As we have already stated, it was for a long time thought, both in England and with us, that a contract in restraint of trade was void on its face if the restraint was unlimited as to space, and there are modern cases laying down the same rule. 22

20 Fox Solid Pressed Steel Co. v. Schoen (C. C.) 77 Fed. 29; Clark v. Need-ham, 125 Mich. 84, 83 N. W. 1027, 51 L. R. A. 785, 84 Am. St Rep. 559; Culp v. Love, 127 N. C. 457, 37 S. E. 476. Contra, Wood v. Whitehead Bros. Co., 165 N. Y. 545, 59 N. E. 357. And see Oakes v. Water Co., 143 N. T. 430, 38 N. E. 461, 26 L. R. A. 544. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

21 Stewart v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co., 56 Fla. 570, 48 South. 19, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 649, per Whitfield, J. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

22 Alger v. Thacher, 19 Pick. (Mass.) 51, 31 Am. Dec. 119; BISHOP v. PALMER, 146 Mass. 469, 16 N. E. 299, 4 Am. St Rep. 339, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 290; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; Thomas v. Miles' Adm'r, 3 Ohio St. 274; Long v. Towl, 42 Mo. 545, 97 Am. Dec. 355; Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171; Sutton v. Head, 86 Ky. 156, 5 S. W. 410, 9 Am. St. Rep. 274; Smith's Appeal, 113 Pa. 579, 6 Atl. 251; Warfield v. Booth, 33 Md. 63; Goodman v. Henderson, 58 Ga. 567; Lufkin Rule Co. v. Fringeli, 57 Ohio St. 596, 49 N. E. 1030, 41 L. R. A. 185, 63 Am. St. Rep. 736; Harding v. Glucose Co., 182 I11. 551, 55 N. E. 577, 64 L. R. A. 738, 74 Am. St. Rep. 189 (cf. Lanzit v. Manufacturing Co., 184 I11. 326, 56 N. E. 393, 75 Am. St. Rep. 171); Union Strawboard Co. v. Bonfield, 193 I11. 420, 61 N. E. 1038, 86 Am. St Rep. 346. See, also, Gamewell Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50, 35 N. E. 98, 22 L. R. A 673, 39 Am. St. Rep. 458. It was at one time considered that an agreement not to carry on a business anywhere within a state, like an agreement not to carry it on anywhere within the United States, was unlimited as to space, and was invalid as imposing a general restraint, Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen (Mass.) 370, 90 Am. Dec. 203; Chappel v. Brockway, 21 Wend. (N. T.) 157; Wright v. Ryder, 36 Cal. 342, 95 Am. Dec. 186; More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251, 6 Am. Rep. 621; Nobles v. Bates, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 307; but this doctrine is now generally repudiated, and such an agreement will be enforced, if, under the circumstances, the restraint is reasonable. Oregon Steam Nav. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64, 22 L. Ed. 315; Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490; DIAMOND MATCH CO. v. ROEBER, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419, 60 Am. Rep. 464, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 264, affirming 35 Hun (N. Y.) 421; Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3, 19 Atl. 712, 8 L. R. A. 469, 33 Am. St. Rep. 850. See "Contracts;' Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

The tendency of the cases is, however, to relax the old rule, and to allow a restraint unlimited in space if it is reasonable, and no broader than is necessary, for the protection Of the covenantee. Such is the doctrine which is now established in England.28 Thus, in a recent case,24 where a patentee and manufacturer of guns and ammunition covenanted with a company to which his patents and business had been transferred not to engage, for twenty-five years, in the business of manufacturing guns and ammunition, it was held that the covenant was not in restrain of trade. "The inquiry as to the validity of all covenants in restraint of trade," said Lord Ash-borne, "must now ultimately turn upon whether they are reasonable, and whether they exceed what is reasonably necessary for the covenantee." In this country, also, the tendency of the modern cases is to support a restraint, although unlimited in space, provided it is reasonably necessary for the protection of the promisee.25