1 Services to one's family or friends give rise to no inference of payment, without proof of a special contract, Brown v. Yaryan, 74 Ind. 305; as where a daughter does work after becoming of age in her father's family, Smith v. Smith, 3 Stewart, 564. See O'Connor v. Beckwith, 41 Mich. 657; Harshberger v. Alger, 31 Gratt. 52; Titman v. Titman, 64 Penn. St 430; Moist's Appeal, 74 Penn. St. 166; Neal v. Gilmore, 79 Penn. St 421. But a son-in-law who takes care of his mother-in-law in his family, with an understanding that he should be paid for her board, is entitled to remuneration, Wence v. Wykoff, 52 la, 644. See Schoch v. Garrett, 69 Penn. St. 144.

A person who seduces a servant away from the service of his master or employer, is liable in an action for damages. Although this principle has been less positively settled by adjudication in this country than in England, we have no doubt of it as a rule of law. (l) tion, and did not decide it; but they were unanimous in the opinion, that in all such cases the question must be determined by the jury, on all the circumstances, whether there was an implied request for labor, and an implied promise of repayment or not. In King v. Sow, 1 B. & Ald. 179, a female natural child was hired for a year by the wife of its reputed father, and continued doing the household work for three years; but after the first year no wages were paid, nor was there any new contract of hiring. Held, that the sessions were warranted in finding that after that time she did not continue on the terms of the original contract. And Bailey, J., said: "Where the parties are not related, it may fairly be presumed, from a continuance in the service, that the terms on which they continue are the same as during the preceding year. But where the relation of father and child subsists, the ground for that presumption fails." See to the same effect, Dye v. Kerr, 15 Barb. 444; Ridgway v. English, 2 N. J. 409; Swires v. Parsons, 5 W. & S. 357; Defiance v. Austin, 9 Penn. St. 309; Steel v. Steel, 12 id. 64; Lantz v. Frey, 14 id. 201; Zerbe v. Miller, 16 id. 488; Resor v. Johnson, 1 Cart. (Ind.) 100; Hussey v. Roundtree, 1 Bush. L. 110; Partlow v. Cooke, 2 R. I. 451; Davis v. Goodenow, 1 Williams, 715; Candors' Appeal, 5 W. & S. 513. So an action cannot be maintained for services performed with a view to a legacy, and not in expectation of a reward in the nature of a debt. See Osborn v. Governors of Guy's Hospital, Stra. 728; Le Sage v. Coussmaker, 1 Esp. 188; Little v. Dawson, 4 Dallas, 111; Lee v. Lee, 6 G. & J. 309. Nor will an action for work and labor lie for services performed under a contract of apprenticeship which before expiration of the service turns out to be void. Maltby v. Harwood, 12 Barb. 473. But where one party has rendered services for another, and it is manifest from the circumstances of the case that it was understood by both parties that compensation should be made by will, and none is made, an action will lie to recover the value of such services. Martin v. Wright, 13 Wend. 460. In Eaton p. Benton, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 576, it is said, that one who has served another in expectation of a testamentary provision, and to whom the latter subsequently devises a portion of his estate, cannot maintain a suit for such services against the executors. The general rule seems to be, that a legacy left by a debtor to his creditor, which in amount is equal to or greater than the debt, shall be presumed to be in satisfaction of it.

(/) Lumley v. Gye, 20 E. L. & E. 168; s. c. 2 E. & B. 216; Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 511; Hart v. Aldridge, Cowp. 54. See also Peters v. Lord, 18 Conn. 337; Haight v. Badgeley, 15 Barb. 499. This doctrine was held at nisi prius by Morton, J., in an interesting case in Massachusetts, a few years since. So one is liable for continuing to employ the servant of another, after notice, although the defendant did not himself procure the servant to leave his former master, or know when he employed him that he was the servant of another. Blake v. Lanyon, 6 T. R. 221. Although a servant is hired by the piece, and not for any certain time, yet an action lies for enticing him away. Anon. Lofft, 493. But an action will not lie for inducing a servant to leave his master's employ at the expiration of the time for which he originally hired himself, although the servant had not at the time any intention of then quitting his master. Nichol v. Martyn, 2 Esp. 734. The contract of hiring between the servant and his former master must have been binding, in order to render one enticing him away liable therefor. Sykes v. Dixon, 9 A. A E. 693. The damages in this action are not such as the master sustained at the time, but such as he would naturally sustain from the leaving of his employment. Gunter v. Astor, 4 J. B. Moore, 12; Dixon v. Bell, 1 Stark. 287. See Hays v. Borders, 1 Gilman, 46; McKay v. Bryson, 5 Ired. L. 216.

In some cases very liberal presumption of payment is made in favor of the master; as where the servant has left his master for a considerable period; and where it is usual to pay wages weekly. (m)

As the contract of service is mutual, the employer has a claim against the employed for his neglect of duty; and it is held that the employer does not waive this claim by paying the servant and continuing him in his service. (mm) 1