(g) Vide ante, p. * 367.

(h) Vide ante, p. *368; Pritchard v. Oyey, 1 Jacob & W. 396.

(i) Kettleby v. Atwood, 1 Vern. 298, 471; Fothergill v. Fothergill, 1 Eq. Cas. Ab. 222.

(j) Perkins v. Washington Ins. Co. 4 Cowenf 645; Lord Denman, C. J., Mead v. Davidson, 3 A. & E. 308; Carpenter v. Mutual Ins. Co. 4 Sandf. Ch. 408; Baile v. St. Joseph Ius. Co. 73 Mo 371. And after a loss, a court of equity, taking jurisdiction for the purpose of giving a specific performance of the agreement to insure, is not bound to stop by decreeing the execution of a policy, but without turning the plaintiff over to an action at law upon it. may give him full relief. Tayloe v. Merchants Fire Ins. Co. 9 How. 405.

(k) Bennet v. Abrams, 41 Barb. 619.

1 Equity will not enforce the specific performance of an agreement on the part of a lessor, contained in a lease, to repair damages caused by fire. Beck v Allison, 56 N. Y. 366, in which the English cases are discussed by Graver, J.

which the plaintiff may rationally ascribe to them, so *far as he is concerned. (l) Or where personal property is detained in breach of trust, (m)1 And where a dispute relates to many articles, and for some the plaintiff may be com* pensated in damages, and for others not, equity will enforce specific performance as to all. (n) Nor is it a ground of demurrer to a bill that it seeks specific performance of a contract which relates to personalty. (o)

It makes but little difference in the jurisdiction which equity takes, or in the relief it gives, whether the promise be positive or negative. But, technically speaking, equity decrees specific performance when the promise is positive, and injunction when it is negative, (p) It is obvious, that many promises may be in either form equally valid and effective. Thus, a promise, already * referred to, to leave manure on a farm, may just

(l) Pusey v. Pusev, 1 Vera. 273; Fellg 9. Read, 3 Ves. 70; Macclesfield v. Davis, 3 Ves. & B. 16; Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves. 95.

(m) Pooley v. Budd, 14 Beav. 34; Mc-Gowin v. Remington, 12 Pa. 56; Cowles v. Whitman, 10 Conn. 121; Mechanics Bank of Alexandria v. Seton, 1 Pet. 299, 305.

(n) McGowin v. Remington, 12 Pa. 56.

(o Carpenter v. Mutual Safety Ins. Co. 4 Sandf. Ch. 408.

(p) There are cases where a contract to do something, and the correlative contract to refrain from doing some inconsistent thing, are not the converse of one another, and where, in other words, the performance of the negative part of the agreement is not of itself the performance of the positive part. In such a case, although the nature of the act to be done is such that a specific performance of it cannot be compelled, the court may still do what it can towards compelling men to the fulfilment of their engagements, by enjoining the party from violation of the negative part of the contract. Rolfe v. Rolfe, 15 Sim. 88. The court will not indeed use the power of injunction for the purpose of indirectly accomplishing that which it is unable to effect by the direct exercise of its jurisdiction to decree specific performance; yet where there is contained in the contract a promise to refrain from doing some particular thing, affording, therefore, of itself a proper case for an injunction, an injunction will be granted; and all the more willingly, if the final consequences will probably be the performance of the whole agreement, including as well those affirmative parts, which from their nature cannot be directly enforced, as that negative promise which is the legitimate ground for the injunction. A very recent and instructive case of this kind is Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G., M. & G. 604, 13 Eng. L. & Eq. 252, where Mademoiselle Wagner had agreed with Mr. Lumley to sing at his theatre for three months, and during that time not to sing elsewhere; Lord st. Leonards, Ch. (affirming the decision of Parker, V. C), enjoined her from violating the negative stipulation not to sing at any other theatre, though he could not compel her to sing at the plaintiff's theatre. The opinion of the Lord Chancellor contains an elaborate review of the conflicting cases upon this important subject, and is worthy of particular attention. Lumley v. Wagner was recognized in Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham R. Co. 3 De G., M. & G. 927, 932. Hamblin v. Dinneford, 2 Edw. 529, is contra, but was decided when the course of English decision was different from what it now is. Where the injunction prayed is only ancillary to the enforcement of the contract, the court will not grant it, if the contract is not one which is capable of specific execution. Baldwiu r. Society for Diffusing Useful Knowledge, 9 Sim. 393; Gurley v. Hiteshue, 5 Gill, 217. And see South Wales Railway Co. v. Wythes, 1 Kay & J. 186,31 Eng L. & Eq. 226.

1 Or for the delivery of title deeds. Williams v Carpenter, 14 Col. 477; Baum's Appeal, 113 Pa. 58.

as well be a promise not to take it away; and equity would relieve in one case as well as in the other. A covenant in restraint of trade, so called, that is, not to carry on a certain business, for a certain time, in a certain place, will, if in itself just and reasonable, be enforced by injunction; (q) so will a covenant not to build on land contiguous to the plaintiff, and to his detriment, (r) or not to erect or use dangerous or annoying buildings or machinery near him;(s) or that buildings on certain land shall conform in reasonable particulars with those on the land of the promisee; (t) or that trees, which are peculiarly ornamental, or convenient to the plaintiff, shall not be cut down by the defendant, on whose land they grow, (u) And a court of equity has jurisdiction to grant a specific performance of an agreement for the purchase of a copyright (v)

Before leaving contracts for personal acts, or relating to chattels, it may not be useless to remark, that the Supreme Court of the United States appears to be less disposed than the courts of England to regard the distinction between contracts which relate to realty and those which refer only to personalty, (w) Indeed, throughout this country, there seems to be a strong tendency to subordinate this distinction, and all the more technical rules which have been enunciated in reference to this subject, to the general question, whether the plaintiff is in justice *and equity entitled to other and better relief than the law can give him. (x) In those of our States in which an equity jurisdiction was slowly and reluctantly admitted, among the earliest instances of equity power given to the courts, after that of relieving in mortgages, was that of specific performance. And