An agreement, to be recognized as such by the law, so as to constitute a contract, must be "an act in the law;"11 that is, it must be, on the face of the matter, capable of having legal effects; and therefore, the intention of the parties must refer to legal relations, so that the courts, which can only deal with legal relations, may take cognizance of it. It must have reference to the assumption of legal rights and duties, as opposed to engagements of a social character and engagements of honor. If a person agrees to sell another a horse, the agreement refers to legal relations, and may result in contract; but, if a person agrees to go to another's house to dine, the intention refers merely to a social engagement, and no contract results. Legal consequences are not contemplated.12
8 Rodgers, McCabe & Co. v. Bell, 156 N. C. 378, 72 S. E. 817 [cit Clark on Contracts, pp. 2. 3]. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 22; Cent. Dig. §§ 82-92.
9 Leake, Cont. 8. Intention may be communicated to the agent of a party, but this is equivalent to communication to the party himself. "In the case in hand," it was said, "the plaintiff determined to accept. But a mental determination not indicated by speech, or put in course of indication by act to the other party, is not an acceptance which will bind the other. Nor does an act which in itself is no indication of an acceptance become such because accompanied by an unevinced mental determination." WHITE v. CORLIES, 46 N. Y. 467, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 1. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 22; Cent. Dig. §§ 82-92.
10 Northrup v. Colter, 150 Mo. App. 639, 131 S. W. 364. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 16; Cent. Dig. §§ 49-56, 71-92.
11 Pol. Cont. 2.