(a) In Rich v. Lord, 18 Pick. 825, Shaw, C. J., said: "It is now a general rule in construing releases, especially where the same instrument is to be executed by various persons, standing in various relations, and having various kinds of claims and demands against the releasee, that general words, though the most broad and comprehensive, are to be limited to particular demands, where it manifestly appears, by the consideration, by the recital, by the nature and circumstances of the several demands, to one or more of which it is proposed to apply the release, that it was so intended to be limited by the parties. And for the purpose of ascertaining that intent, every part of the instrument is to be considered. As where general words of release are immediately connected with a proviso restraining their operation. Solly v. Forbes, 2 Brod. & B. 38. So a release of all demands, then existing, or which should thereafter arise, was held not to extend to a particular bond, which was considered not to be within the recital and consideration of the assignment, and not within the intent of the parties. Payler v. Homersham, 4 M. & S. 423. So, where it is recited that various controversies are subsisting between the parties, and actions pending, and that it had been agreed that one should pay the other a certain sum of money, and that they should mutually release all actions, and causes of action, and thereupon such releases were executed, it was held, that though general in terms, the releases were qualified by the recital, and limited to actions pending. Simons v. Johnson, 8 B. & Ad. 175; Jackson v. Stackhouse, 1 Cowen, 126. So it has been held in Massachusetts, that where, upon the receipt of a proportionate share of a legacy given to another, the person executed a release of all demands under the will, it was held not to apply to another and distinct legacy to the person himself. Lyman v. Clark, 9 Mass. R. 285." And see Learned v. Bellows. 8 Vt. 70. See also, ante, pp. * 502, * 503, and notes.

(b) 2 Roll. Abr. 413, tit. Release (H), pl. 1.

(c) Willis v. De Castro, C. B. 1868, 21 Law Rep. 376.

(d) Brooks v. Stuart, 8 A. & E. 864. This was assumpsit by indorsees against the maker of a promissory note. Plea, that the promise was a joint and several one by defendant and A., to whom one of the plaintiffs executed a release under seal. Replication, that the release was executed at the request of defendant, who afterwards, and while the note was unpaid, in consideration of such release, ratified his promise, and promised to remain liable to plaintiffs for the amount of the note. Held, bad, because it set up a parol exception to a release under seal. And see ante, vol. i. p. * 23.

(e) Baker v. Dewey, 1 B. & C. 704. But an agreement under seal, which compromises a suit, does not prevent either party from setting up and proving a parol undertaking, that one of the parties should pay the costs that had accrued. Such an undertaking does not contradict or vary the written agreement, but is distinct and independent of it whole burden of proof on him who signed it, if he alleges that he signed it through mistake or fraud. (ee)

A release of a debt should be made by him who has a legal interest in it; and if made by one who has not such an interest, but is beneficially interested, and is not the plaintiff of record, though this may for many purposes release the debt, it has been held that it cannot defeat the action at law. (f) If the release be made by the trustee, or other party having the legal interest, it can be set aside, if to the prejudice of the party beneficially interested, and made without his assent. (g)

The release may be only by operation of law; but this also is grounded upon the presumed intent of the parties. Thus, at common law (varied by statutory provisions), a creditor who appoints his debtor his executor, cancels the debt; (h) unless the * debtor refuses to accept the office; this he may do, and then he does not accept the release. (i) So if the parties intermarry. (j) Or if the creditor receive from the debtor a higher security, as a bond for a simple contract debt; but the higher security may be given only as collateral to the original debt, which then remains in full force. ( k) Nor will a specialty security

Morancy v. Quarles, 1 McLean, 194. That a simple receipt may be contradicted or varied by extrinsic evidence, see ante, p. • 554, and notes.

(ee) Curley v. Harris, 11 Allen, 112.

(f) Quick v. Ludborrow, 3 Bulst. 29, where A covenanted with B that C should pay B and D a certain sum per year, as an annuity. D married, and her husband released the payment. This was held no bar to the action by B to enforce the covenant. And see Walmesley v. Cooper, 11 A. & E. 216, where A covenanted with B not to sue him for any debt due from B to A. Held, no bar to an action against B by A and C, for a debt due them.

(g) See ante, vol. i. p. * 22, and notes, and ante, p. *617, n. (v). And see further Jones v. Herbert, 7 Taunt. 421; Furnival v. Weston, 7 J. B. Moore, 350; Arton v. Booth, 4 id. 192; Herbert v. Pigott, 2 Cromp. & M. 384; Crook v. Stephen, 5 Bing. N. C. 688; Eastman v. Wright, 6 Pick. 823; Loring v. Brackett, 8 Pick. 408.

(h) Cheetham v. Ward, 1 B. & P. 630. And see 20 Edw. IV. 17, pl. 2; 21 Edw. IV. 8, pl, 4; Woodward v. Darcy, Plowd. 184; Wankford v. Wank ford, 1 Salk. 299, Co. Litt. 264, b, n. (1); Dorchester v. Webb, Sir W. Jones, 346; Rawlinson v. Shaw, 3 T. R. 667; Freakley v. Fox, 9 B. & C. 180; Allin v. Shadburne, 1 Dana, 68. But see contra, in this country, Winship v. Bass, 12 Mass. 199. And see Ritchie v. Williams, 11 Mass. 60; Kinney v. Ensign, 18 Pick. 232; Stevens v. Gaylord, 11 Mass. 267; Ipswich Man. Co. v. Story, 6 Met. 818; Pusey v. Clemson, 9 S. & R. 204.

(t) Dorchester v. Webb, Sir W. Jones, 846. And see cases cited in preceding note.

(j) Cage v. Acton, 1 Ld. Raym. 515; Cannel v. Buckle, 2 P. Wms. 242; Smith v. Stafford, Noy, 26, Hob. 216. But a bond conditioned for the payment of money after the obligor's death, made to a woman in contemplation of the obligor's marrying her, and intended for her benefit if she should survive, is not released by their marriage. And if the marriage be pleaded in bar to an action of debt on the bond against the heir of the obligor, a replication stating the purposes for which the bond was made will be good, for they are consistent with the bond and condition. Milbourn v. Ewart, 5 T. R. 381.

(k) Twopenny v. Young, 3 B. & C. 208; Drake v. Mitchell, 3 East, 261; Solly v. Forbes, 2 Brod. & B. 88.

extinguish a simple contract debt, unless it be coextensive therewith. (l)

For the effect of a release by or of one of joint parties, see ante, ch. 2, sec. 2.