The English law of apprenticeship grew out of, and with nearly all its incidents rested upon, the ancient establishment of guilds, or companies for trade or for handicraft, which were once almost universal throughout Europe, and still generally subsist, although much modified in form and effect. No one could pursue a trade or mechanical occupation, on his own account, who was not a member of such guild or company. Nor could he become a member except by a regular apprenticeship.

Hence, a change of trade became very difficult; and the several companies provided with great care against such increase of their numbers as should render it too difficult for all to find occupation. Under such circumstances, to enter upon an apprenticeship which led to such membership was to acquire a support for life, and it was usual to pay large fees to the master. This custom exists in England now very generally. In this country we suppose it to occur much less frequently; and the entire freedom of employment, and the absolute right which every person has to engage in what business he pleases, and to change his business as often as he pleases, has undoubtedly operated to make apprenticeships less common with us than in Europe. In some parts of our country they are comparatively infrequent; and perhaps in none are they so necessary or so universal an introduction to business as they still are in England.

(m) See Sellen v. Norman, 4 C. & P. 81; Lucas v. Novosilieski, 1 Esp. 296; Evans v. Birch, 3 Camp. 10. But it is no evidence of payment for one servant's labor that other laborers employed by the party, on the same work, at the same time, were duly paid. Filer v. Peebles, 8 N. H. 226.

(mm) Stoddard v. Treadwell, 26 Cal. 294.

1 But if an employer keeps a hired person through a term of service, he cannot deduct his wages for time lost, or compel him to make it good. Bast v. Byrne, 61 Wis. 531.

The contract of apprenticeship is generally in writing, and it has been said, that it could be made only by writing; (n) it is also most frequently by deed, and is to be construed and enforced as to all the parties, by the common principles of the law of contracts. Usually, the apprentice, who is himself a minor, and his father or guardian with him, covenant that he shall serve his master faithfully during the term. And the master covenants that he will teach the apprentice his trade; but it is said that the indenture is not made invalid by the omission to specify any trade or profession as that to be taught. (o) He also covenants to supply him with all necessaries, and at the end of the term give him money or clothes. Slight informalities would not make the indenture void. Even if they are of sufficient magnitude to have this effect, the indenture will, it is said, prescribe and measure the claim of each of the parties against the other, if they have lived under this indenture as master and servant. (p) It is also said, that the apprentice's consent will not be inferred from his mere signature, but must be expressed. (q)

In case of sickness the master is bound to provide proper medicines and attendance. (r) At common law the infant is not himself responsible, on his covenants as apprentice, being a minor; (s) and therefore an adult also covenants with him; and at the age of majority the infant may repudiate the contract if it extends beyond that period. The master cannot transfer his trust, or his rights over the apprentice. (t) He has no right to employ the apprentice in menial services not connected with the trade or business which he has agreed to teach him. (u) And when he neglects to take due charge of the apprentice, the parent's or guardian's authority will revive. (v)

(n) Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337.

(o) Fowler v. Hollenbeck. 9 Barb. 309.

(p) Maltby v. Harwood, 12 Barb. 473.

(q) Harper v. Gilbert, 5 Cush. 417.

(r) Regina v. Smith, 8 C. & P. 153.

(s) Cuming v. Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 59. At common law, an indenture of apprenticeship was not binding upon an infant. See Gylbert v. Fletcher, Cro. C. 179; Jennings v. Pitman, Hutton, 63; Lylly's case, 7 Mod. 15; McDowle's case, 8 Johns. 331; Whitley v. Loftus, 8 Mod. 191. In Woodruff v. Logan, 1 Eng. (Ark.) 276, it was said, that a contract of apprenticeship was binding upon an infant, as being for his benefit; but this is not consistent with the current of authority, or the analogy of the law. - But the father might be bound on the covenants; and it would be no defence to an action by the master against the father, for the desertion of the infant, that the infant was not bound by the indenture; for if the son does not choose to do that which the father covenanted he should do, the covenant is broken, and the father is liable. Cuming v. Hill, 3 B. & Ald. 57. In Hiatt v. Gilmer, 6 Ired. L. 450, where a boy was bound by his father as an apprentice to a copartnership, to be taught a mechanical trade, and the father took away the boy before his time was expired, and soon afterwards the partnership was dissolved, the period of apprenticeship being still unexpired, it was held by a majority of the court, Ruffin, C. J., dissenting, that the persons composing the partnership could only recover damages for the loss of the boy's services during the time the copartnership continued, and not afterwards.

* The sickness of the apprentice, or his inability to learn or to serve, without his fault, does not discharge the master from his covenants, (w) because these covenants are independent, and he takes this liability on himself. Nor will such misconduct as would authorize a master to discharge a common servant, discharge the master of an apprentice from his liability on his contract. (x) 1 But if the apprentice deserts from his service, and contracts a new relation which disables him from returning lawfully to his master, the latter is not bound to receive him again if he offers to return. (y)

The parties who covenant for the good behavior and continued service of the apprentice are not liable for trifling misconduct; but it seems by the English cases that, for whatever produces substantial injury to the master, as long-continued absence, re(t) Futrell v. Vann, 8 Ired. L. 402; Tucker v. Magee, 18 Ala. 99.