The writing must also show the subject-matter, at least to such an extent that it can be identified.32 Parol evidence is admitted to identify the subject-matter to which the writing refers; as, for instance, to identify a house described in the writing as a "house on Church street," or property described as "your half, E. B. wharf, and premises this day agreed upon between us."33 Such parol evi-

30 Hayes v. Jackson, 159 Mass. 451, 34 N. E. 683 coverruling Grace v. Deni-son, 114 Mass. 16]; White v. Dahlquist Mfg. Co., 179 Mass. 427, 60 N. E. 791; Johnson v. Ronald, 4 Munf. (Va.) 77. Contra, Kelly v. Thuey, 143 Mo. 422, 45 S. W. 300, in which it is said, per Sherwood, J.: "At one time in this court the heresy was announced that parol testimony was admissible for the purpose indicated. O'Neil v. Crain, 67 Mo. 251. The last erroneous adjudication on this subject is found in Ellis v. Bray, 79 Mo. 227; but the contrary and correct ruling was declared in Ringer v. Holtzclaw, 112 Mo. 519, 20 S. W. 800, and followed in Boyd v. Paul, 125 Mo. 9, 28 S. W. 171." And see cases cited supra, note 27. See "Frauds, Statute of," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 112; Cent. Dig. § 23S.

31 Sault v. Stormont, 51 Mich. 636, 17 N. W. 214; Nelson .v. Shelby Mfg.

& Imp. Co., 96 Ala. 515, 11 South. 695, 38 Am. St. Rep. 116 (memorandum relied on by vendor to establish validity of contract against vendee). See "Frauds, Statute of," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 112; Cent. Dig. % 288.

32Whelan v. Sullivan, 102 Mass. 204; Beekman v. Fletcher, 48 Mich. 555, 12 N. W. 849; Tice v. Freeman, 30 Minn. 3S9, 15 N. W. 674; King v. Wood,

7 Mo. 389; Mason v. Small, 130 Mo. App. 249, 109 S. W. 822. "I have sold this place" is not sufficient. Cunha v. Gallery, 29 R. I. 230, 69 Atl. 1001, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 616, 132 Am. St. Rep. 811. See "Frauds, Statute of," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 109, 110; Cent. Dig. §§ 222-236.

33 Mead v. Parker, 115 Mass. 413, 15 Am. Rep. 110; Tallman v. Franklin, 14 N. Y. 584; Ryan v. United States, 136 U. S. 68, 10 Sup. Ct 913, 34 L. Ed. 447; Mellon v. Davison, 123 Pa. 298, 16 Atl. 431; Henderson v. Perkins, 94 Ky. 207, 21 S. W. 1035; Dougherty v. Chesnutt, 86 Tenn. 1, 5 S. W. 444; Lente v. Clarke. 22 Fla. 515, 1 South. 149; Cossitt v. Hobbs, 56 111. 231; Hollis v. Burgess, 37 Kan. 487, 15 Pac. 536; Quinn v. Champagne, 38 Minn. 322, 37 N. W. 451; Breckinridge v. Crocker, 78 Cal. 529, 21 Pac. 179; Humbert v. Brisbane, 25 S. C. 506; Oliver v. Hunting, 44 Ch. Div. 205; Francis v. Barry, 69 Mich. 311, 37 N. W. 353. A memorandum is not sufficient where it merely describes it as "an estate on A. street, owned by B.," and the evidence shows that B. owned two estates on that street. Doherty v. Hill, 144 Mass. 465, 11 N. E. 581. And see Jones v. Tye, 93 Ky. 390, 20 S. W. 388; Alabama Mineral Land Co, v. Jackson, 121 Ala. 172, 25 South. 709, 77 Am. St Rep. 46. "Your land," in a letter to the alleged vendor is not sufficient. Taylor v. Allen, 40 Minn. 433, 42 N. W. 292. And see Lowe v. Harris, 112 N.C. 472, 17 S. E. 539, 22 L. R. A. 379. A memorandum that P. shall have the land "of which he is now in possession" has been held sullicieut Phildence, however, is confined to evidence of the location of objects mentioned, the circumstances of the parties, as, for example, the property owned by them, and other external matters, and does not extend to spoken language passing between the parties.34 It must be confined to the construction and application of the writing and may not be used to add to or subtract from it.36