This is a maritime peril, an injury from which is quite common in harbors, and it sometimes occurs at sea. It gives rise to a question entirely distinct from those presented by other losses or perils. This question is this: Is either of the two ships or their owners responsible to the other ship or owner, and on what ground, and to what extent? The party in fault must suffer his own loss, and compensate the other party for the loss he may sustain. (m)

(h) Rohl v. Parr, 1 Esp. 445; Martin v. Salem Ins. Co. 2 Mass. 420; Hazard v. New England Ins. Co. 1 Sumner, 218, 8 Pet. 567.

(i) See Hunter v. Potts, 4 Camp. 208; Dale v. Hall, 1 Wilson, 281; Laveroni v. Drury, 8 Exch. 166; Garrigues v. Coxe, 1 Binn. 692; Aymar v. Astor, 6 Cow. 266. It is so held in a recent English case, in which it appeared that the ship-owner had made use of all possible precautions to prevent this damage: Kay v. Wheeler, Law Rep. 2 C. P. 302: and in the New

York Circuit Court of the United States: The Miletus, 6 Blatchford, 386.

(j) Baker v. Manuf. Ins. Co. Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 14 Law Reporter, 203.

(k) Id. But see Montoya v. London Ass. Co. 6 Exch. 451.

(l) Gordon v. Bowne, 2 Johns. 160; Brown v. Neilson, 1 Caines, 626.

(ll) Grill v. Iron Screw Collier Co. Law Rep. 1 C. P. 600.

(m) The Scioto, Daveis, 369: The Woodrop-Sims, 2 Dods. 83; Reeves v. Ship Constitution, Gilpin, 579; The Sappho, 9 Jur. 560.

The nearly universal maritime law is, that where a collision takes place from causes which could not have been prevented by any efforts reasonably required, and no blame is imputable to either party, the loss must rest where it falls; and he who suffers it has no claim on the other. (n) We have called * this a nearly universal rule, for the only exceptions we know of prevail at Hamburg and at Calcutta, and have given rise, in both ports, to a difficult question of marine insurance, which will be treated of in the chapter on that subject.

If both ships are equally, or if, though not equally yet both substantially in fault, the rule may not be so certain. The common law would seem to lead to the same result as where there is no fault, because at common law a plaintiff has no remedy for a loss caused by an accident, if his own negligence was a substantial cause of the accident. And it has been said, that if it contributed in any degree whatever to the accident he has no remedy. (o) It has however been held, that admiralty divides the loss if both vessels are in fault. (p) 1

If it is certain that there was fault, and it cannot be ascertained on which party the fault lies, there might be reason for saying, that the result should be the same as in the case where it is known that both are in fault. There is, however, ground for saying that common law would now divide the loss between the two vessels; and perhaps still stronger ground for asserting this to be the rule of admiralty. (q) And according to very high admiralty authority in this country, the loss must be equally apportioned where there has been no fault, or fault on both aides, or fault with an uncertainty on which side. (r) In the uncertainty which still rests upon this rule, it may be believed that the equity power of the court of admiralty would be sufficient, and would be exercised for the purpose of doing justice in the case. And it has been said by the Supreme Court of the United States, that the rule dividing the loss, is, under the circumstances usually attending such disasters, just and equitable, * and tending most strongly to induce care and diligence on both sides. (s) It cannot be denied, however, that the highest authorities appear to hold different opinions on this subject. (t)

(n) The Woodrop-Sims, 2 Dock. 88; The Celt, 8 Hagg. Adm. 828, note; The Itinerant 2 W. Rob. 236; Stainback v. Rae, 14 How. 532. An inevitable accident is defined in The Virgil, 2 W. Bob. 201, to be "that which the party charged with the offence could not possibly prevent by the exercise of ordinary care, caution, and maritime skill."

(o) Dowell v. Gen. Steam Nav. Co. 6 Ellis & B. 195; Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Mann, 14 C. B. 127; Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Tonkin, 4 Moore, P. C. 814; Simpson v. Hand, 6 Whart. 311; Barnes v. Cole, 21 Wend. 188.

(p) Vaux v. Sheffer, 8 Moore, P. C. 76; The Victoria, 8 W. Bob. 49; The Montreal, 24 Eng. L. & Eq. 680; Allen v. Mackay, Sprague, 219; Sch. Catherine v. Dickinson, 17 How. 177; Rogers v. Steamer St Charles, 19 How. 108; Cashing v. The John Fraser, 21 How. 184,196.

(q) See The Catherine of Dorer, 2 Hagg. Adm. 145; The Scioto, Dareis, 369; Lucas p. Steamboat Swann, 6 McLean, C. C. 282; The Nautilus, Ware, 2d ed.629.

1 Where both vessels are in fault for a collision, the maritime role is to divide the entire damage equally between them, and to decree half the difference between their respective losses in favor of the one that suffered most, and the statute of limited liability does not apply until a balance is struck. The North Star, 106 U. S. 17; The Stoomvart Maatschappy Nederland v. Peninsular, etc. Co. 7 App. Cat. 795.

It has been held, that, where both parties are wilfully in fault, the court will not interfere in favor of either party. (u) If a vessel be thrown against another with no voluntary action whatever on the part of her master or crew, she is not liable. (v) In England it has been held, that if a vessel has been employed by government, and is under the charge of a naval officer, she is not liable for damages caused by a collision, which was itself caused by his orders. (w)

In England, and in this country, by an act of Congress, and by some State statutes, (x) the responsibility of a ship for such damages is limited to the value of the ship and her cargo.

Wherever any injurious collision occurs, if any imputation of negligence is thrown by the evidence on either vessel, her owners must prove that this negligence was not a substantial cause of the collision; (y) and, on the other hand, a plaintiff in a cause of collision must offer evidence tending to prove both his own care, and the want of care by the defendant, if his claim rests upon the defendant's negligence. (z) 1 It would be a sufficient want of care,