Every State holds jurisdiction over all persons and all things within its dominion, and no further. In England and America, foreigners may avail themselves of the courts for suits or defences against each other, in like manner as citizens may. And a person who has property within the jurisdiction of an English or American court, is liable in respect to that property to the action of such court, though he himself may be out of the jurisdiction, provided he receives such notice as the general law of the State or the rules of the court may require. (l)

But on the trial, and in respect to all questions as to the forms, or methods, or conduct of process, or remedy, the law of the place of the forum is applied. (m) A familiar instance of this is an action on an instrument, which, having a scrawl with a mere locus sigilli (or L. S.) upon it, was made in a State where this is all that is necessary to constitute it a sealed instrument, but is sued in a State where a seal of some kind must be put to it. This instrument must not only be declared on as a simple contract, but if sued there it is only as a simple contract * that it will be there construed, in respect to all the rights and obligations of the parties. (n) So, too, if a negotiable note be given for a debt, the law of the State in which it is given, determines whether it operates as a payment of the debt. (nn) If goods be consigned in one State to a commission merchant in another, the interest he may charge is determined by the law of the State in which he lives. (no) The acceptance of a bill is a contract to be performed in and be governed by, the law of the State where it is to be paid. (np)

(j) Blanchard v. Russell, 13 Mass. 1; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 280; Braynard v. Marshall, 8 id. 194. See also ante, p. *671, n. (g).

(k) Very v. MeHenry, 29 Me. 206.

(kk) Scott v. Seymour. 1 Hurl. & Colt. 219.

(l) In this country we have, very generally, statutory provisions for giving absent defendants due notice; and there are generally, perhaps universally, rules of court and of practice, for the same purpose. And the principle that they are entitled to this protection is universally recognized. Fisher v. Lane, 8 Wilson, 302, 303; The Mary, 9 Cranch, 126, 144; Bradstreet v. Neptune Ins. Co. 8 Sumner, 600.

Some question has arisen in the case of an arrest in a suit on a contract made where the arrest would not have been permitted by law; and it has been held, that the right to arrest would be that only which was given by the law of the place where the contract was made. (o) It seems, however, to be * settled otherwise, arrest being of the remedy and not of the right. (p)

(m) This rule is constantly asserted, not only by all civilians, but in numerous cases in England and in this country. See Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077; De La Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 284; Trimbey v. Vignier, 1 Bing. N. C. 151, 150; British Linen Co. v. Drummond, 10 B. & C. 908; Don v. Lippman, 5 Clark & F. 1; Nash v. Tupper, 1 Caines, 402; Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84; Smith v. Spinolla, 2 Johns. 198; Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 1 Gallia. 374; Lodge v. Phelps, 1 Johns. Cas. 139, 2 Caines's Cas. in Error, 321; Peck v. Hosier, 14 Johns. 346; Jones v. Hook, 2 Rand. 303; Wilcox v. Hunt, 13 Pet. 378; Pickering v. Fisk, 6 Vt. 102; Wood v. Watkinson, 17 Conn. 500. But in Rice et al. v. Courtis, 32 Vt. 400, Redfieldt C. J., it was held, that the local rule of policy in that State requiring a complete change of possession, in case of the transfer of personal property, in order to exempt it from attachment upon process against the transferrer, is universal in its application to all personal property actually within the State.

(n) Andrews v. Herriot, 4 Cowen, 508, overruling Meredith v. Hinsdale, 2 Caines, 362; Bank of United States v. Donally, 8 Pet. 361; Douglas v. Oldham, 6 N. H. 150; Thrasher v. Everhart, 3 Gill & J. 234; Adams v. Kerr, I B. & P. 360; Le Roy v. Beard, 8 How. 451.

(nn) Pecker v. Kennison, 40 N. H. 488.

(no) Cartwright v. Green, 47 Barb. 9. (np) Bright v. Judson, 47 Barb. 29. (o) Such at least has been understood to be the decision of the court in Melan v. Fitzjames, 1 B. & P. 138. We would submit, however, that the judgment of the court in that case proceeded on a different ground. It was an action on an instrument executed in France. The that a foreigner, bringing an action on a debt which is barred by lapse of time in the State where it is sued, but would not be at home, is bound by the law of the forum, and cannot recover payment. (q) The general reason is, that all States make their laws of place to prevent oppressive and wasteful litigation within their jurisdiction, and have a right to determine, for all who resort to their tribunals, how soon after the debt is due the creditor must claim it or lose it. But the question which might arise, if the action would be barred if brought in the place of the contract, but is not barred by the law of the forum, whether the shorter limitation, being that by the law of the place of contract, shall now prevail, is not so well settled. We should say, however, in this as in the former case, the law of the forum must govern, on the general ground that the whole question of limitation or prescription is one of process and * remedy, and not of right and obligation. (r) 1 Thus, it seems to be decided, that the

