And if no special injunction of secrecy was made, the result would be the same, for from the nature of the case, such an instruction, so far as regards the minimum price, must be intended as a private matter between the principal and agent, not to be communicated to the persons to whom he proposed to make a Bale, from its obvious tendency to defeat the attempt to obtain a greater sum, which was the special dun of the agent. It will not do to say that the agent was not authorized to sell, unless he could obtain that price. That is the very question, whether such a private instruction limits the authority to sell." pp. 545-547 . "No man is at liberty to send another into the market to buy or sell for him as his agent, with secret instructions as to the manner in which he shall execute his agency, which are not to be communicated to those with whom he is to deal; and then, when his agent has deviated from those instructions, to say that he was a special agent, - that the instructions were limitations upon his authority, - and that those with whom he dealt, in the matter of his agency, acted at their peril, because they were bound to inquire, where inquiry would have been fruitless, and to ascertain that of which they were not to have knowledge. It would render dealing with a special agent a matter of great hazard. If the principal deemed the bargain a good one, the secret orders would continue sealed; but if his opinion was otherwise, the injunction of secrecy would be removed, and the transaction avoided, leaving the party to such remedy as he might enforce against the agent. From this reasoning, we deduce the general principle, that where private instructions are given to a special agent, respecting the mode and manner of executing his agency, intended to be kept secret and not communicated to those with whom he may deal, such instructions are not to be regarded as limitations upon his authority; and notwithstanding he disregards them, his act, if otherwise within the scope of his agency, will be valid, and bind his employer." pp. 548, 549. See also Trickett v. Tomlinson, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 663; Edmunds v. Bushell, L. R. 1 Q. B. 97; Louisville Coffin Co. v. Stokes. 78 Ala. 372; Nat. Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., 110 Ill. 427; Fatman v. Leet, 41 Ind. 133; Cruzan v. Smith, 41 Ind. 288: Banks v. Everest, 35 Kan 687; Byrne v. Massa-soit Packing Co. 137 Mass 313; Sails v.

The importance of the distinction between a general agent and a special or particular agent, lies in the rule, that if a particular agent exceed his authority, the principal is not bound; (b) but if a general agent exceed his authority the * principal is bound, (c)1 provided the agent acted within the ordinary and usual scope of the business he was authorized to transact, and the party dealing with the agent did not know that he exceeded his authority. (d) 2

Any specific authority must be strictly pursued; as, for example, one known to be an agent to settle claims, and with specific authority to this effect, cannot be supposed to have authority to commute them. (e) 3 Nor can the agency be enlarged

Miller, 98 Mo. 478; Howell v. Graff, 25 Neb. 130; Daylight Burner Co. v. Odlin, 51 N. H. 56.

(b) Flemyng v. Hector, 2 M. & W. 178; Todd v. Emly, 7 M. & W. 427; 8 id. 505; East India Co. v. Hensley, 1 Esp. 111; Woodin v. Burford, 2 Cr. & M. 391; Jordan v. Norton, 4 M. & W. 155; Sykes v. Giles, 5 M. & W. 645; Waters v. Brogden, 1 Y. & J. 457; Daniel v. Adams, Ambl. 495. And see Reaney v. Culbertson, 21 Penn. St. 507.

(c) Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld, 12 Cl. & F. 248, 273; Nickson v. Brohan, 10 Mod. 109; Monk v. Clayton, Molloy, B. 2, ch. 10, § 27.

(d) Forman v. Walker, 4 La. An. 409; Campbell v. Hicks, 4 H. & N. (Exch.) 851.

(e) Kingston v. Kincaid, 1 Wash. C. C. 454. That the authority given to the agent must in all cases be strictly pursued, see Robertson v. Ketchum, 11 Barb. 652, and Cooley v. Willard, 34 Ill. 69; Chicago, etc. Land Co. v. Peck, 112 Ill. 408; New York Iron Mine v. Citizens' Bank, 44 Mich. 344. The exception, extending the principal's liability in favor of third parties, is only made where such third parties are ignorant that restrictions have been imposed upon the agent. See Hayes v. Colby, 65 N. H. 192; Edwards v. Dooley, 120 N. Y. 540. In Attwood v. Munnings, 7 B. & C. 283, Bayley, J., said: " This was an action upon an acceptance importing to be by procuration, and, therefore, any person taking the bill would know that he had not the security of the acceptor's signature, but of the party professing to act in pursuance of an authority from him. A person taking such a bill, ought to exercise due caution, for he must take it upon the credit of the party who assumes the authority to accept, and it would be only reasonable prudence to require the production of that authority." The authority in that case was contained in two powers of attorney, and it was decided that, taking the proper construction of them, the agent had exceeded his authority, and so the principal was not bound. This case is confirmed by Withington v. Herring, 5 Bing. 442. Goods were shipped on board of plaintiff's ship, and by the bills of lading, which were indorsed to the defendants, were to be delivered on payment of freight. The bills were indorsed by the defendants to their factors, to whom the goods were delivered, and the freight charged. Assumpsit was brought against the defendants on the bankruptcy of the factors, but was not sustained on the ground that authority so as to hold any principal but the one employing the agent; thus, the agent of a partnership is not the agent of the members severally. (ee) The * rule is, as to the public, that the * 4."» authority of a general agent may be regarded by them as measured by the usual extent of his general employment. ( f) The obvious reason fur this is, that the public may not be deceived to its injury by previous acts which the agent was fully authorized to do. By such authority the principal does, as it were, proclaim and publicly declare him to be his agent, and must abide the responsibility of so doing. It would not be right for the principal to say to one who dealt with his general agent: " You knew that he was my general agent, for I authorized you and everybody else to believe this, but in this particular instance I had revoked or limited the authority, and the revocation or limitation shall affect you although you did not know it. " But a principal may well say to one who dealt with an agent for a particular purpose," it was your business first to ascertain that he was my agent, and then to ascertain for yourself the character and extent of his agency. "(ff) We think the distinction between a general agency and a special agent useful, and sufficiently definite for practical purposes, although it may have been pressed too far, and relied upon too much in determining the responsibility of a principal for the acts of an agent. It may indeed be said, that every agency is, under one aspect, special, and under another, general. No agent has authority to be in all respects and for all purposes an " alter to receive the goods was given only on immediate payment of the freight. Tobin v. Crawford, 5 M. & W. 235. And see Hogg v. Suaith, 1 Taunt. 347; Acey v. Fernie, 7 M. & W. 157; Esdaile v. La Nauze, 1 Y. & Coll. 394; Maanss v. Henderson, 1 East, 335; Murray v. East India Co., 5 B. & Ald. 204; Gardner v. Baillie, 6 T. R. 591; with which compare Howard v. Baillie, 2 H. Bl. 618; Stainback v. Bank of Virginia, 11 Gratt, 269; Same v. Read, id. 281. The ruling of Heath, J., in Hicks v. Hankins, 4 Esp. 114, seems to admit of question. For instance, where the authority of a general agent has been circumscribed, see Odiorne v. Maxcy, 13 Mass. 178; White v. Westport Cotton Man. Co. 1 Pick. 215; Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. l; Wyman v. Hallowell & Augusta Bank, 14 Mass. 58; Kerns v. Piper, 4 Watts, 222; Terry v. Fargo, 10 Johns. 114; Reynolds v. Rowley, 4 La. An. 409. Except the master of a vessel and an acceptor for honor, no agent can borrow money on his principal's account without special authority. Hawtayue v. Bourne, 7 M. & W. 595. See post, pp. & *82.