(a) The word "goods" has replaced the words "goods, wares, and merchandises." As to the definition of goods in the Sale of Goods Act (Ont. s. 2; U. K. s. 62), see chapter 1,14.
(b) The word "value" has replaced the word "price." The former word had been used in Lord Tenterden's Act and it had been held that the effect of reading Lord Tenterden's Act and s. 17 of the Statute of Frauds together was that s. 17 must be construed as if it had used the word "value." See 23.
(c) The words " a contract . . . shall not be enforceable by action" have replaced the words "no contract . . shall be allowed to be good." See notes below. In the Sale of Goods Act (Ont. s. 2; U. K. s. 62), "action" includes counterclaim and set off.
(d) The word "contract" has replaced the word "bargain. " Since the passing of Lord Tenterden's Act the argument formerly based upon the use of the word "bargain" in s. 17 of the Statute of Frauds was no longer tenable. See 23.
(e) The words "party to be charged or his agent in that behalf" have replaced the words "parties to be charged . . or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized." It had been held that the note or memorandum need not be signed by both parties to the contract, but that only the party to be charged need sign. Reuss v. Picksley, 1866, L. R. 1 Ex. 342.
The view that the words " no contract . . . shall be allowed to be good" in s. 17 of the Statute of Frauds are the equivalent of " a contract . . . shall not be enforceable by action" in the Sale of Goods Act, and that consequently the Sale of Goods Act has made no change in the law in this respect, is the prevalent view. Maddison v. Alderson, 1 App. Cas. 467, at p. 488. The contrary view is vigorously maintained by Willis (Sale of Goods, pp. 67 ff.). See also Lord Finlay's judgment in Morris v. Baron,  A.C. 1, at p. 11.
In Morris v. Baron the House of Lords held that a contract for the sale of goods of more than £10 value, evidenced in writing as required by the Sale of Goods Act, might be rescinded by a subsequent oral contract for the sale of goods, if there was a clear intention to rescind as distinguished from an intention to vary, notwithstanding that the subsequent contract was itself unenforceable by reason of its non-compliance with the statute. As to oral variation of a written con-tract or oral waiver of condition, see also Malouglney v. Crowe, 1912, 26 O.L.R. 579, 6 D.L.R. 471; Sierichs v. Hughes, 1918, 42 O.L.R. 608, 43 D.L.R. 297; Hartley v. Hymans,  3 K.B. 475, at pp. 486 ff
The defence that the statute has not been complied with must be specially pleaded.
Brutton v. Branson  2 Q.B. 219; as to terms where the defendant is allowed to amend at the trial, see Vipond v. Sisco, 1913, 29 O.L.R. 200, 14 D.L.R. 129.