1 Thus where a general agent gave, without authority, a lease under seal in his principal's name, and received rent thereunder, its surrender to him is a good defence to the principal's action for further rent. Amory v. Kannoffsky, 117 Mass. 351. See Thurber v. Anderson, 88 Ill. 167. - K.

2 This is true although the agent was expressly forbidden to do the act in question. Bell v. Offutt, 10 Bush, 632; Minter v. Pacific R. Co., 41 Mo. 503. - K.

3 Authority to sell gives no power to barter, Hayes v. Colby, 65 N. H. 192; nor, necessarily, to receive payment. Kane v. Barstow, 42 Kan. 465. Authority to receive payments gives no power to receive notes in payment. Scully v. Dodge, 40 Kan. 395. Nor does authority to draw bills of exchange on time or sight include the drawing of post-dated bills. New York Iron Mine v. Citizens' Bank, 44 Mich. 344. Nor does authority to buy include buying on credit. Wheeler v. McGuire, 86 Ala. 398. For other illustrations see cases cited in note (e) supra, and Section iii. infra.

(ee) Johnston v. Brown, 18 La. An. 330.

(f) Bickering v. Busk, 15 East, 38; Whitehead v. Tuckett, L5 East, 400. But if an injury is to result to one man from the omission or neglect of an agent of another, the principal must be held liable. And when the defendants sent their agent to employ the plaintiff, who was a physician, to visit a boy who had been injured while in their service, directing the agent to tell the plaintiff that they would pay him for his first visit, and the agent neglected so to do, and employed the plaintiff generally to attend the boy so long as he might need medical aid, and the plaintiff attended upon the boy on the credit of defendants, held, that defendants were liable to the plaintiff for his ser\ in attending the boy. Barber v. Briton & Hall. 26 Vt. 112.

(ff) Barry v. Anderson, 22 Ind. 36; Davenport v. Peoria Ins. Co., 17 Ia. 276; and cases notes (e) and 3, supra.

ego" of his principal, binding him by whatever the * agent may do in reference to any subject whatever; and therefore the agency must be special so far as it is limited by place, or time, or the extent or character of the work to be done. On the other hand every agency must be so far general, that it must cover not merely the precise thing to be done, but whatever usually and rationally belongs to the doing of it.

Of late years, courts seem more disposed to regard this distinction and the rules founded upon it, as altogether subordinate to that principle which may be called the foundation of the law of agency; namely, that a principal is responsible, either when he has given to an agent sufficient authority, or when he justifies a party dealing with his agent in believing that he has given to this agent this authority. (g)

Where the agency is implied from general employment, it may survive this employment, and will be still implied in favor of those who knew this general employment, but have not had notice of the cessation of the employment, and cannot be supposed to have knowledge thereof. (h) Hence the common and very proper practice of giving notice by public advertisement when such an agency is revoked.

In order to judge correctly of the extent of an agent's authority, the distinction must be noticed between those acts which are within his authority, and those which are only within an appearance of authority, for which the principal is not responsible; for a principal is responsible only for that appearance of authority which is caused by himself, and not for that appearance of conformity to the authority which is caused only by the agent. An agent's authority is that which is given by the declared terms of his appointment, notwithstanding secret instructions; or that with which he is clothed by the character in which he is held out to the world, although not within the words of his commission. Whatever is done under an authority * thus manifested, is actually within the authority, and the principal is bound for that reason; for he is bound equally by the authority which he actually gives, and by that which, by his own acts, he appears to give. But it is obvious that an agent may clothe his act with all the indicia of authority, and yet the act itself may not be within either the real or apparent authority. The appearance of the authority is one thing; and for that the principal is responsible only so far as he has caused that appearance. The appearance of the act is another; and for that it seems the agent alone is responsible. It is a fundamental proposition, that one man can be bound only by the authorized acts of another. He cannot be charged because another holds a commission from him, and falsely asserts that his acts are within it.(i) This distinction has been well illustrated by recent adjudications. Thus a master of a ship is the general agent of the owners to perform all things relating to the usual employment of his ship, and, among other things, to sign bills of lading for goods put on board, and acknowledge the nature, quality, and condition of the goods. But if he signs a bill of lading for goods which have never been shipped, he exceeds his authority; and although the act, judged by its appearance and the representation of the agent, is strictly within the authority, yet the principal is not bound. (k) So, if the master signs a bill of lading for a greater quantity of goods than those on board, the same principle applies. (l) And where the servant of a wharfinger fraudulently signed a receipt, purporting to be an acknowledgment that certain wheat had been delivered at his employer's wharf, no such wheat having in fact been delivered, and thereby wilfully induced one C to pay the • price thereof to the pretended vendor; it was held that the wharfinger was not liable, the servant having authority only to give receipts for goods which had in fact been delivered at the wharf. (m) Again, where a railroad corporation appointed an agent to issue certificates for stock, upon a transfer on the company's books by a previous owner, and a surrender of that owner's certificate; and the agent fraudulently issued * certificates for his own benefit, without a compliance with either of the above conditions, his acts were held to be beyond the scope of his authority, and his principals not bound. (n) And where an agent authorized in writing to purchase goods to a certain amount, had exceeded the amount, but assured a seller that he had not, and the seller sold the goods on this assurance, it was held by a majority of the court (Wilde, J., dissenting), that the principal was not held. (o) We have some doubts of the last decision;