(r) Langford v. Frey, 8 Humph. 443.

(s) Cronise v. Clark, 4 Md. Ch. 403. See also McCarty v. Murray, 3 Gray, 578.

(t) In Connecticut some contracts of an infant are made void by statute. Rogers v. Hurd, 4 Day, 57; Maples v. Wightman, 4 Conn. 376.

(u) The rule that an infant's contracts are void or voidable according as they may be pronounced to be prejudicial or useful, has been laid down, and recognized by many courts and judges. See Keane v. Boycott, 2 H. Bl. 515; Baylis v, Dinely, 3 M. & Sel. 477, 481; Latt v. Booth, 3 Car. & K. 292; Vent v Osgood, 19 Pick. 572; Lawson v. Lovejoy, 8 Greenl. 405; Rogers v. Hurd, 4

Day, 57; McGan v. Marshall, 7 Humph. 121; Fridge v. The State, 3 G. & J. 104; Ridgely v. Crandall, 4 Md. 435; Wheaton v. East, 5 Yerg. 41; McMinn v. Richmonds, 6 id. 9; Kline v. Beebe, 6 Conn. 494; United States v. Bainbridge, 1 Mason, 71, 82, and many other cases. But it may be questioned whether it is a sufficiently clear, certain, and practical rule. The more recent authorities incline to hold all (or all with a single exception) an infant's contracts to be voidable merely, not void, and that it is the privilege and right of the infant only (not that of the court) to declare his contracts void. And the rule itself as alluded to in the text, and sustained by the older authorities, has been declared unsatisfactory, liable to many exceptions, and difficult of safe application. See Fonda v. Van Horne,15 Wend. 631, 635; Breckenbridge's Heirs v. Ormsby, 1 J. J. Marsh. 236, 241; Scott v. Buchanan, 2 Humph. 468; Cole v. Pennoyer, 14 Ill. 158; Cummings v. Powell, 8 Tex. 80; Fetrow v. Wiseman, 40 Ind. 148; Weaver v. Jones, 24 Ala. 420; Keil v. Healey, 84 Ill. 104; Lemmon v. Beeman, 45 Ohio St. 505, 509. And see a just criticism by Mr. Justice Bell upon the vague and indefinite use of the words " void " and " voidable," in State v. Richmond, 6 Foster (N. H.), 232; Parke, B., in Williams v. Moore, 11 M. & W. 256; 1 Am. Lead. Cas. 103, 104. And see Nashville R. R. Co. v. Elliot, 1 Cow. 611; and post, note (b), * 329.

1 So, too, a judgment confessed by an infant's partner, Soper v. Fry, 37 Mich. 236. - K.

* But the contract of an infant for necessaries is neither void nor voidable. It is permitted for his own sake that he may make a valid contract for these things, as otherwise, whatever his need, he might not be able to obtain food, shelter, or raiment. And the principles which govern this rule show plainly that it is intended only for his benefit, and is regarded and treated as an exception to a general rule.

The word necessaries, in relation to an infant, is not used in a strict sense; but the social position of the infant, his means, and those of his parents, are taken into consideration. Necessaries for him mean such things as he ought properly to have, and not merely that which is indispensable to his life or his bodily comfort. It is difficult to lay down any positive rule which shall determine what are and what are not necessaries. Indeed there is no such rule. It may be said, however, that whether articles of a certain kind, or certain subjects of expenditure, are or are not such necessaries as an infant may contract for, is a matter of law, and for instruction by the court; but the question whether any particular things come under these classes, and the question also as to quantity, are, generally, matters of fact for the jury to determine. (v) The cases cited in the notes will show the views taken of this question by various courts in England and in this country.

It seems to be certain that food, clothing, lodging, and needful medicine are such necessaries; and the infant may contract for them on credit, although he has ready funds in his possession. (w) So, proper instruction. (x) Necessaries for an infant's

(v) Bent v. Manning, 10 Vt. 225, 230; Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb, 519, 521; Grace v. Hale, 2 Humph. 27, 29; Stanton v. Wilson, 3 Day, 37; Phelps v. Worcester, 11 N. H. 51; Harrison v. Fane, 1 Man. & G. 550; Peters v. Fleming, 6 M. & W. 42; Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690; Tupper v. Cadwell, 12 Met. 559; Davis v. Caldwell, 12 Cush. 512. This is to be understood with some limitation, however, for the quantity of goods supplied may be excessive, in which case, if the jury give the plaintiff his whole bill, their verdict may be set aside. Johnson v. Lines, 6 W. & S. 80. So if they find a verdict for the plaintiff, contrary to the opinion of the court, a new trial will be granted. Harrison v. Fane, 1 Man. & G. 550.

(w) Burghart v. Hall, 4 M. & W. 727.

