This remedy in equity is also sought in contracts for a lease, as well as for a sale of land. And equity will, for sufficient reason, direct a lease to be made and dated at a time previous to alleged breaches, that the plaintiff may have his action on the covenants, (ww)

Madd. 20; Popham v. Eyre, Lofft, 786, 814: Smedberg v. More, 26 Wend. 238; Hatch v. Cobb, 4 Johns. Ch. 559; Decamp v Feay, 5 S. & R. 326. And the express stipulation making time essential need not be contained in the written contract. Nokes v. Killmorey, 1 De G. & S. 444, an instructive case upon this subject, which however, cannot be conveniently abridged, (w) And Sir James Knight Bruce, one of those judges who adhere to the maxim, that in equity time is not of the essence of the contract, in one case had so sensibly before him the serious consequences of a disappointment in the receipt of the purchase-money at the appointed day, as to be reported as saying, *° that a purchaser not ready with the price, according to his contract, ought, I think, to show a very special case for the interference of this court against the vendor." Gee v Pearse, 2 De G. &. 8. 346. Now the injury resulting from a neglect on the part of the vendor to convey the title at the appointed day, though not perhaps so common, may be as real and as ruinous a consequence as that which is occasioned when the purchaser on his part fails to pay the money at the day. On the whole, however averse the court of equity may be to adopt the strictness of the common law, the general tendency of the modern decisions is, certainly, to confine the equitable remedy to cases where the parties applying for it have displayed a becoming promptness on their own part. Walker v. Jeffreys, 1 Hare, 348; Soutncomb v. Bishop of Exeter, 6 Hare, 213. See Rogers v. launders, 16 Me. 92; Benedict v. Lynch, 1 Johns. Ch. 370. (ww) Noonan v. Orton, 21 Wis. 283.

1 If no special circumstances indicate that the precise time fixed for performance was intended to be treated as essential, and the language of the contract does not expressly state that it shall be so treated, a court of equity will not so regard it. Van Vran ken p. Cedar Rapids, etc. R. R. Co. 55 la. 135; Austin v Wacks, 30 Minn. 335; Dvnan v. McCulloch, 46 N. J. Eq. 11; Dav v. Hunt, 112 N. Y. 191; Sylvester v Born, 132 Pa. 467; Smith's Ex. v. Profltt's Adm. 82 Va. 832; Malthv v Austin, 65 Wis 527. But if delay is wilful or there is great laches equity will give the plaintiff no relief. Stewart v. Allen, 47 Fed. Rep. 399; Beach v. Dyer, 93 111. 295; Russell r. Baughman, 94 Pa. 400. The nature or subject-matter of the contract may indicate that time is essential. Wilson v. Roots. 119 111. 379; Carter u. Phillips, 144 Mass. 100. And extrinsic evidence is admissible to show that it is essential. Quinn v. Roath, 37 Conn. 16; Thurston v. Arnold, 43 la. 43. But see Austin v. Wacks, supra Or the parties may themselves in their contract expressly agree that it shall be essential Cleary v Folger. 84 Cal. 316; Coleman v. Applegarth, 68 Md. 21; Sowles r. Hall, 62 Vt. 247. See Cheney v. Libbv, 134 U. S. 68.