(p) De La Vega v. Vianna, 1 B. & Ad. 234; lmlay v Ellefsen, 2 East, 453; Peck v. Hosier, 14 Johns. 846; Hinkley v. Marean, 8 Mason, 88; Titus v. Hobart, 5 id. 378; Smith v. Spinolla, 2 Johns. 198;

Woodbridge v. Wright, 8 Conn. 523; Atwater v. Townsend, 4 id. 47; Smith v. Healy, id. 49; Whittemore v. Adams, 2 Cowen, 620.

So, too, limitation and prescription are applied only according to the law of the forum. At least, it seems quite well established, defendant haying been held to bail, a rule was obtained calling on the plaintiff to show cause why the bail-bond should not be given up to be cancelled, on the defendant's entering a common appearance. At the hearing an affidavit of a French counsellor was produced, stating, that by the law of France, "not only the person of the contractor or grantor was not engaged or liable, but it was not even permitted to the party contracting to stipulate that his body should be arrested or imprisoned by reason of a deed of that sort." After argument, the court made the rule absolute, Heath, J., dissenting. But it seems clear, from the opinions delivered, that Eyre, C. J., and Rooke, J., who constituted a majority of the court, went upon the ground that the instrument in question did not, according to the law of France, contain any personal obligation, and did not authorize any proceedings in personam, but only in rem. And it was upon this point that Heath, J., differed from them. Eyre, C. J., said: "If it appears that this contract creates no personal obligation, and that it could not be sued as such by the laws of France, on the principle of preventing arrests so vexatious as to be an abuse of the process of the court, there seems to be fair ground on which the court may interpose to prevent a proceeding so oppressive as a personal arrest in a foreign country, at the commencement of a suit in a case which, as far as we can judge at present, authorizes no proceeding against the person in the country in which the transaction passed. If there could be none in France, in my opinion there can be none here. I cannot conceive that what is no personal obligation in the country in which it arises, can ever be raised into a personal obligation by the laws of another. If it be a personal obligation there, it must be enforced here in the mode pointed out by the law of this country; but what the nature of the obligation is must be determined by the law of the country where it was entered into, and then this country will apply its own law to enforce it." Heath, J., said: "This, on consideration, does seem to me to be a personal contract, and if it be so, I have not the least doubt that the defendant should be held to bail. That being the case, we all agree, that in construing contracts, we must be governed by the laws of the country in which they are made; for all contracts have a reference to such laws. But when we come to remedies it is another thing; they must be pursued by the means which the law points out where the party resides. The laws of the country where the contract was made can only have a reference to the nature of the contract, not to the mode of enforcing it. Whoever comes into a country voluntarily subjects himself to all the laws of that country, and therein to all the remedies directed by those laws, on his particular engagements." Rooke, J.: "I entirely agree with my Lord Chief Justice. Though the contract, on the face of it, may seem to bind the person of the Duke de Fitzjames, by the words 'binding himself,' etc., yet being made abroad, we must consider how it would be understood in the country where it was made. According to the affidavit which has been produced on one side, and not contradicted by the other, this contract is considered in France as not affecting the person. Then what does it amount to? It is a contract that the duke's estate shall be liable to answer the demand, but not his person. If the law of France has said that the person shall not be liable on such a contract, it is the same as if the law of France had been expressly asserted in the contract. If it had been specially agreed between the parties not to consider the duke's person liable, and under those circumstances he had come over here, there would have been no difference between us; for if it were agreed there that the person should not be liable, it would not be liable here. Now, as far as I can understand the contract, this is the true meaning of it. The defendant is not bound by the mere words of the contract, but has a right to explain by affidavit how it would be considered in France. With the explanation given I am satisfied, and being satisfied with it, I think the defendant should be permitted to enter a common appearance. Such was also understood to be the turning-point of the case by Adair, Serjeant, who showed cause against the rule. "This rule," said he, "was granted in order to ascertain whether the security in question was that kind of security which imported a remedy against the person of the defendant, or whether it was only in the nature of a mortgage on his estate. If this be a mere security, affecting the land and personal property only of the defendant, and if it so appears on the face of it, the court will attend to that circumstance.