(u) Commonwealth v. Hemperly, 12 Penn. Law Rep. 129.

(v) Commonwealth v. Conrow, 2 Penn. St. 402.

(w) Rex v. De Hales Owen, 1 Stra. 99.

(x) Winstone v. Linn, 1 B. & C. 460. So in Wise v. Wilson, 1 Car. & K. 662, it was held, that a person has a right to dismiss a servant for misconduct, bat has no right to turn away an apprentice because he misbehaves; but the case of a young man, seventeen yean old, who, under a written agreement not under seal, is placed with a surgeon as "pupil and assistant" and with whom a premium is paid, is a case between that of apprenticeship and service; and if such a person on some occasions come home intoxicated, this alone will not justify the surgeon in dismissing him. But if the "pupil and assistant, by employing the shop-boy to compound the medicines, occasion real danger to the surgeon's practice, this would justify the surgeon in dismissing him. And Lord Denman, C. J., in summing up, said:

"There is a great distinction between a contract of apprenticeship, and a contract with a servant. A person has a right to dismiss a servant for misconduct, but has no right to turn away an apprentice because he misbehaves."

(y) Hughes v. Humphreys, 6 B. & C. 680, which was covenant by the father of an apprentice against the master, for not teaching and providing for the apprentice. Plea, that up to a certain time the defendant did teach, etc, and that then the apprentice, without leave, quitted the defendant's service, and never returned. Replication, that on, etc., the defendant refused then, or ever, to receive back the apprentice, and thereby discharged him from his service. Rejoinder, that the apprentice enlisted as a soldier, and that the plaintiff never requested the defendant to receive back the apprentice, when he was able to return to the service. Surrejoinder, that soon after the apprentice enlisted, the defendant refused then, or ever, to take him back, and wholly discharged him from his service. Held, on demurrer, that the surrejoinder was bad, not being a sufficient answer to the rejoinedge and consent of his master, the employer is liable to the master for the services of the apprentice, although he did not know the fact of the apprenticeship. (c) It may be added, * that if an action be brought for harboring an apprentice against the will or without the consent of his master, the plaintiff is bound to prove that the defendant had a knowledge of the apprenticeship. (d) But a defendant who did not know the apprenticeship when he hired or received the apprentice, and who, being informed thereof, continued to retain and harbor him, thereby makes himself liable. (e)

1 But where a contract of apprenticeship provides that the apprentice shall obey all commands, and give his services entirely to business during business hours, the master may dismiss the apprentice for wilful disobedience and habitual neglect of duties. Westwick v. Theodor, L. R. 10 Q. B. 224.

pudiation at majority, or the like, they are liable. (z) * But it seems not to be so in this country, under our common statutory apprenticeships, (a) although doubtless phraseology might be adopted, which would have that effect. Where the indenture can be construed as meaning only that the parent or guardian sanctions the binding of the apprentice, and does not bind himself, it will be so construed, although the covenants may seem to be covenants both of the apprentice and of the parent.

Not only a party who seduces an apprentice from his service is liable, (b) but where one employs an apprentice without the knowlder, and that the plea was good, as it disclosed a sufficient excuse for non-performance of the defendant's covenant.

(z) Wright v. Gihon, 3 C. & P 583, where it was held, that the staying out by an apprentice on a Sunday evening beyond the time allowed him, is not such an unlawful absenting of himself as will enable his master to maintain an action of covenant against a person who became bound for the due performance of the indenture. In Cuming v. Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 59, the action was covenant upon an indenture of apprenticeship, by the master against the father; the breach assigned was, that the apprentice absented himself from the service; plea, that the son faithfully served till he came of age, and that he then avoided the indenture. Held, that this was no answer to the action. Abbott, C. J., said: "I am of opinion that the father is liable to this action. He covenants that the son shall faithfully serve; the avoidance of the apprenticeship by the son during the term cannot discharge the father's covenant. The indenture of apprenticeship has existed in this form for more than a century, and has been in universal use. A construction has been put upon the instrument in a court of law, in the case cited from Douglas (Branch v. Ewington, Dougl. 518). I do not see any reason to doubt the propriety of that decision, and I think, therefore, upon principle as well as upon authority, that the defendant is answerable in this action." Bayley, J., also said: "I may bind myself that A B shall do an act, although it is in his option whether he will do it or not. The father here binds himself that the son shall serve seven years. It is no answer in an action brought against the father, for the breach of that covenant, for him to say that it was in the option of the son whether he would serve or not If the son does not choose to do that which the father covenanted he should do, the covenant is then broken, and the father is liable." - It seems, that any change of trade on the part of the master discharges the father from his obligation that the son shall continue to serve. Ellen v. Topp, 4 E. L. & E. 412; 8. c. 6 Exch. 424.

(a) Blunt v. Melcher, 2 Mass. 228. where it was held, that in an indenture of apprenticeship made by the master, the apprentice, and the guardian of the apprentice, the covenants that "the apprentice shall faithfully serve his master," etc., are not the covenants of the guardian. And Parker, J., in giving his opinion, observed : "The question for our determination is, whether the defendant is bound by the covenants in this indenture for the apprentice's good conduct. My opinion is decidedly that he is not bound. He is not mentioned as a party to those or any other covenants contained in the instrument. The intent of all the parties in making this indenture, appears from the instrument itself. The apprentice binds himself with the consent of his guardian. To express that consent, and, in my opinion, with no other intent, and for no other purpose, the guardian signs and seals the instrument. It is objected to this, that great inconveniences and mischiefs will arise from this construction of this species of indenture. But to guard against these, the guardian may enter into covenants explicitly with the master, and there is no doubt such covenants will be valid and binding upon him." See also Holbrook v. Bullard, 10 Pick. 68. The same rule is supported by Ackley v. Hoskins, 14 Johns. 374. See further, Sackett v. Johnson, 3 Blackf. 61; Chapman v. Crane, 20 Me. 172.

(b) Lightly v. Clouston, 1 Taunt. 112; Foster v. Stewart, 3 M. & Sel. 191. So, it seems, that the seduction of a minor, who is a servant de facto, though not a legal apprentice, from the service of the master, is actionable. Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337.

In a recent case in Vermont, where a boy of ten was bound as an apprentice by his father until he should be twenty-one, it was held that the contract was voidable when the boy reached the age of fourteen years; and was revoked by his enlisting into military service after that age. (f)

(c) Bowse v. Tibbets, 7 Greenl. 457; Conant v. Raymond, 2 Aik. 243; Munsey v. Goodwin, 3 N. H. 272; James v. Le Roy, 6 Johns. 274. In Ayer v. Chase, 19 Pick. 556, where the plaintiff put his apprentice into the service of another person exercising the plaintiff's trade for a short time, on wages to be paid to the plaintiff, and during that period the apprentice absconded, and went to sea, it was held, that by such transfer of the apprentice the plaintiff's right to his services was suspended, and that it did not revive upon his absconding, so as to entitle the plaintiff to his earnings on the voyage.

{d) Ferguson v. Tucker, 2 Har. & G. 182. Ana see Stuart v. Stimpson, 1 Wend. 376; Conant v. Raymond, 2 Aik. 243.

(e) Ferguson v. Tucker, 2 Har. & G. 182.

(f) Hudson v. Worden, 39 Vt. 382.