It has been said without qualification that, if the restraint is reasonably limited as to space, the fact that it is unlimited as to time will not render the agreement void; that, for instance, an agreement not to carry on a trade, business, or profession in a certain city is valid, though it may be agreed that it shall never be carried on there.28 It is clear, however, that the same considerations apply as in the case of a restraint unlimited in space. A restraint unlimited as to time may be necessary to protect the party in whose favor it is imposed, and in such a case it will be upheld; but, if unnecessary, the agreement cannot be sustained.27

23 Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. 351; Badische Anilin und Soda Fabrik v. Schott, [1892] 3 Ch. 447; Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Co., [1894] App. Cas. 535; Underwood v. Barker, [1899] 1 Ch. 300. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

24 Nordenfelt v. Maxim-Nordenfelt Co., [1894] App. Cas. 535. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

25 DIAMOND MATCH CO. v. ROEBER, 106 N. Y. 473, 13 N. E. 419, 60 Am. Rep. 464, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 264; Herreshoff v. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3, 19 Atl. 712, 8LR.A. 469, 33 Am. St. Rep. 850; National Ben. Co. v. Hospital Co., 45 Minn. 272, 47 N. W. 806, 11 L. R. A. 437; Gibbs v. Gas Co.,' 130 U. S. 409, 9 Sup. Ct. 553, 32 L. Ed. 979; Fowle v. Park, 131 U. S. 88, 9 Sup. Ct. 658, 33 L. Ed. 67'; Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484, 28 Atl. 973, 23 L. R. A. 639, 49 Am. St. Rep. 784; Carter v. Ailing (C. C.) 43 Fed. 208; Richards v. Seating Co., 87 Wis. 503, 58 N. W. 787; Consumers' Oil Co. v. Nunnemaker, 142 Ind. 560, 41 N. E. 1048, 51 Am. St Rep. 193; Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawkes, 171 Mass. 101, 50 X. E. 509, 41 L. R. A. 189, 68 Am. St. Rep. 403; Kramer v. Old, 119 N. C. 1, 25 S. E. 813, 34 L. R. A. 389, 56 Am. St. Rep. 650; Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 Atl. 723, 46 L. R. A. 255, 78 Am. St. Rep. 612; Buck v. Coward, 122 Mich. 530, 81 N. W. 328; National Enameling & Stamping Co. v. Haberman (C. C.) 120 Fed. 415; United Shoe Machinery Co. v. Kimball, 193 Mass. 351, 79 N. E. 790. See "Contracts in Restraint of Trade," by Amasa M. Eaton, 4 Harv. Law Rev. 128. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

26 Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 344, 43 Am. Dec. 93; Angier v. Webber, 14 Allen (Mass.) 211, 92 Am. Dec. 748; Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 178, 36

In a leading English case the defendant had entered the service of the plaintiff, who was a druggist carrying on his business in the town of Taunton, as the plaintiff's assistant, under a contract whereby he agreed that he would not, at any time after leaving the plaintiff's service, engage in the business of a druggist and chemist in that town. The agreement was held void in the lower court on the ground that the restraint was larger than the necessary protection of the party in favor of whom it was given required.28 This judgment was reversed on writ of error on the ground that a restriction so extensive in point of time was necessary for the protection of the promisee in the enjoyment of the good will of his trade. "The good will of a trade," it was said by Tindal, C. J., "is the subject of value and price. It may be sold, bequeathed, or become assets in the hand of the personal representative of a trader; and, if the restriction as to time is to be held to be illegal if extended beyond the period of the party by himself carrying on the trade, the value of such good will, considered in those various points of view, is altogether destroyed. If, therefore, it is not unreasonable (as undoubtedly it is not) to prevent a servant from entering into the same trade in the same town in which his master lives, so long as the master carries on the trade there, we cannot think it unreasonable that the restraint should be carried further, and should be allowed to continue if the master sells the trade, or bequeaths it, or it becomes the property of his personal representative." 29

Am. Rep. 64. See "Contracts" Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

