Allen (Mass.) 299; Ullmann v. Railway Co., 112 Wis. 150, 88 N. W. 41, 88 Am. St." Rep. 949; Wilkie v. New York Life Ins. Co., 146 N. C. 513, 60 S. E. 427; Newbern Banking & Trust Co. v. Duffy, 153 N. C. 62, 68 S. E. 915 [cit. Clark on Contracts (2d Ed.) §§ 218, 219]. If it clearly appears that a word was used inadvertently, or is inconsistent with the real intention, it will be rejected. Wells v. Tregusan, 2 Salk. 463; Dollman v. King, 4 Bing. (N. C.) 105; Buck v. Burk, 18 N. Y. 337; Stockton v. Turner, 7 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 192; Hibbard v. McKindley, 28 111. 240; Iredell v. Barbee, 31 N. C. 250. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 147; Cent. Dig. §§ 730, 743. *

77 Dwight v. Insurance Co., 103 N. Y. 341, 8 N. E. 654, 57 Am. Rep. 729; Canterberry v. Miller, 76 111. 355; Noyes v. Nichols, 28 Vt. 159; Williamson v. McClure, 37 Pa. 402; Armstrong v. Granite Co., 47 N. Y. 495, 42 N. E. 1S6, 49 Am. St. Rep. 683; Clark v. Mallory, 185 111. 227, 56 N. E. 1099; Abraham v. Railroad. 37 Or. 495, 60 Pac. 899, 64 L. R. A. 391, 82 Am. St Pep. 779; Lambert Hoisting Engine Co. v. Paschall, 151 N. C. 27, 65 S. E. 523. See "Contracts:' Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 147; Cent. Dig. §§ 730, 743.

78 Zohrlaub v. Mengelberg, 144 Wis. 564, 124 N. W. 247, 12S N. W. 975; Caverly-Gould Co. v. Village of Springfield, S3 Vt. 396, 76 Atl. 39. See "Contracts" Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 168; Cent. Dig. § 751.

79 Close v. Browne, 230 111. 228, 82 N. E. 629, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 634. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 169; Cent. Dig. § 752.

80 Zohrlaub v. Mengelberg, 144 Wis. 564, 124 N. W. 247, 128 N. W. 975; PLANO MFG. CO. v. ELLIS, 68 Mich. 101, 35 N. W. 841, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 347; Roberts v. Bonaparte, 73 Md. 191, 20 Atl. 918, 10 L. R. A. 689, and authorities there cited. And see Nash v. Towne, 5 Wall. 689, 18 I.. Ed. 527; Caperton's Adm'rs v. Caperton, 36 W. Va. 479. 15 S. E. 257; Pen-fold v. Insurance Co., 85 N. Y. 317, 39 Am. Rep. 600; Wilson v. Roots, 119 111. 379, 10 N. E. 204; Kuecken v. Voltz, 110 111. 264; Lacy v. Green, 84 Pa. 514; Excelsior Needle Co. v. Smith, 61 Conn. 56, 23 Atl. 693; Mobile & R. R. Co. v. Jurey, 111 U. S. 5S4, 4 Sup. Ct 566, 2S L. Ed. 527; Gillett v. Bank,

These rules seem to be in conflict with the rule first stated. Taking them together they come substantially to this: that men will be taken to have meant precisely what they have said, unless, from the whole tenor of the instrument, a definite meaning can be collected which gives a broader interpretation to specific words than their literal meaning would bear. The courts will not make an agreement for the parties, but will ascertain what their agreement was, if not by its general purport, then by the literal meaning of its words.