Parol evidence is also admissible, where it is necessary in order to explain the terms of a written contract. Explanation of terms may merely amount to evidence of the identity of the parties to the contract, as where two persons have the same name, or where an agent has contracted in his own name, but on behalf of a principal whose name or whose existence he failed to disclose.28 Or, again, it may be a description of the subject-matter of a contract that needs explanation. Where, for instance, persons agreed to buy from another certain wool, which was described as "your wool," and the right of the seller to introduce evidence of the quality and quantity of the wool was disputed, the evidence was held admissible.28

Again, it may be necessary to explain some word or clause in the writing, not describing the subject-matter of the contract, but

27 Erskine v. Adeane, 8 Ch. App. 756. See "Evidence," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 441; Cent. Dig. §§ 1723-1763.

28 Wake v. Harrop, 6 Hurl. & N. 768; Darrow v. Produce Co. (C. C.) 57 Fed. 463; Mobberly v. Mobberly, 60 Md. 376; Hartzell v. Crumb, 90 Mo. 629, 3 S. W. 59; Simpson v. Dix, 131 Mass. 179; Martin v. Smith, 65 Miss. 1, 3 South. 33; Wakefield v. Brown, 38 Minn. 361, 37 N. W. 788, 8 Am. St. Rep. 671; Barkley v. Tarrant, 20 S. C. 574, 47 Am. Rep. 853; Rumbough v. Southern Imp. Co., 106 N. C. 461, 11 S. E. 528; Northern Nat. Bank v. Lewis, 78 Wis. 475, 47 N. W. 834; Bartlett v. Remington, 59 N. H. 364; Haskell v. Tukesbury, 92 Me. 551, 43 Atl. 500, 69 Am. St. Rep. 529; First Nat. Bank v. North, 2 S. D. 480, 51 N. W. 96. The writing, however, cannot be contradicted as to the parties. Parol evidence, for instance, is not admissible to show that an order reading "Ship to me," and signed "G. G. Bauder," was intended to be the order of the firm of "George G. Bauder & Co." Osgood v. Bauder, 82 Iowa. 171, 47 N. W. 1001. An agent who contracts in his own name cannot, to escape liability, show that he intended to bind his principal and not himself. Hig-gins v. Senior, 8 Mees. & W. 834; Dexter v. Ohlander, 93 Ala. 441, 9 South. 361; Cream City Glass Co. v. Friedlander, 84 Wis. 53, 54 N. W. 28, 21 L. R. A. 135, 36 Am. St. Rep. 895; Brigham v. Herrick, 173 Mass. 460, 53 N. E. 900; Tiffany, Ag. 234, 356. See "Evidence," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 448; Cent. Dig. §§ 2066-2082.

29 Macdonald v Longbottom, 1 El. & El. 977. And see Bulkley v. Devine, 127 111. 406, 20 N. E. 16, 3 L. R. A. 330; Clark v. Coffin Co., 125 Ind. 277, 25 N. E. 288; Thompson v. Stewart, 60 Iowa, 223, 14 N. W. 247; Thornell v. City of Brockton, 141 Mass. 151, 6 N. E. 74; Busby v. Bush, 79 Tex. 656, 15 S. W. 638; Thacker v. Howell (Ky.) 26 S. W. 719; Rapley v. Klugh, 40 S. C. 134, 18 S. E. 680; Merriam v. United States, 107 U. S. 437, 2 Sup. Ct. 536, 27 L. Ed. 531; Reed v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 23, 24 L. Ed. 348; New England Dressed M. & W. Co. v. Standard W. Co., 165 Mass. 328, 43 N, describing the amount and character of the responsibility which one of the parties takes upon himself as to the conditions of the contract. Where, for instance, a person accepted an order upon him by one who had contracted to do certain work for him, "to be paid out of the last installment," evidence was admitted to show that the meaning of the words quoted was that the order was only to be paid out of the last payment to a certain person provided for in the contract, and that, if that person did not fulfill his contract so that the last payment would become due and payable, there should be no liability on the order.30 So, also, where a vessel is warranted "seaworthy," a house promised to be kept "in tenantable repair," or a thing undertaken to be done in a "reasonable manner," parol evidence is admissible to show the application of these phrases to the subject-matter of the contract, so as to ascertain the intention of the parties. In every policy of marine insurance there is an implied warranty by the assured that the vessel is "seaworthy." In an action on such a policy, evidence was held admissible to show that the word "seaworthy" was understood in a modified sense with reference to the particular vessel and voyage.31

Cases of the sort we have just described are called cases of latent ambiguity, as distinguished from patent ambiguities, where words are omitted or contradict one another. In the latter cases explanatory evidence is not admissible. Thus, where a bill of exchange was drawn for one sum in words, and the figures at the top were for a larger amount, evidence was not admitted to show that the bill was intended to be drawn for the latter amount.32

E. 112, 52 Am. St Rep. 516; Brown v. Markland, 16 Utah, 360, 52 Pac. 597, 67 Am. St. Rep. 629. See "Evidence" Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 460; Cent. Dig. §§ 2115-2128.

30 Proctor v. Hartigan, 143 Mass. 462, 9 N. E. 841. And see Manchester Paper Co. v. Moore, 104 N. Y. 680, 10 N. E. 861; Wickes Bros. v. Electric Light Co., 70 Mich 322, 38 N. W. 299; Rhodes v. Wilson, 12 Colo. 65, 20 Pac. 746; Roberts v. Bonaparte, 73 Md. 191, 20 Atl. 918, 10 L. R. A. 689; Clay v. Field, 138 U. S. 464, 11 Sup. Ct. 419, 34 L. Ed. 1044; Macdonald v. Dana, 154 Mass. 152, 27 N. E. 993; Fawkner v. Wall-Paper Co. (Iowa) 49 N. W. 1003; Hurd v. Bovee, 54 Hun, 635, 7 N. Y. Supp. 241; Id., 134 N. Y. 595, 31 N. E. 624; Durr v. Chase, 161 Mass. 40, 36 N. E. 741; Halladay v. Hess, 147 111. 588, 35 N. E. 3S0. See "Evidence;' Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 463; Cent. Dig. §§ 2140-2148.

31 Burges v. Wickham, 3 Best & S. 669. See Payne v. Haine, 16 Mees. & W. 541. See "Evidence;' Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 456, 457; Cent. Dig. §§ 2104-2106.

32 Sanderson v. Piper, 5 Bing. N. C. 425. See "Evidence" Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 451, 452; Cent. Dig. §§ 2085-2101.