62 Ante, p. 209.
63 Craighead v. Wells, 21 Mo. 409; Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194. See, also, Nichols & Shepard Co. v. Snyder, 78 Minn. 502, 81 N. W.
516. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 31, 58; Cent. Dig. §§ 59, 157.
64Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359, 8 Am. Dec. 105; Mustard v. Wohl-ford's Heirs, 15 Grat. (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209. Where an infant bought of another infant, and paid the price, and after the seller had spent the money the buyer disaffirmed the contract, and brought action to recover the money paid both in contract and in tort, it was held that the defendant's plea of infancy was a defense to the count in contract, and that there was no dealing with the money by the defendant which could constitute conversion. Drude v. Curtis, 183 Mass. 317, 67 N. E. 317, 62 L. R. A. 755. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 31, 58; Cent. Dig. §§ 50, 157.
65 See Brawner v. Franklin, 4 Gill (Md.) 470; Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me.
517, 525. And see post, p. 215. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 30, 57; Cent. Dig. §§ 41-63, 186-148.
66 See Price v. Furman, 27 Vt 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194; LEMMON v. BEE-MAN, 45 Ohio St 505, 15 N. E. 476, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 140; Carr v. Clough, 26 N. H. 2S0, 59 Am. Dec. 345; Robinson v. Weeks, 56 Me. 102; Johnson v. Ins. Co., 56 Minn. 365, 57 N. W. 934, 26 L. R. A. 187, 45 Am. St. Rep. 473; Lane v. Iron Co., 101 Tenn. 581, 48 S. W. 1094; Bell v. Burk-halter (Ala.) 57 South. 460. See, also, cases cited infra, note 74. Formal demand and refusal, recover in trover.67 That return of the consideration is not a condition to disaffirmance, where the disaffirmance by the infant is by dealing with the property he has parted with as his own, and where he is not seeking the aid of a court to recover it, is everywhere conceded; as where, having sold land and received the purchase money, he disaffirms by conveying the land to another. The latter deed is effectual though he has not returned the consideration for his prior deed.68 (c) According to the weight of authority, an infant, on attaining his majority, may disaffirm his contract, whether it is executory or executed, and in the latter case may recover back what he has parted with or for what he has done, without returning or offering to return the consideration received by him, if, during his minority, he has squandered or otherwise disposed of it so that he cannot return it.69 The rule is also applied to cases where tender is not required as a condition precedent to a suit by him. but restoration must be made on the trial as a condition of the judgment Starr v. Watkins, 78 Neb. 610, 111 N. W. 363; Jones v. Valentine's School of Telegraphy, 122 Wis. 318, 99 N. W. 1043. Money borrowed by an infant mortgagor and used to pay off prior liens and for permanent improvements will be regarded in equity as in his hands; and in a suit to foreclose the mortgage after disaffirmance, relief may be given by a sale of the property and the application of the proceeds in such manner as to place the mortgagee in statu quo, provided this can be done without depriving the mortgagor of an interest equivalent to that which he had in the property at the time the mortgage was executed. MacGreal v. Taylor, 1G7 U. S. 688, 17 Sup. Ct. 961, 42 L. Ed. 326. Cf. Nottingham, etc., Society v. Thurston, 19 L. T. R. 54 (H. of L.) affirming s. c.  1 Ch. 1 (C. A.) reversing s. c.  1 Cm 88. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 31, 58; Cent. Dig. §§ 59, 157.
67 Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117; Tucker v. More-land, 10 Pet. 58, 73, 9 L. Ed. 345; Shaw v. Boyd, 5 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 309, 9 Am. Dec. 368; McCarty v. Iron Co., 92 Ala. 463, 8 South. 417, 12 L. R. A. 136: Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571, 15 N. E. 12; Drude v. Curtis, 183 Mass. 317, 67 N. E. 317, 62 L. R. A. 755. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) §§ 31, 58; Cent. Dig. §§ 59, 157.
68 Dawson v. Helmes, 30 Minn. 107, 14 N. W. 462. See "Infants," Dec. Dig. (Key-No.) § 31; Cent. Dig. § 59.
69 Chandler v. Simmons, 97 Mass. 508, 93 Am. Dec. 117; Price v. Furman, 27 Vt. 268, 65 Am. Dec. 194; Boody v. McKenney, 23 Me. 517; LEMMON v. BEEMAN, 45 Ohio St. 505, 15 N. E. 476, Throckmorton Cas. Contracts, 140; Reynolds v. McCurry, 100 111. 356; Mustard v. Wohlford's Heirs, 15 Grat (Va.) 329, 76 Am. Dec. 209; Miller v. Smith, 26 Minn. 248, 2 N. W. 942, 37 Am. Rep. 407; Green v. Green, 69 N. Y. 553, 25 Am. Rep. 233; Mordecai v. Pearl, 63 Hun, 553, 18 N. Y. Supp. 543; Petrie v. Williams, 68 Hun, 589, 23 N. Y. Supp. 237; Brandon v. Brown, 106 111. 519; Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo. 584, 13 S. W. 906, 18 Am. St. Rep. 569; Lacy v. Pixler, 120 Mo. 3S3, 25 S. W. 200; Harvey v. Briggs, 68 Miss. 00, 8 South. 274, 10 L. R. A. 02; Engle-bert v. Troxell, 40 Neb. 195, 58 N. W. 852, 26 L. R. A. 177, 42 Am. St. Rep. 665; Manning v. Johnson, 26 Ala. 446, 62 Am. Dec. 732; Ridgeway v. Herbert, the consideration is of such a nature that it cannot be returned, as, for example, instruction, or personal services,70 or insurance on one's life.71 He is not bound to return an equivalent.72 Some of the courts extend this rule to cases in which the infant was even benefited by disposing of the consideration.73 The principle on which this rule is based is that the privilege of the infant to avoid his contracts is intended to protect him against the improvidence which is incident to his immaturity, and that to require him to return the consideration received and squandered or otherwise disposed of during his minority would be to withdraw this protection, and frustrate the object of the law. This rule has been applied, not only where the contract was a sale and conveyance of land by the infant, but to sales of personalty and other contracts as well.
(d) Many courts, on the other hand, apply the principle that the privilege of an infant is intended as a shield, and not as a sword - or, in other words, as a protection to the infant, and not as an instrument of fraud and injustice to others - hold, or have held, that an infant cannot avoid his executed contracts, whereby he has benefited, and recover what he has parted with, or for what he has done, unless he can and does restore the consideration he has received; and that it is immaterial that the consideration has been disposed of by him, or for any other reason cannot be returned. In other words, they hold that an infant who receives a substantial consideration for his executed contract cannot, on attaining- his majority, avoid the contract, and recover what he has parted with, unless he can and does place the other party in statu quo.74