Maintenance and champerty are offences at common law; and contracts resting upon them are void. But those offences, if not less common in fact, as it may be hoped that they are, are certainly less frequent in their appearance before judicial tribunals than formerly; and recent decisions have considerably qualified the law in relation to them. Still, however, they are offences, and contracts which rest upon them are void. Maintenance, in particular, seems now to be confined to the * intermeddling of a stranger in a suit, for the purpose of stirring up strife and continuing litigation. (k) Nor is any one liable to this charge who

In Scarfe v. Morgan, 4 M. & W. 270, it was held, that where a contract, the execution of which gave a lien on property, was made and executed on Sunday, although the contract was void, the lien attached. See further Sumner v. Jones, 24 Vt. 317; Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 B. & C. 232; Moore v. Kendall, 1 Chand. 33. A common carrier who has received goods into his possession, on Sunday, for transportation, cannot avail himself of the plea of the illegality of the transaction, in a suit against him for the value of the goods, if destroyed by fire. Powhatan S. B. Co. v. Appomattox R. R. Co. 24 How. 247.

(h) See Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 B. & C. 232; Fennell v. Riddle, 5 B. & C. 406; Begbie v. Levi, 1 Cromp. & J. 180; Allen v. Deming, 14 N. H. 133; Saltmarsh v. Tuthill, 13 Ala. 390.

(i) Commonwealth v. Kendig, 2 Penn. St. 448.

(j) Phila. R. R. Co. v. Havre de Grace Steamboat Co. 23 How. 209.

(k) See, on this subject, Master v. Miller, 4 T. R. 340; Flight v. Leman, 4

Q. B. 883 ; Bell v. Smith, 5 B. & C. 188; Williamson v. Hanley, 6 Bing. 299. It has been considered maintenance for an attorney to agree to save a party harmless from costs, provided he be allowed onehalf of the proceeds of the suit in case of success. In re Masters, 4 Dowl. 18. And see Harrington v. Long, 2 Mylne & K. 590. But one may lawfully agree to promote a suit, where he has reasonable ground to believe himself interested, although in fact he is not so. Findon v. Parker, 11 M. & W. 675. In Call v. Calef, 13 Met. 362, it appeared that A had an interest in the exclusive use in Manchester, N. H., of a certain patent machine, and B had an interest in the exclusive use of the same machine in Lowell. S was using said machine in Manchester, without right. A gave to B a power of attorney, authorizing him to take such steps in A's name as B might judge to be necessary or expedient, by suit at law or otherwise, to prevent S from using, letting, or selling said machine in Manchester, and also authorizing B to sell to S the gives honest advice to go to law, or advances money from good motives to support a suit, or if he stands towards the person who is the party to the suit in any intimate relation, as of landlord, father or son, or master, or husband. (l)

1 Cranson v. Goss, 107 Mass. 439, decided that a bond fide holder of a note, taken by him before maturity for good consideration, and without notice that it was made on Sunday, may maintain an action thereon against the maker. See also Knox v. Clifford, 38 Wis. 651; Greathead v. Walton, 40 Conn. 226; Trieber v. Commercial Bank, 31 Ark. 128.

Champerty is treated as a worse offence; for by this a stranger supplies money to carry on a suit, on condition of sharing in the land or other property gained by it. And contracts of this sort are set aside both at law and in equity. And any agreements to pay part of the sum recovered, whether by commission or otherwise, on consideration either of money advanced to maintain a suit, or services rendered, or information given, or evidence furnished, come within the definition of champerty. (m)1 And right to use said machine in Manchester. And by a parol agreement between A and B, B was to have, as his compensation for his services under said power of attorney, one-half of what he should recover or receive of S. B rendered services under said power, for which he was entitled by said parol agreement to $25. A afterwards assigned his right to the use of said machine to C, with notice of B's claim on A, and with authority to C to revoke said power of attorney to B, upon paying B $25. C promised B to pay him said sum, and B consented to the revocation of the power of attorney. B afterwards brought an action against C to recover said sum of $25. Held, that the parol agreement between A and B was not illegal and void on the ground of maintenance and champerty, but was a valid agreement, since the unauthorized use of the patent in either place would diminish the value and profits of the patent in the other, and therefore B had a direct interest in preventing the violation of the patent-right; that C's promise to pay B said sum was on a good and sufficient consideration; and that the action could be maintained.

(l) Perine v. Dunn, 3 Johns. Ch. 508; Thalhimer v. Brinckerhoff, 3 Cowen, 647; see also Voorhees v. Dorr, 51 Barb. 580.

(m) Stanley v. Jones, 7 Bing. 369; Thurston v. Percival, 1 Pick. 415; Lathrop v. Amherst Bank, 9 Met. 489, an excellent case on this subject; Byrd v. Odem, 9 Ala. 755; Satterlee v. Frazer, 2 Sandf. 141; Holloway v. Lowe, 7 Porter, 488; Key v. Vattier, 1 Ham. 58; Rust v. Larue, 4 Litt. 417; Martin v. Voeder, 20 Wis. 466 ; Alexander v. Polk, 39 Miss. 737. It has been held in Kentucky, that a contract by a client to pay his attorney "a sum equal to one-tenth of the amount recovered," was not void for champerty. Evans v. Bell, 6 Dana, 479; Sprye v. Porter, 7 E. & B. 58, 26 L. J. Q.B. 64.

1 An attorney may stipulate for an absolute or contingent compensation, but not to take a claim for collection, pay all the expenses of prosecution, and divide the sum recovered. Coughlin v, N. Y. etc. R. Co. 71 N. Y. 443. That "a fair agreement to supply funds to carry on a suit in consideration of having a share of the property, if recovered, ought not to be regarded as being per se opposed to public policy;" but that "agreements of this kind ought to be carefully watched, and when found to be extortionate, unconscionable," or made for "improper objects," ought to be held invalid; and that an "action cannot be maintained against a third person on the ground that be was a mover of and had an interest in a suit, in the absence of malice and want of probable cause," see Ram Coomar Coondoo v. Chunder Canto Mookerjee, 2 App. Cas. 186. See also Schomp v. Schenck, 11 Vroom, 195, for elaborate opinion of Beasley, C. J., on law of maintenance and champerty. Although an attorney and his client make an agreement void for champerty, the attorney may recover full compensation for his services. Steams v. Felker, 28 Wis. 594. The indorsement of an overdue promissory note to the plaintiff for the consideration of the principal, the plaintiff to have the accrued interest if he collects it, otherwise the indorser to return the consideration, is not champerty. Taylor v. Gilman, 58 N. H. 417. An agreement by a client to pay his attorney "the first fifty dollars collected by him," is no defence to an action by the latter against the former for his services. Scott v. Harmon, 109 Mass. 237. See Martin v. Clarke, 8 R. L 389; Orr v. Tanner, 12 R. I. 94, from which it appears that the law relating to this has also been extended to cover * many cases of the purchase of a doubtful title to land, by a stranger, of one not in possession, and of land which he who has possession holds adversely to the title purchased. (n)