27 Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 453; Smith v. Brown, 164 Mass. 584, 42 N. E. 101; Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N. J. Eq. 185, 7 Atl. 37; Carrl v. Snyder (N. J. Ch.) 26 Atl. 977; French v. Parker, 16 R. I. 219, 14 Atl. 870, 27 Am. St. Rep. 733; Trenton Potteries Co. v. Oliphant, 58 N. J. Eq. 507, 43 Atl. 723, 46 L. R. A. 255, 78 Am. St. Rep. 612; Up River Ice Co. v. Denier, 114 Mich. 296, 72 N. W. 157, 68 Am. St. Rep. 480; Eisel v. Hayes, 141 Ind. 41, 40 N. E. 119; O'Neal v. Hines, 145 Ind. 32, 43 N. E. 946; Swanson v. Kirby, 98 Ga. 586, 26 S. E. 71; Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 30 S. E. 735, 69 Am. St Rep. 154. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

28 Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 438. See "Contracts" Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 55.',-569.

29 Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 Adol. & E. 453. And see Pemberton v. Vaughan, 10 Q. B. 87; Elves v. Crafts, 10 C. B. 241; Atkyns v. Kinnier, 4 Exch.

Some courts draw a distinction between contracts binding the promisor to desist from the practice of a learned profession, and contracts not to engage in a business which, with its good will, the promisor has sold, holding that in the former case a restraint unlimited in time is unreasonable.80 Thus, in a recent New Jersey-case, in which it was held that since a contract imposing a restraint greater than is necessary to protect the party for whose benefit it is imposed is void, a covenant that a physician shall not "at any time thereafter" engage in practice in a certain city is void, because it would prevent him from practicing after the death of the other party.81 The court considered the English case above mentioned, and held that the reasoning did not apply. "The practice of a physician," it was said, "is a thing so purely personal, depending so absolutely on the confidence reposed in his personal skill and ability, that when he ceases to exist it necessarily ceases also, and after his death can have neither an intrinsic nor a market value." The contrary, however, has been held in Rhode Island. The reason of the English decisions mentioned above, it was said, "is as valid in the case of a profession as of a trade; for whether, technically speaking, there be any good will attending a profession or not, the professional practice itself would probably sell for more with the restraining contract, if the restraint were unlimited in duration, than it would if the restraint were for the life of the promisee or covenantee only. If the complainant here wished to retire from his practice and sell it, he could probably sell it for more if he would secure the purchaser from competition forever than he could if he could only secure him from such competition during his- own life. So, if he wished to take in a partner, he could for the same reason make better terms with him." 32

(Welsb., H. & G.) 782; Bowser v. Bliss, 7 Blackf. (Ind.) 344, 43 Am. Dec 93. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Gent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

30 Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N. J. Eq. 185, 7 Atl. 37; Rakestraw v. Lanier, 104 Ga. 188, 30 S. E. 735, 69 Am. St. Rep. 154. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig (Key-So.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

31 Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N. J. Eq. 185, 7 Atl. 37. See "Contracts," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 117; Cent. Dig. §§ 554-569.

32 French v. Parker, 16 R. I. 219, 14 Atl. 870, 27 Am. St. Rep. 733. To the same effect, see Butler v. Burleson, 16 Vt. 176; Martin v. Murphy, 129 Ind. 464, 28 N. E. 1118; Linn v. Sigsbee, 67 I11. 75; McClurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. 51; Miller v. Elliott, 1 Ind. 484, 50 Am. Dec. 475; Cook v. Johnson, 47 Conn. 175, 36 Am. Rep. 64; Doty v. Martin, 32 Mich. 462; Timmerman v. Dever, 52 Mich. 34, 17 N. W. 230, 50 Am. Rep. 240; Cole v. Edwards, 93 Iowa, 477, 61 N. W. 940; McCurry v. Gibson, 108 Ala. 451, 18 South. 806, 54 Am. St. Rep. 177; Tillinghast v. Boothby, 20 R I. 59, 37 Atl. 344; Ryan v. Hamilton, 205 I11. 191, 68 N. E. 781. Agreement never to practice law In a particular town.