(x) And for some, the term "proper instruction" might include a knowledge of the languages, while for others a mere knowledge of reading and writing may ho sufficient. Alderson, B., in Peters v. Fleming, 6 M. & W. 48. But a regular collegiate education for one in the ordinary station and circumstances in life has been held in this country not within the term "necessaries." Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683. But a good " common-school "education would be, for every one; such an education is essential to the intelligent discharge of civil, political, and religious duties. Royce, J, in Middle-bury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 686. Instruction in reading and writing was held necessary, in Man by v. Scott, 1 Sid. 112; and the reason given was that it was for the benefit of the realm that learning should be advanced. In Raymond v. Loyl, 10 Barb. 489, Hand, J., says: " It was said on the argument that 'schooling' is not a necessary. And Mr. Chitty says, it seems a parent Is not legally bound to educate his child. Chit. on Cont. 140. A parent is almost the sole judge of wife may be validly contracted for by him; but not, it is said, if they are necessaries provided in view of marriage, though his wife afterwards use them. (y) And it seems that, as an incident to a marriage, which an infant may contract, he is liable during coverture for the antenuptial debts of his wife, which she was legally liable to pay, at her marriage. (z) He is also liable to the same extent as an adult would be for necessaries supplied to his lawful children. (a) In some cases, such things as horses, regimentals, watches, or even jewelry, are regarded as necessaries. (b) An infant cannot borrow money, so as to render himself liable to an action for money lent, although borrowed and expended for necessaries; because the law does not, for his own sake, trust him with the expenditure. (c) Nor is he liable on a contract for repairs made upon his what is necessary. But if a parent is liable to a third person, I hope it will never be decided that sending to a common school, at a suitable season, and to a reasonable extent, is not necessary in this country." [A professional education was held not a necessary in Turner v. Gaither, 83 N. C. 357. But instruction in a trade was held necessary in Walter v. Everard, (1891), 2 Q. B. 369.] house, although the house must have fallen into decay without them.(d) Nor can he bind himself for the insurance of his property, (e) nor for the board of horses which he uses in his business. (/) And it is said that an action cannot be maintained against an infant for the falsehood of his warranty, or for a breach of it. (g)

(y) Turner v. Trisby, 1 Stra. 168. See Rainsford v. Fenwick, Carter, 215; Abell v. Warren, 4 Vt. 149, 152, Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb, 519, 520. And see Sams v. Stockton, 14 B. Mon. 232. And an infant widow is personally hound by her contract for the funeral expenses of her deceased husband, who died leaving no assets. Chappie v. Cooper, 13 M. & W 252.

(2) Paris v. Stroud, Barnes's notes, 95; Roach v. Quick, 9 Wend. 238; Butler v. Breck, 7 Met. 164.

(a) Dicta in Abell v. Warren, 4 Vt. 152: Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb, 520.

(b) To be necessaries the articles must be bona fide purchased for use, and not for mere ornament; they need not be such as a person could not do without, but should be in quality and quantity suitable for his real wants, and his condition and circumstances in life. The term includes his food, but not dinners, confectionery, fruit, etc, supplied to his friend. Brooker v. Scott, 1 M. & W. 67; Wharton v. McKenzie, 5 Q. B. 606: Barnes v. Barnes, 50 Conn. 572. Also lodging and house-rent, Kirton v. Elliott, 2 Bulst. 69; Crisp v. Churchill, cited in Lloyd v. Johnson, 1 B. & P. 340. But not food for his horses. Mason v. Wright, 13 Met. 306. Nor the rent of a building for carrying on a trade or manual occupation. Lowe v. Griffith, 1 Scott, 458. Suitable clothing also comes within the class of necessaries, but not suits of satin and velvet with gold lace. Makarell v. Bachelor, Cro. E. 583. Nor racing jackets. Burghart v. Angerstein, 6 C. & P. 690. Nor cockades for an infant captain's soldiers. Hands v. Slaney, 8 T. R. 578; although regimentals for a volunteer, and livery for such captain's servant have been held to be necessaries, Id.; Coates v. Wilson, 5 Esp. 152. The following are examples of articles not generally " necessaries ": Horses, saddles, bridles, liquors, pistols, powder, whips, and fiddles. Beeler v. Young, 1 Bibb, 519; Glover v. Ott, 1 McCord, 572; Rainwater v. Durham, 2 Nott & McC. 524; Grace 0. Hale, 2 Humph. 27; Clowes v. Brooke, 2 Stra. 1101; Harrison v. Fane, 1 Man. & G. 550 A stanhope. Charters v. Bayutun, 7 C. & P. 52. Coach hire. Hedgley v. Holt, 4 C. & P. 104. A chronometer for a lieutenant in the navy, not then in commission. Berolles v. Ramsay, Holt, 77. Balls and serenades. Carter, 216. Counsel fees and expenses of a lawsuit. Phelps v. Worcester, 11 N. H. 51. But see Epperson v. Nugent, 57 Miss. 45; Barker v. Hibbard, 54 N. H. 539; Askey v. Williams, 74 Tex. 294. As each case is governed by its own peculiar circumstances, the examples here given can serve only as illustrations, and under different circumstances would not necessarily be binding precedents. Thus, as we have just seen, horses are not generally necessary. Skrine v. Gordon, 9 Ir. Rep. C. L. 479; House v. Alexander, 105 Ind. 109; Wood v. Losey, 50 Mich. 475. See Mohney v. Evans, 51 Pa. 80. But when an infant had been advised to ride on horseback for his health, a different rule was applied. Hart v. Prater, 1 Jur. 623. (c) Smith v. Gibson, Peake, Ad. Cas.

It is said that a lawsuit may or may not be a necessary for an infant, according to circumstances. (gg)l