Sub.-s. 3, defining acceptance for the purpose of the section, adopts the language of Bowen L.J. in Page v. Morgan, 1885, 15 Q.B.D. 228, at p. 233. In this case there was a sale of wheat by sample. The buyer, having received a number of sacks of wheat delivered under the contract at his premises, opened the sacks and examined their contents to see if they were equal to sample, but immediately after doing so gave notice to the seller that he refused the wheat as not being equal to sample. Clearly there was no acceptance which would preclude the buyer from refusing the goods as not being in accordance with the contract, but it was held that there was an act done by the buyer in relation to the goods which recognised the existence of a contract for the purchase of the goods by him, and therefore such acceptance as, joined with the actual receipt of the goods by him, would preclude him from relying upon the Statute of Frauds as a defence. Inasmuch as a later section of the Sale of Goods Act (s. 35) enacts what shall be sufficient acceptance to preclude a buyer from refusing goods as not being in accordance with the contract, it is necessary in the statute to define acceptance for the purposes of the Statute of Frauds. Since the passing of the statute, the statutory definition of acceptance has been applied in circumstances similar to those existing in Page v. Morgan.
Abbott v. Wolsey,  2 Q.B. 97; Taylor v. Great Eastern Railway,  1 K.B. 774; Thames Canning Co. v. Eckardt, 1915, 34 O.L.R. 72, 23 D.L.R. 805; cf. McLean v. McGhee, 1920, 30 Man. R. 386, 53 D.L.R. 14 (assumption of ownership).
A different definition of acceptance for the purpose of the Statute of Frauds has been adopted in the United States by the Uniform Sales Act (s. 4),
There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this section when the buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods, expresses by words or conduct his assent to becoming the owner of those specific goods.
This is said to represent the American rule, as well as the early English view, and is substantially in accordance with the view expressed in Willis, Sale of Goods, pp. 78 ff., 88 ff.
An actual receipt of the goods by the buyer takes place when there is a delivery of the goods to or into the control of the_buyer so as to divest the seller's lien in respect thereof. where the seller agrees to hold the goods as the buyer's bailee, some doubt may exist how far the Sale of Goods Act, which preserves the lien in such case (see chapter 7, 73), has modified the law as to actual receipt. Where, at the time of the attornment, no right of lien exists, the attornment seems to amount to an actual receipt, for the fact that the lien may afterwards revive is immaterial; but where there is a lien at the time, the case seems to be doubtful.
25 Halsbury, Laws of England, p. 132, and note (n) where many cases are cited; cf. Willis, Sale of Goods, pp. 92 ff.; as to constructive delivery , see Dublin City Distillery v. Doherty,  A. C. 823, at pp. 844 ff. Where the goods are, at the time of the contract, in the possession of the buyer as the seller's bailee, the acts of the buyer which constitute an acceptance of the goods also constitute an actual receipt thereof. A delivery of the goods to a carrier, or other agent for the transmission of the goods to the buyer, is an actual receipt of the goods by the buyer by his agent, if the goods are in accordance with the contract and if the, seller has not reserved the right of disposal; but such a delivery is not an acceptance of the goods by the buyer, the carrier or other agent not being the buyer's agent for acceptance.
25 Halsbury, Laws of England, pp. 132-3; cf. Bushel v. Wheeler, 1844, 15 Q.B. 442 n., 23 R.C. 213; Meredith v. Meigh, 1853, 2 E & B. 364, 23 R.C. 217; as to reservation of the right of disposal, see chapter 3, 34.