We apprehend that the true rule that governs, or should govern these cases, is one which has a much wider application in the law of specific performance. We suppose it may be thus expressed. If the bargain be such, that when the defendant has paid his legal damages (which equity, generally, at least, supposes that he will pay), the plaintiff is fully compensated, and, by using the money he gets, may secure to himself all the benefit he had a right to expect from the bargain, the court will leave him to these damages; but if it appears to the court, that after the plaintiff should recover and receive these damages, and use them as well as he could to supply the breach of the contract, he would remain uncompensated, because a * substantial part of the advantage he hoped to receive from the bargain would be lost to him, here equity will interfere and enforce a specific performance. For example, if we suppose a person to own ninety shares of a certain stock, and if he can own one hundred he will possess some valuable privilege which he now does not possess, and for this purpose contracts to buy ten with the only person who has them for sale, and the other party, discovering his need, refuses to sell as he agreed to, and demands an extravagant price, we should confidently expect - providing of course that the conduct and purpose of the plaintiff were unexceptionable - that a court of equity would decree specific performance. It is quite common for owners of stock to need more in order to obtain a majority of votes. In most cases of this kind, a very strong objection against the prayer would arise from the obvious impolicy of permitting or rather requiring sales for such purposes; but if this objection were removed, by the circumstances and the objects of the plaintiff, we might put this among the cases for a decree for specific performance.1

Another very nice distinction has been taken, between a contract to build a house and one to repair a house. Thus, it is said that one party can repair a house as well as another; and the plaintiff may be supposed to insist that the defendant and he alone should make the repairs, only because he has bargained to do it for less than another man would do it and less than it should be done for. But a contract to build a house is quite a different thing. Here a man selects a builder for special and personal reasons, and has a right to insist that this very man shall build him a house, in order that it may have the qualities he expects, (u) But it is quite obvious that while there may be *a general foundation for such a distinction as this, it must often be unreal or inapplicable. If repairs are extensive, it is about as important that they be done well as that a house be built in a certain way. And, on the other hand, very many houses are built precisely as merchandise is bought, and for the same purpose. Upon the whole, therefore, we should say, that if the contract were for building a house, there might be some presumption in favor of the applicant for Specific performance; and if it were only for repairs, there would be a much less presumption for him, or none at all. Still, the controlling question in both cases would be, Can the court see any peculiar circumstances, giving a peculiar reason for considering that the applicant would not be adequately compensated by the damages he would recover at law? It is undoubtedly competent for a court of equity to enforce the specific performance of a contract by a defendant to do defined work upon his soil, in the perform1 It seems to be settled law in England that though contracts, for the sale of government stock will not be specifically enforced, contracts for the sale of shares in private corporations will be. See note (5), supra; Fry on Specific Performance (3d ed.), § 73 et seq., § 1496 et seq. But whatever reason there may formerly have been for this distinction, at the present day damages are generally an entirely adequate remedy for breach of a contract to sell shares, for they can ordinarily be purchased in the market For this reason specific performance of such contracts is generally refused in this country. Frue v. Houghton, 6 Col. 318; Eckstein v. Downing, 64 N. H. 248; De la Cuesta v. Ins. Co. of North America, 136 Pa. 62; Avery v. Ryan, 74 Wis. 591. But when shares cannot be obtained otherwise, specific performance will be enforced. Frue v. Houghton, 6 CoL 318; Johnson v. Brooks, 93 N. Y. 337. Contra is Barton v. De Wolf, 108 111. 195.

(u) 1 Fonbl. Eq. (5th ed.) 355, note (r). Sir William Grant, Flint v. Brandon, 8 Ves. 164; Lucas v. Comerford, 1 Ves. Jr. 235, where Lord Thurlow refused to compel specific performance of a covenant to rebuild in a lease. Pembroke v. Thorpe, 3 Swanst. 437, n., where an agreement to build a house was enforced in a case of partial performance. Birchett v. Boiling, 5 Munf. 442. In Mosely v. Virgin, 3 Ves. 184, Lord Loughborough took the reasonable distinction, that if the contract expressed distinctly what sort of house was agreed to be built, so that the court could describe it as a subject for the report of the Master, specific performance might be decreed; but if the description in the contract was loose and undefined, the court would not assume to reduce it to certainty, and the party must be left to his remedy in damages. That contracts to repair will not, in general at least, be enforced specifically, appears from Hill v. Barclay, 16 Ves 402; Ray nor v. Stone, 2 Eden, 128. Compare ance of which the plaintiff has a material interest, and which is not capable of adequate compensation in damages, (v)

Sanders v. Pope, 12 Ves. 282, and Davis v. West, 12 id. 475, per Lord Erskine, Ch. See an instance of the enforcement of a covenant to repair, in Kempe v. Fitchie, 7 & 8 Eliz. 340. Even admitting the principle, that ordinarily an agreement to repair ought not itself to be specifically executed, the Court of Chancery will decree specific performance of agreements for the execution of leases containing covenants to repair. Paxton v. Newton, 2 Smale & G. 437. Yet, where the defendants contracted to perform certain work, and, as a part of the same agreement, promised to give a bond conditioned for the performance of their undertaking, inasmuch as the main agreement was not of such a character that a court of equity would compel its specific performance, the court also refused to compel the execution of the bond. South Wales Railway Co. v. Wvthes, 1 Kay & J. 186. 31 Eng. L. & Eq. 226, by the Lords Justices.